American University Kyiv

A Capstone Project

DESIGNING GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AS A STRATEGIC CAPABILITY FOR MANAGING REGULATORY ISSUES

ПРОЄКТУВАННЯ GOVERNMENT RELATIONS ЯК СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ СПРОМОЖНОСТІ ДЛЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ РЕГУЛЯТОРНИМИ ПИТАННЯМИ

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how large companies organize and use Government Relations (GR) functions to manage regulatory issues and how these practices can be translated into a managerial framework. GR is viewed not only as a representational or communication activity, but as a firm-level strategic capability that connects changes in the regulatory environment to internal business decisions. The research focuses on large companies operating in Ukraine in a volatile institutional context shaped by wartime disruption, regulatory change, and European integration pressures.

The study adopts a qualitative cross-case approach based on six semi-structured interviews with senior practitioners responsible for GR or closely related functions. The interview material was analyzed through thematic coding in order to identify recurring organizational patterns and differences across cases.

The findings indicate that companies organize GR in markedly different ways. Some rely on fragmented and reactive arrangements, while others use more formalized and strategically integrated models. Stronger GR models are associated with earlier issue detection, clearer prioritization, better cross-functional coordination, more deliberate stakeholder engagement, and closer integration with management decision-making. Weaker models tend to remain person-dependent, weakly formalized, and late in their involvement.

Based on these findings, the study develops a practical framework for designing and improving GR as a strategic capability for managing regulatory issues. The framework combines structural, process, and enabling dimensions and includes a three-level maturity logic. The study contributes to theory by clarifying GR as a firm-level strategic capability and offers a context-sensitive managerial tool for firms operating under regulatory uncertainty.

Keywords: government relations, non-market strategy, regulatory issue management, dynamic capabilities, corporate political activity, Ukraine

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPA — Corporate Political Activity

EU — European Union

GR — Government Relations

KPI — Key Performance Indicator

OECD — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SOE — State-Owned Enterprise

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Large firms do not operate only in market environments. They also face political and regulatory conditions that determine how they compete, invest, expand their operations, and respond to risks. In practice, this means that regulations are more than just legal or compliance concerns. They often become management challenges early on, especially when regulatory changes affect costs, market access, licensing, standards, taxes, or overall business stability. Companies exposed to regulatory change therefore need internal mechanisms for identifying relevant changes, interpreting their business implications, and organizing a timely response.

This challenge is especially clear in Ukraine. Companies there face wartime disruptions, rapid institutional change, and growing pressure to meet European regulatory standards. As a result, the regulatory environment is both more unpredictable and more important for business strategy. Given this, firms need some way of spotting important changes early, understanding what they mean, and organizing their responses before these issues become urgent or serious obstacles.

In reality, companies handle this task differently. Some have a clear Government Relations (GR) function, some don't, while others spread the work among legal, communications, compliance, or senior managers. In some cases, GR is present but not as a stable organizational capability. This difference is important. A company might have enough external contacts to fix individual problems but still lack an internal structure to manage regulatory issues consistently.

The main problem this thesis addresses is not whether companies interact with the government, as that is already well known in both practice and research. Instead, the focus is on how GR is organized within companies and why some GR models seem to handle regulatory issues better than others.

This matters because companies manage regulatory risks in different ways. Some only react after a problem becomes clear or politically sensitive, while others can spot changes earlier, set better priorities, coordinate effectively across functions, and involve senior management before issues escalate. These differences show that effective regulatory management depends not only on external factors but also on how the GR function is organized and integrated within the company.

Research shows why it is important for companies to engage with the regulatory and political environment. However, it is less clear about how to design GR as a strategic part of a company. This gap is especially important in places like Ukraine, where changing institutions make both the need for GR and the challenge of organizing it even greater.

With this background, the main research question for this study is:

How do large companies organize and use GR functions to manage regulatory issues, and how can these practices be translated into a framework to enhance managerial effectiveness?

The object of the study is the organization of Government Relations functions in large companies operating in Ukraine.

The subject of the study is the internal design of GR as a strategic capability for managing regulatory issues, including its mandate, organizational placement, regulatory issue sensing, prioritization, escalation, cross-functional coordination, stakeholder engagement, and integration into management decision-making.

The study is guided by one main research assumption and three supporting assumptions, which are presented in Section 2.6 as part of the analytical framework and assessed through the qualitative methodology described in Chapter 3. These assumptions will be examined through interview evidence, thematic coding, and cross-case comparison.

To answer this question, the thesis has four main goals. First, it examines how large companies define, set up, and use GR in practice. Second, it identifies key differences between reactive and more strategic GR models. Third, it explores which parts of an organization influence how well regulatory issues are managed. Fourth, it uses these findings to create a practical framework for designing and improving GR functions.

The study focuses on large companies in Ukraine across several sectors with varying degrees of regulation. The primary focus is not on the relationship between business and government in the broadest sense, but rather on the GR function at the company level and its organizational logic.

The main focus is the GR function within each company. In practice, this role may be filled by a Head of GR, a Legal Director, a Public Affairs lead, a Communications executive, or, in some cases, by senior managers such as the CEO or Deputy CEO. The study does not assume there is only one way to organize GR. Instead, it recognizes that the function can be more or less formal and more or less integrated into the company.

This thesis uses a qualitative, design-focused research approach. It relies on semi-structured interviews with experienced professionals who handle GR or similar roles in large companies. These interviews help document current practices and compare how different firms organize and use GR to manage regulatory issues.

The data is analyzed using comparative thematic coding. This helps identify common organizational patterns and distinguish between reactive, developing, and more strategic GR models. The study is also practical in its approach: it goes beyond just describing what happens and uses the findings to build a managerial framework based on both theory and real-world evidence.

The study aims to contribute both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it clarifies how GR can be viewed as a strategic capability within a company, not just as a support function or part of external affairs. It connects research on non-market strategy, corporate political activity, organizational design, and capability development to a practical discussion of how GR works inside companies. This approach matches the proposal and analysis developed later in the thesis.

Practically, the study provides a framework for designing and improving GR functions in uncertain regulatory environments. This framework is intended as a practical, evidence-based tool for managers, not just a theoretical model. It aims to help companies clarify roles, structure, issue detection, priority setting, cross-functional management, stakeholder engagement, and the broader conditions that make GR more stable and effective over time. This is the main practical result expected from the research.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and builds the study's analytical framework. Chapter 3 explains the methodology and research design. Chapter 4 presents the results of the cross-case analysis. Chapter 5 develops a managerial framework grounded in the literature and research findings. The thesis concludes by answering the research question, assessing the research assumptions, and outlining the study's limitations and possible future research directions.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Non-market strategy as the broader lens

Companies operate not only within their own markets but also within a broader non-market environment, which includes government institutions and the regulatory framework. Market access, competitive conditions and decisions regarding long-term investments often depend on these factors. This is precisely why interaction with the state cannot be viewed merely as a matter of compliance or external communications. In strategic management, it increasingly plays the role of a fully-fledged management tool (Baron, 1995; Mellahi et al., 2016).

More recent non-market strategy research also emphasizes the importance of institutional perspectives, political management capabilities, and the interaction between market and non-market arenas (Doh et al., 2012; Henisz, 2000; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).

Baron's idea of an integrated strategy stems from a simple premise: companies create and defend competitive advantages not only through market competition, but also through interaction with the state, regulatory bodies, the courts, the media, civil society and activist groups (Baron, 1995). And these are not merely external factors, but an arena of interaction where companies make decisions and bear the consequences. He argues that market and non-market strategies must be integrated to achieve the company's objectives and adapted to the company's market and non-market environments, as well as to its competencies, and that this can be just as important for the company's performance as market actions (Baron, 1995).

Risks and opportunities in the non-market environment directly influence the success of market strategy, as regulatory decisions can alter the rules of competition, political processes can open or close markets, and public pressure can render a market strategy unacceptable or impossible. The interrelationships between the market and non-market environments mean that responsibility for the company's performance in the non-market environment lies not only with those specialising in relations with public authorities, but also with the managers responsible for performance in the market environment (Baron, 1995; Mellahi et al., 2016). Consequently, this function should be viewed not as a support function, but as a strategic component of company management.

The non-market environment is characterized by four "I's": issues, institutions, interests, and information (Baron, 1995). Issues refer to the specific problems that non-market strategies address. Institutions are the stakeholders—such as government bodies—that have formal decision-making authority over these issues. Interests are individuals and groups that have preferences regarding a given issue or a stake in its outcome. Information concerns what interested parties know or believe about the relationship between actions and their consequences, as well as about the preferences and capabilities of other interested parties.

Subsequent authors have developed this perspective further. Mellahi and his co-authors demonstrate that non-market strategies can create value in several ways: by protecting companies from adverse institutional pressures, by building relationships and strengthening legitimacy, and by more directly influencing regulatory and political outcomes (Mellahi et al., 2016) This broader view is important because it takes the discussion beyond a narrow focus on political activity alone. It emphasises that non-market strategy can serve a variety of purposes — from creating a protective buffer to more proactive efforts to shape the external environment.

For this thesis, the key implication of non-market strategy research is that engagement with government should be understood as a strategic management task rather than as an ancillary communication or compliance activity (Baron, 1995; Mellahi et al., 2016). This creates a further question: how this task is organized inside firms and how it becomes connected to managerial decision-making.

2.2. Defining the scope of terminology: government relations, public relations, lobbying, and regulatory affairs

In the academic literature, terminology in this field is used inconsistently. Although government relations (GR), public relations, lobbying, and regulatory affairs are interrelated, they are not identical organizational functions. This study therefore narrows the focus to the company-level function responsible for identifying, interpreting, and managing regulatory issues through interaction with public authorities, sectoral stakeholders, and internal decision-makers.

Lobbying is usually the narrowest of these concepts. As a rule, it refers to specific attempts to influence political decisions during the drafting, amendment, or adoption of bills or other regulatory acts. In such cases, the target of influence is the authorities or their representatives who are directly involved in preparing and adopting these decisions, while the entity exerting influence is a company, association or external lobbyist with a specific, defined objective regarding the subject of regulation. Although lobbying is an important aspect of activities aimed at engaging with the government, it does not encompass the wider governance responsibilities that frequently accompany such work (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). Lobbying represents only a small part of how companies interact with government. In contrast, GR usually involves broader, more continuous engagement.

Regulatory affairs tend to focus on the practical side of regulation: understanding specific rules, interpreting legal requirements, and ensuring the company remains compliant. This is particularly important in heavily regulated industries, where even small mistakes can have serious consequences. However, this focus remains largely technical and does not cover the wider set of activities usually associated with GR. GR extends to stakeholder engagement, policy interpretation, political analysis of regulatory changes, and interaction with government bodies that goes beyond compliance issues (Coen & Vannoni, 2020; Lawton et al., 2013). Consequently, a company may have significant experience in regulatory matters. However, this may not be sufficient for the systematic management of regulatory issues. In such cases, there is a lack of a wider function that links legislative changes to the company's strategy. There may also be a lack of connection with external positioning or with internal problem-solving processes.

In this study, GR is understood as a company-wide function that manages interactions with government and regulatory stakeholders and supports the strategic resolution of regulatory issues. In narrower forms, it may involve practical support or selective lobbying, while in broader forms it includes early issue identification, internal coordination, stakeholder engagement, and close links to management decision making. This functional definition allows adaptation across firms while clearly distinguishing GR from lobbying and from compliance-oriented regulatory affairs

If GR is understood as a broader organizational function, the question is whether it is merely external action or an internal management capability. This is important because firms may engage public authorities without a stable GR capability. The next section shifts to the organizational logic of government-facing activity

2.3. Engagement with the government as an organizational capability

Research on corporate political activity (CPA) shows that firms do not engage with public authorities only as a passive response to regulation. They make deliberate managerial choices about whether to engage, which issues to prioritize, which actors to address, and which forms of participation to use (Getz, 1997; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004).

In this literature, political activity is therefore treated as a strategic and managerial phenomenon rather than as an automatic reaction to the external environment (Lawton et al., 2013; Lux et al., 2011).

A useful starting point is the distinction between transactional and relational political engagement. Transactional approaches focus on individual issues, short-term interventions, or specific regulatory outcomes. Relational approaches, by contrast, rely on long-term interaction, credibility, trust, information exchange, and repeated engagement with public actors (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). This distinction is important for this study because it already points to differences in GR maturity. Some companies may engage with the state episodically and reactively, while others build a more continuous and embedded government-facing presence.

CPA literature also shows that political behavior cannot be understood only through tactics. CPA depends on the institutional and organizational context in which it is embedded (Lawton et al., 2013). This moves the discussion from the question of what firms do politically to the question of how they are organized to do it. For a study of GR, this shift is essential because regulatory issue management depends also on how information, priorities, responsibilities, and decisions are structured within the company.

The government affairs literature develops this internal perspective further. Coen and Vannoni (2020), in their study of EU-level government affairs in Brussels, treat government affairs as a distinct firm-level function rather than as a generic category of political behavior. Their work shows that effectiveness depends on internal design choices such as specialized in-house staff, sector-specific expertise, credible technical information, long-term presence, and coordination with other company functions (Coen & Vannoni, 2020).

Taken together, these directions of research suggest that the way firms structure and manage their government-facing activities is part of the explanation for differences in regulatory issue management (Lawton et al., 2013; Coen & Vannoni, 2020; Lux et al., 2011). For this thesis, this supports a capability-oriented view of GR: GR is not only an external engagement activity, but also an internal organizational capacity for detecting, interpreting, prioritizing, and managing regulatory issues.

2.4. Dynamic Capabilities and Regulatory Issue Management

At this stage, the literature review requires an approach that links external regulatory uncertainty with how companies respond to it inside the organization. The theory of dynamic capabilities is useful here because it explains how firms adapt to changing conditions by developing internal processes for identifying, interpreting, and responding to external change. Regulatory conditions rarely remain stable and often change unevenly, so companies must be able to recognize relevant changes early, assess their implications, and organize an appropriate response.

The dynamic capabilities literature is commonly associated with three interrelated processes: sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007, 2014). Sensing refers to identifying and interpreting changes in the external environment. Seizing refers to selecting and responding to the most relevant opportunities or threats. Reconfiguring refers to adjusting internal resources, structures, and routines as conditions change.

Although this concept was not developed specifically for regulation or GR, it is useful for analyzing regulatory issue management. Legislative and regulatory changes can be urgent, politically contingent, and costly for firms if interpreted too late or managed poorly. Companies therefore need more than awareness of regulatory developments. They need internal routines that allow them to detect relevant changes, determine which issues deserve management attention, coordinate internal responses, and engage external stakeholders when necessary.

From this perspective, GR can be understood as an adaptive organizational capability that connects external regulatory change with internal managerial response. This moves the discussion beyond treating GR as a support function that becomes involved only after a problem has already become visible. Instead, GR can be analyzed as a mechanism that helps the company identify relevant changes in time, focus management attention on priority issues, and coordinate action across internal and external stakeholders.

In this study, the dynamic capabilities lens is used not as a ready-made model for organizing GR, but as an analytical language for understanding how companies connect external regulatory change with internal organizational response. In the empirical analysis, sensing is reflected in regulatory intelligence and early issue detection; seizing is reflected in prioritization, escalation, and stakeholder engagement; and reconfiguring is reflected in cross-functional coordination, adjustment of internal responsibilities, and the institutionalization of GR routines.

This capability-based interpretation also explains how this study differs from broader research on public relations or political activity. The focus here is also on the internal organizational capability that enables such interaction to be strategic, timely, and aligned with management decision-making. The next section therefore turns to the organizational design dimensions through which this capability can be structured inside the firm.

2.5. Organizational design dimensions of Government Relations

If GR is viewed as a capability rather than merely a set of external actions, then the internal organization of this function becomes central to the analysis. It matters how government-facing work is positioned inside the company, how responsibilities are distributed, how regulatory issues are processed, and how external engagement is connected to internal decision-making. This is where the existing literature becomes less specific. Broader non-market strategy and CPA research explains why firms engage politically and why such engagement may create value, but it provides less guidance on what needs to be organized inside the company for GR to function as a stable and effective capability (Lawton et al., 2013; Mellahi et al., 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).

One of the first design questions concerns the role and mandate of GR. The literature clearly supports the strategic relevance of government-facing activity, but it is less precise in defining the internal scope of the function itself. In practice, a firm may use GR narrowly, as support, troubleshooting, or selective advocacy. It may also use it more broadly, as a function that interprets regulatory change, helps shape strategic responses, and connects the external environment to internal decision-making. This difference matters because the mandate assigned to GR influences whether it remains a reactive support activity or becomes part of strategic management.

A second issue concerns structural placement, staffing, and expertise. Coen and Vannoni are especially useful in this respect because their analysis comes closest to the organizational object of this study. Their research on government affairs in Brussels suggests that effectiveness depends not only on the external political setting, but also on what firms build internally: dedicated in-house staffing, specialized expertise, technically credible information, and structured coordination with other functions. This shifts the discussion away from the idea that government-facing work is mainly about access or personal connections. In their account, government affairs appears as a professionally managed function with specific organizational requirements (Coen & Vannoni, 2020). Earlier research on corporate political entrepreneurship also shows how firms professionalized political activity and developed internal capacities for managing political advantage (Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985).

Structure alone, however, does not explain how GR works in practice. Internal design also includes the way regulatory issues are handled: how they are identified, interpreted, prioritized, escalated, and coordinated across the firm. Lawton et al. (2013) are relevant here because they argue that CPA remains theoretically fragmented and that the CPA function itself is still an underexplained variable in firm-level strategic decision-making. Mellahi et al. (2016) make a similar point from a broader non-market strategy perspective. The implication is that firms may recognize the strategic importance of regulatory engagement while still lacking a clear internal logic for organizing it.

The same applies to stakeholder engagement and effectiveness. External influence depends not only on whether a company has access to public authorities, but also on whether it can generate credible information, coordinate internal knowledge, maintain continuity, and connect external engagement to business priorities. The literature therefore provides several important design elements for understanding GR: role definition, organizational placement, professional expertise, cross-functional coordination, stakeholder engagement, and the connection between GR and senior decision-making. However, these elements are often discussed separately. What remains underdeveloped is an integrated design view that brings them together into a coherent architecture of GR as a firm-level capability for managing regulatory issues.

2.6. Literature gap and analytical framework

The previous sections show that four main theories are particularly relevant to this study. Non-market strategy explains why engagement with political and regulatory actors is part of business strategy rather than a peripheral activity (Baron, 1995; Mellahi et al., 2016). Institutional theory explains why regulatory issues are shaped by formal and informal rules, uncertainty, and institutional change (North, 1990; Henisz, 2000). CPA and government affairs literature shows that firms approach public actors deliberately and that the internal organization of government-facing activity affects how such engagement works (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lawton et al., 2013; Coen & Vannoni, 2020). Dynamic capabilities provide a useful lens for understanding how firms sense, interpret, and respond to changing environments through internal organizational processes (Teece et al., 1997).

However, across these strands, one issue remains insufficiently addressed: how engagement with government is developed and managed as a strategic capability at the company level. Existing literature explains why non-market strategy and corporate political activity matter, but provides less guidance on how GR should be structured internally in order to support systematic regulatory issue management. This gap is not only theoretical, but also managerial. The literature identifies the importance of political and regulatory engagement, but it does not provide a sufficiently integrated explanation of how companies should organize the internal architecture of GR: its mandate, reporting line, authority, issue-sensing routines, prioritization logic, cross-functional coordination, stakeholder engagement model, and institutional memory. As a result, existing research helps explain why firms need non-market engagement, but gives less practical guidance on how GR becomes a stable internal capability for managing regulatory issues before they escalate. Coen and Vannoni (2020) come closest to an empirical answer by examining firm-level government affairs in Brussels, but their evidence comes from a relatively stable EU-level context and does not fully explain how such organizational logics operate in more volatile institutional settings.

This issue is especially relevant in Ukraine. Large companies operating in Ukraine face wartime disruption, frequent regulatory change, institutional uncertainty, and pressure connected with European integration. In such conditions, GR may also become an internal capability that helps the company detect regulatory issues earlier, interpret their business relevance, coordinate responses across functions, and connect external regulatory change to management decisions.

Additional research reinforces the importance of firm-specific capabilities under institutional uncertainty. Bonardi et al. (2006) argue that non-market outcomes depend not only on the external political environment, but also on companies' internal capabilities for managing political transaction costs. Okhmatovskiy (2010) shows that ties to the government can create both advantages and constraints, which means that their value depends on how they are structured and governed inside the firm. These arguments support the view that GR should be examined as an organizational arrangement with its own structure, processes, routines, and governance logic.

Research question, sub-questions, and research assumptions. The main research question guiding this study is:

How do large companies organize and use GR functions to manage regulatory issues, and how can these practices be translated into a framework to enhance managerial effectiveness?

To answer this question, the study addresses the following research sub-questions:

RQ1: How are GR functions positioned, formalized, and integrated inside large companies?

RQ2: How do companies identify, prioritize, escalate, and coordinate regulatory issues internally?

RQ3: What organizational features distinguish more reactive GR models from more strategic and integrated GR models?

RQ4: How can the observed practices be translated into a practical framework for designing GR as a strategic capability?

The study is guided by the following main research assumption:

If a large company has a more developed and strategically integrated GR function, then it is more likely to manage regulatory issues effectively.

In this study, effective regulatory issue management is understood through qualitative indicators such as earlier issue detection, clearer prioritization, stronger cross-functional coordination, more credible stakeholder engagement, and closer integration with management decision-making.

The main research assumption is developed through three supporting assumptions:

Supporting assumption on mandate and senior management access: If GR has a clear mandate, formal organizational placement, and access to senior management, then regulatory issues are more likely to be identified and escalated before they become urgent or costly.

Supporting assumption on cross-functional coordination: If GR is supported by structured cross-functional coordination, then the company is more likely to develop coherent and credible positions on regulatory issues.

Supporting assumption on institutionalization and continuity: If GR routines are institutionalized rather than dependent mainly on individual relationships, then the company is more likely to maintain continuity and strategic adaptability in regulatory issue management.

Since the research uses a qualitative cross-case design, these assumptions are not tested statistically. They are assessed through recurring patterns in the six interview cases and through comparison of GR models across companies.

Building on this, the study adopts a capability-oriented view of GR. Instead of focusing only on what firms do in the political arena, it examines how GR is defined, structured, integrated, and institutionalized inside companies, and how these design choices affect the management of regulatory issues. Based on the literature reviewed above, the study uses the following analytical dimensions:

1. Role definition and strategic positioning — how the company defines GR and whether it is treated as a support, problem-solving, representational, or strategic function.

2. Structural placement and formalization — where GR is located in the organizational structure, whether it has a formal mandate, and whether responsibility is concentrated in a defined role or dispersed across other functions.

3. Regulatory issue sensing — how the company identifies regulatory changes, policy initiatives, risks, opportunities, and early warning signals.

4. Prioritization and escalation — how regulatory issues are assessed, ranked, escalated, and translated into management attention.

5. Cross-functional coordination — how GR works with legal, compliance, communications, operations, finance, strategy, and senior management.

6. Stakeholder engagement architecture — how the company organizes external interaction with public authorities, business associations, regulators, local government, sectoral actors, and other relevant stakeholders.

7. Integration into management decision-making — whether GR is involved early enough in strategic, operational, investment, and risk-related decisions.

8. Effectiveness and outcome logic — how the company understands the value of GR, including prevention of risks, reduction of regulatory uncertainty, improved timing of responses, protection of business interests, and contribution to strategic objectives.

9. Institutionalization versus person-dependence — whether GR depends mainly on individual relationships and informal experience or is supported by routines, processes, documentation, role clarity, and organizational memory.

These dimensions provide the basis for the cross-case analysis in Chapter 4 and the managerial framework developed in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design and Approach

This study employs a qualitative, design-oriented cross-case approach to examine how large companies organize and use GR functions to manage regulatory issues. A qualitative design is appropriate because the research question focuses on organizational meanings, internal processes, managerial practices, and cross-case patterns that cannot be captured adequately through quantitative indicators alone. The aim is not to statistically test causal relationships, but to understand how GR functions operate in practice and how their design can inform a practical managerial framework.

The design-oriented logic of the study reflects its practical aim: to develop a GR Capability Framework grounded in empirical interview evidence. The interviews therefore provide the basis also for identifying recurring patterns, gaps, maturity differences, and design elements that inform the framework developed in Chapter 5.

This approach is also consistent with the practical orientation of the capstone project. The study does not aim only to describe existing GR practices, but to use qualitative evidence to identify design elements that can inform a managerial framework.

The selected methodology is directly linked to the research assumptions. Since these assumptions concern organizational design, internal processes, coordination mechanisms, and managerial perceptions of GR effectiveness, they cannot be adequately assessed through quantitative indicators alone. Semi-structured interviews make it possible to collect evidence on how GR is positioned, how regulatory issues are identified and escalated, how internal coordination works, and whether GR routines are institutionalized or person-dependent. Thematic coding then allows these interview responses to be organized into recurring analytical categories, including mandate, formalization, senior management access, sensing, prioritization, cross-functional coordination, stakeholder engagement, effectiveness logic, and institutionalization. Cross-case comparison makes it possible to examine whether these patterns recur across different companies and whether stronger GR models are associated with more effective regulatory issue management. In this way, the methodology provides a basis for assessing the extent to which the research assumptions are reflected in the qualitative evidence and recurring cross-case patterns, rather than for statistically confirming or rejecting them.

3.2 Unit of Analysis and Participant Selection

The unit of analysis in this study is the company-level GR function, however labelled or formally organized, rather than the company as a whole. This choice reflects the project's central argument: GR should be understood also as an internal organizational capability that helps a company identify, interpret, prioritize, and manage regulatory issues.

This focus made it possible to examine how GR is actually organized inside companies: how its role is defined, where it is placed in the organizational structure, how it interacts with other departments, how regulatory issues are escalated, and how external engagement is connected to internal decision-making. The emphasis is therefore not on individual lobbying activities or isolated regulatory episodes, but on the internal architecture through which companies manage regulatory change.

The study does not assume that GR has the same formal structure in every company. In some firms, it exists as a separate department or role. In others, GR-related responsibilities are integrated into legal, communications/PR, compliance, or senior management. This variation was important for the research because it allowed comparison between more formalized and less formalized ways of organizing the same underlying function.

Interview participants were selected purposively. The aim was not to build a statistically representative sample, but to reach respondents who could explain how GR or GR-related responsibilities work at the company level. The empirical material consists of six semi-structured interviews with senior professionals from large companies operating in Ukraine. Each respondent had direct knowledge of the company's GR arrangements, including the role of the function, its organizational placement, coordination mechanisms, interaction with management, and involvement in regulatory issue management.

Respondents were selected on the basis of functional equivalence rather than identical job titles. This means that they did not necessarily hold the same formal position, but they performed comparable responsibilities or had comparable insight into how GR was organized. In some cases, GR existed as a formal function. In others, it was embedded in legal, communications, executive, or hybrid responsibilities. This approach was useful because one of the study's objectives was precisely to understand how different organizational forms affect GR maturity and regulatory issue management.

The key selection criteria were that the respondent had to occupy a senior or expert role connected to GR or regulatory issue management; have direct knowledge of interaction with public authorities or regulatory stakeholders; be able to discuss GR at a company-wide level rather than only in relation to isolated tasks; and represent a large company operating in Ukraine.

The number of interviews is limited, but this limitation is connected to the nature of the research field. The study focuses on a relatively narrow group of large companies in Ukraine where GR is either formalized or performed by senior managers as part of regulatory issue management. In addition, the internal organization of GR is rarely visible from outside the company. Decision-making routines, stakeholder engagement practices, and escalation mechanisms are usually known only to a small number of senior managers or specialists. For this reason, access to relevant respondents depended on professional networks and on the possibility of conducting interviews in a setting where respondents were willing to speak in detail about internal organizational practices.

By the fifth and sixth interviews, the main analytical dimensions had begun to repeat across cases, especially in relation to role definition, organizational placement, regulatory sensing, prioritization, cross-functional coordination, stakeholder engagement, and strategic integration. This does not make the findings statistically representative. However, it suggests sufficient thematic saturation for the exploratory and design-oriented purpose of the study, especially because the goal is to develop a preliminary managerial framework rather than to generalize quantitatively to all companies in Ukraine.

3.3 Data Collection

The primary method of data collection is semi-structured interviews. This method was chosen because the study focuses on strategic and organisational issues, which are typically only accessible to experienced specialists. Issues such as the placement of the GR function, the involvement of senior management, the logic of cross-functional coordination, or the internal prioritization process in the regulatory sphere are not always reflected in public documents and are often best understood through interviews with knowledgeable individuals.

Semi-structured interviews are particularly useful in this context as they combine structure with flexibility. On the one hand, they allow the researcher to ask all respondents the same core questions, which facilitates comparison between cases. On the other hand, they leave respondents room to explain company-specific mechanisms and highlight aspects of practice that may not have been fully anticipated in advance.

As respondents were senior professionals with limited availability, the interviews were designed to last approximately 30-40 minutes. For this reason, the interview guide is focused and concise. It is structured around a limited number of key questions covering the most important aspects of the study: the role and purpose of GR, the method of identifying and prioritizing regulatory issues, the organisational placement of the function, its interaction with legal, compliance, communications and business functions, the level of senior management involvement, as well as the respondent’s views on what makes GR more or less effective in practice. A detailed list of the questions is provided in Appendix A.

The interview guide was designed to generate evidence relevant to each research assumption. Questions on the role, mandate, and organizational placement of GR were used to examine the assumption on mandate and senior management access. Questions on issue identification, prioritization, escalation, and cooperation with other departments were used to examine the assumption on cross-functional coordination. Questions on routines, documentation, continuity, and dependence on individual relationships were used to examine the assumption on institutionalization and continuity. The overall comparison of these dimensions across the six cases was used to assess the main research assumption.

Before each interview, the respondent received a brief explanation of the study's purpose and the expected duration of the conversation. It was explained that the interview was part of an academic project and that the focus was on organizational practices rather than confidential details of specific politically sensitive interactions. Interviews were conducted individually, either in person or remotely. With the respondent's permission, interviews were audio-recorded to ensure accuracy. Where necessary, additional written notes were taken to capture contextual observations and immediate analytical reflections.

For the purposes of this study, all audio recordings were transcribed using the Turboscribe.ai service, preserving the full logic and structure of the dialogue. The resulting set of transcribed data forms the empirical basis for the coding and analytical procedures outlined in the following section.

Ethical considerations were observed at every stage of data collection, including respondent anonymity, voluntary participation, careful and systematic data processing, and the use of the material exclusively for academic purposes.

3.4 Analytical Approach

The empirical data were analyzed using comparative thematic analysis. This method was appropriate because the aim of the study was to identify recurring organizational patterns across different cases rather than to produce a separate descriptive account of each company. Thematic analysis made it possible to structure the interview material around common categories and then compare how these categories appeared across different GR arrangements.

The coding process combined deductive and inductive elements. Deductive codes were derived from the research question, working proposition, and analytical framework developed in the literature review. These initial categories included role definition, structural placement, regulatory issue sensing, prioritization and escalation, cross-functional coordination, strategic integration, stakeholder engagement, effectiveness logic, and institutionalization. These categories reflected the main dimensions through which GR was conceptualized as a firm-level capability.

At the same time, the coding process remained open to inductive refinement. Some subthemes emerged from the interview material itself, including person-dependence, informal coordination, late involvement of GR, reliance on associations, executive-level access, and the difference between reactive troubleshooting and proactive regulatory agenda-setting. These themes were not treated as isolated observations; they were used to refine the broader analytical categories and to capture differences in how GR actually operated across cases.

The analysis proceeded in several steps. First, each interview transcript was read closely to identify passages related to the organization and use of GR. Second, relevant passages were coded according to the initial deductive categories and emerging inductive subthemes. Third, short case-level analytical notes were prepared to summarize the main features of each case. Fourth, the cases were compared across the core dimensions in order to identify recurring patterns, contrasts, and tensions. This cross-case comparison formed the basis for the empirical findings presented in Chapter 4.

For example, statements describing situations where GR became involved only after a regulatory issue had already escalated were initially coded as "late involvement" or "reactive response." During refinement, these were grouped under the broader category of "regulatory issue sensing and escalation." Across cases, this category helped distinguish between reactive or monitoring-based GR arrangements and more anticipatory models in which GR was involved earlier in identifying, interpreting, and prioritizing regulatory issues.

The final coding structure was directly connected to the analytical dimensions used in Chapter 4: role definition, structural placement, sensing, prioritization, cross-functional coordination, strategic integration, stakeholder architecture, effectiveness logic, and institutionalization. These dimensions also informed the framework developed in Chapter 5. In this way, the methodology provides a basis for assessing whether the research assumptions are supported, partially supported, or not supported through qualitative evidence rather than statistical measurement.

Consequently, the ultimate aim of the analysis was twofold. First, it sought to explain how GR is currently organized and applied in large companies operating in Ukraine. Second, it provided an empirical basis for transforming these observations into a structured managerial framework for addressing regulatory issues.

3.5 Ethical considerations and limitations

The aim of this study is analytical and practical rather than statistical. It does not seek to draw generalised quantitative conclusions about all companies operating in Ukraine. Instead, it seeks to provide informed insights into how GR functions are organized in practice and which organisational features appear to contribute to more effective management of regulatory issues.

Given the sensitivity of GR-related work, confidentiality was an important methodological and ethical consideration. The study does not disclose the names of companies or respondents and does not analyze confidential details of specific political, regulatory, or commercial interactions. The interviews were used to understand organizational practices, roles, processes, and managerial perceptions rather than to evaluate individual companies or specific advocacy campaigns.

The analytical process was made transparent by linking the coding categories directly to the research question, the literature-based analytical framework, and the cross-case comparison presented in Chapter 4. This helped ensure that the findings were not based only on selected examples, but on recurring patterns across the interview material.

The study has several limitations. The group of respondents is limited and was selected purposively, so the findings cannot be interpreted as statistically representative of all companies operating in Ukraine. The study is also based on self-reports from experienced professionals, which may involve selective recall, subjective interpretation, or a tendency to present the company's practices in a favorable way. Another limitation is that effectiveness is assessed qualitatively through organizational practices and managerial perceptions, rather than through direct quantitative measurement of regulatory outcomes or business performance. Finally, because the research focuses on large companies, its findings may not fully apply to small and medium-sized firms with fewer resources and less formalized GR arrangements.

Researcher positionality was also relevant to the study. The researcher has professional familiarity with GR practice in Ukraine, which helped in understanding the terminology, context, and practical significance of the respondents' answers. At the same time, this familiarity created a potential risk of confirmation bias, especially because the study starts from the proposition that more strategically integrated GR functions are more likely to support effective regulatory issue management. To mitigate this risk, the analysis relied on a semi-structured interview guide, explicit coding categories derived from the literature, systematic cross-case comparison, and attention to less developed, fragmented, reactive, and person-dependent GR arrangements as well as more strategic models.

These limitations are important, but they do not undermine the value of the research design. For the purposes of this capstone project, elite interviews remain the most appropriate method, as the research concerns strategic roles, management mechanisms and internal coordination processes that are difficult to capture by other means.

In the final written work, respondents, companies or specific quotations were anonymised. The interview guide itself was designed to minimise ethical and professional risks by focusing on organisational models and management processes, rather than on confidential details of lobbying or legally sensitive information. This allows for the collection of meaningful data while maintaining an appropriate level of professional and ethical caution.

Reliance on professional access may have introduced a degree of selection bias, as respondents were more likely to be individuals willing to discuss GR practices openly. This limitation was mitigated by anonymization, the use of a semi-structured interview guide, and cross-case comparison rather than reliance on any single respondent’s account.

CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

4.1. Analytical positioning and focus of the chapter

This chapter presents the empirical findings of the study and looks at GR as a company-level function that firms in Ukraine organize in quite different ways. The aim is not to present the interviews as separate narratives, but to analyze how companies build and use GR, how closely it is connected to decision-making, and where different organizational models begin to diverge. This matters because the study also examines which GR design features appear to support more effective regulatory issue management under conditions of pressure and uncertainty. That follows the logic of the research proposal, which treats GR as more than a representational function and instead sees it as a capability that links changes in the regulatory environment to decisions inside the firm.

For that reason, the chapter is written as a cross-case analysis rather than as six separate company stories. Read one by one, the interviews show different organizational realities. Read together, they show something more useful: recurring variation in how firms define GR, where they place it, how early they detect issues, how they prioritize them, how they coordinate internally, and how seriously they treat the function as part of management.

4.2. Analytical procedure and coding logic

The interview material was first coded at the level of individual cases and then brought into a comparative matrix. This step was analytically important. Some patterns were visible already in the transcripts, but others only became clear once the cases were placed next to each other and compared across the same dimensions. In practical terms, the analysis moved from transcripts to coded case summaries, then to a consolidated matrix, and only after that to cross-case themes and emerging models.

The coding was theory-informed, especially by the capability-based framing of the study, but it was not simply imposed on the material. In several places, the interviews pushed the analysis in a more specific direction than the initial conceptual framing did. That is especially true for internal coordination, person dependence, and the difference between having stakeholder access and having a real stakeholder architecture. So the structure below still follows the broader argument of the project, but the more practical organizational logic comes directly from the interviews and from the matrix built around them.

Table 4.1 summarizes the main dimensions used to compare the six cases. These dimensions emerged from the coding process and were used to organize the cross-case analysis presented below.

Table 4.1

Compact Codebook for Qualitative Analysis

Core dimension	**Analytical focus**	**Why it matters for the study**
Role of GR	How the company defines the main purpose of GR: support-oriented, hybrid, or strategic	Helps distinguish whether GR is treated as a service function or as a strategic capability
Organizational design	Level of formalization, structural placement, reporting line, and stability of the function	Shows whether GR exists as a durable organizational arrangement or mainly through individual effort
Sensing regulatory issues	How the company identifies regulatory developments, emerging risks, and policy signals	Captures the "sensing" element of GR as a capability
Seizing / prioritization and escalation	How issues are filtered, ranked, escalated, and selected for action	Shows whether GR relies on ad hoc reaction or on clearer managerial logic
Cross-functional coordination	How GR works with legal, finance, communications, operations, and senior management	Indicates whether the function can organize coordinated internal responses to regulatory issues
Strategic integration	How early and how deeply GR is involved in management decision-making	Shows whether GR is peripheral, selectively consulted, or strategically embedded
Stakeholder engagement model / architecture	Main external engagement logic: association-led, relational, institutional-relational, or proactive	Helps compare how firms build influence, access, and legitimacy
Effectiveness logic	How the company understands and assesses GR results	Indicates whether GR is managed through intuitive recognition, partial outcomes, or more explicit result logic
Pain points	Recurring internal and external constraints that weaken the function	Helps identify where GR design remains underdeveloped
Ukrainian context	Role of war, eurointegration, volatility, and regulatory change in shaping GR	Explains why GR becomes more visible, urgent, or institutionalized among the interviewed companies
GR model / maturity	Overall configuration of the function across the above dimensions	Supports cross-case comparison and model-building in the findings chapter

Note. The table summarizes the main analytical dimensions used to compare the six interview cases. It is intended as a reader-facing guide to the structure of the findings chapter rather than as a full coding manual.

These dimensions structure the remainder of Chapter 4. Rather than treating the interviews as separate narratives, the analysis below compares the cases across these recurring dimensions and then brings them together into a small number of emerging GR models.

All interview quotations in this chapter were translated from Ukrainian into English by the author. The translations preserve the meaning of the respondents' statements while slightly smoothing wording for readability.

For transparency, a compact cross-case analytical matrix is included in Appendix B.

4.3. Cross-case analysis of the core dimensions of GR design

4.3.1. How companies understand the role of GR

One of the first things that becomes clear across the six cases is that companies do not mean the same thing when they talk about GR. In some interviewed cases, the function is still understood mainly as support. It helps the business move faster, solve regulatory bottlenecks, support operational continuity, or step in when a difficult issue cannot be resolved through legal or operational channels alone. INT02 captures this quite directly: "The first area is development... The second is support for ongoing operations... The third is troubleshooting." This is not a weak function in practical terms, but it is still framed largely through service to the business rather than through a broader strategic role. The matrix places INT02, INT03, and INT06 among the more support-oriented cases.

Other cases already move beyond that support logic, but not fully. INT01 and INT05 sit somewhere in that middle space. Here GR is expected not only to react to issues that have already become urgent, but also to see them earlier, interpret them for the business, and help the company avoid getting pulled into the regulatory process too late. INT01 expresses this very clearly: "In my view, effective GR should be involved before an issue becomes a formal regulatory and urgent matter." The same case also gives a broader formulation of the role: "This function should connect the company's business strategy with the state's policy direction." That is already more than support. It is not yet the strongest strategic model among the interviewed cases, but it is no longer just troubleshooting either. INT05 belongs in a similar transitional space, with a stronger long-term regulatory logic but still an incomplete organizational structure.

INT04 is different in a more fundamental way. In that case, GR is not described as support with some foresight added on top. It is described as part of how the company shapes its operating environment. The selected quote says it plainly: "The company sees the function's purpose as the ability to influence and shape a positive operating environment for the business." This is one of the clearest strategic formulations in the empirical material. It shifts GR away from a reactive or adaptive role and much closer to a strategic capability. This is also where the contrast across cases becomes easiest to see: some companies use GR mainly to help the business cope with regulatory pressure, while one case uses it to influence the conditions under which the business operates. This is one of the clearest maturity markers in the dataset.

4.3.2. Organizational design of GR

The next difference is structural. All six companies have something that can be described as GR in practice, but they do not have it in the same organizational form. Some functions are formalized and institutionally recognized. Others are only partly formalized. In one case, GR still exists mostly through historical practice and the role of a legal leader. The matrix shows this range quite clearly: INT01, INT03, and INT04 are formalized; INT02 and INT05 are partial; INT06 remains informal and embedded.

Placement matters just as much as formalization. In some companies, GR sits close to owners or top management. In others, it is embedded in communications, public affairs, or legal leadership. These are not minor technical differences. Placement shapes the breadth of the mandate, the visibility of the function, and its ability to mobilize other internal actors. INT04 represents the strongest version of this, with a corporate affairs model located inside the executive committee. INT05 remains concentrated through one leader in a legal-GR hybrid role. INT06 is structurally the narrowest, with GR shared informally across legal and board-level actors.

At the same time, the cases show quite clearly that formalization alone does not automatically make GR strategic. INT03 is useful here because it complicates the easy story. The function is formalized and has some measurement logic, but it still remains more support-oriented and less strategically embedded than the strongest cases. So the useful distinction is not simply formal versus informal. It is whether formalization comes together with strategic recognition, stable placement, enough internal authority, and enough resourcing to make the function durable.

This point becomes most visible in the least institutionalized case. INT06 states this directly: “There is no GR specialist or job description. It emerged historically when interaction became necessary.” The same case later makes the fragility even clearer: “If the next manager does not want to deal with this, then there will be no GR function.” These quotes show that the company has GR activity, but not yet GR as a reproducible organizational capability. In other words, one of the more useful distinctions across the interviewed cases is between functions that can outlive a particular office-holder and functions that still depend heavily on one person’s willingness to carry them.

4.3.3. Sensing regulatory issues

The interviews also differ a lot in how companies identify regulatory issues. In the narrower or weaker models, sensing is still built mainly around legal monitoring, public draft acts, and signals coming through associations. That gives the company awareness, but usually only once the issue has already become visible in a formal way. INT06 fits that logic most clearly. There, sensing is based on regular legal monitoring and association signals rather than on informal intelligence or early anticipation. INT03 remains closer to that side as well, even though the function itself is more formalized. The matrix describes both of these as more monitoring-based than anticipatory.

The middle group of cases is broader and more mixed. INT01 combines internal, external, and stakeholder signals. INT02 uses informal signals, media, associations, and board-level discussion. INT05 combines legal monitoring with association-based input and internal signals, but what makes it more developed is that it also adds a political reading of the issue. The quote "To keep a finger on the pulse of the state." fits this case well. It captures a model that is already more interpretive than simple monitoring, even if it is still not as anticipatory as the strongest case.

INT04 is the clearest outlier in this dimension. The respondent describes the team as "We are the company's eyes and ears there. Our task is to identify risks while they are still forming somewhere in the corridors." This is the clearest illustration of anticipatory sensing in the empirical material. The point here is not just that more channels are used. The point is that the whole orientation is different. This model tries to identify and interpret weak signals before they become public, formal, or urgent. That is where the capability logic of the study becomes easiest to see. Some functions mainly monitor visible regulation; the strongest one tries to notice it while it is still taking shape.

4.3.4. Seizing and prioritization

Once issues are identified, companies still have to decide which ones matter and what should be done about them. Here the findings are a bit more uneven, but still quite clear. All six cases show some kind of prioritization logic. The common baseline is business impact: how serious the issue is, whether it affects the company broadly or only one part of it, and whether it creates a real risk or opportunity. In this sense, all cases show some form of issue selection or prioritization. The difference is in how explicit and how layered the filtering becomes.

INT02 is especially useful because it adds a legitimacy filter. The respondent says: "We assess the impact on the business and whether it corresponds to international best practice." In the same case, another selected quote sharpens the point further: "We never lobby against the country, even if something is not beneficial for the business." That matters because it shows that issue selection is not purely interest-maximizing. It is also screened for public legitimacy and defensibility. INT05 adds another filter again: "If a draft law is introduced by the government with the support of leading members of parliament, you cannot simply ignore it." In other words, stronger prioritization is not simply more active. It is more selective, more politically informed, and more clearly filtered.

At the weaker or less developed end, prioritization remains more situational. INT06 is the clearest example. There is still business judgment and management involvement, but the process is more case by case and less structured. INT03 is more formal in one sense because it uses annual planning and board validation, but even there the governance remains semi-formal rather than deeply institutionalized. So the more useful distinction here is not between "having prioritization" and "not having it." It is between more and less explicit managerial logic. In the stronger cases, issues are filtered through a clearer combination of business impact, legitimacy, political weight, and escalation logic.

4.3.5. Cross-functional coordination

If there is one thing that appears in every case, it is that GR does not function on its own. Every respondent, directly or indirectly, describes dependence on other parts of the company: legal, operations, finance, communications, marketing, IT, or business leadership. That is important because it shifts the meaning of GR. It is not only an external-facing function. It is also a point of internal coordination. Before the company can speak outside, it usually has to build an internal position, collect expertise, and agree on what exactly it wants to defend, oppose, delay, support, or explain.

What differs is the model of coordination. INT01 and INT05 are more leader-centered. INT02 is flexible and informal. INT03 uses more structured meetings, though internal interaction remains a bottleneck. INT06 relies on expert input from other functions, but those functions are not a stable GR coalition. INT04 demonstrates the strongest model, where GR has priority access to the functions it needs. INT05 captures the internal capability logic most directly: "It is the ability to bring together internal resources and interested people inside the company." This connects GR strength directly to internal coalition-building rather than only to external influence.

INT06 gives a useful contrast. In that case, internal coordination is organized through point-specific expertise: "For example, it is the finance department if the issue concerns taxation... the technical department if it concerns construction standards... they act as internal experts in their areas." This shows that even less formalized GR models depend on internal expertise, but the coordination remains more case-by-case and less institutionalized. INT06 also reduces the function to a narrower formulation — "GR is primarily about communication." That is not wrong, but it is a thinner understanding of what internal coordination needs to do. What looks from the outside like "influence" often depends, inside the company, on whether GR can align the organization fast enough and with sufficient legitimacy.

4.3.6. Strategic integration and top-management involvement

This is one of the dimensions where the interviewed cases differ most sharply. Not every GR function has the same place in decision-making. Some are close to top management, have early visibility on sensitive issues, and can shape internal discussion before urgency sets in. Others still enter later, once the problem has already become visible or difficult.

INT01 says this very openly: “This function should be involved before an issue becomes a formal regulatory and urgent matter.” That line works because it also implies a different understanding of the function’s place in management. The same case adds another short but strong formulation: “This function should connect the company’s business strategy with the state’s policy direction.” Together, these quotes already move GR away from late-stage response and much closer to early strategic involvement. INT05 fits the same broader logic. The function there is used in strategic sessions and for longer-horizon foresight, even if the structure underneath remains incomplete.

INT04 demonstrates the strongest degree of strategic integration in this dimension. One of the clearest empirical signals is the selected quote: “The CEO even has a KPI that partly overlaps with the KPI of this function: influencing the operating environment.” That suggests not just access, but recognition that GR is tied to something central in the company’s strategy. INT02 is more ambiguous. It has high access and visibility, but still remains narrower and more support-oriented. INT06 shows another useful contrast: strategic sessions may include GR questions, but that integration exists largely because of the respondent’s role rather than because of a separate institutionalized function. Access matters, but access alone is not the point. The stronger difference is earlier and more legitimate involvement.

4.3.7. External engagement and stakeholder model

The external logic of GR also varies a lot across the interviewed cases. In some companies, associations remain the main route into the regulatory process. That is especially visible in the narrower or more reactive models. The logic here is collective and, to some extent, safer: associations provide legitimacy, shared positioning, and a transparent channel for influence. INT02 says this very directly: “If it is possible to work through an association, it is more transparent, stronger, and more appropriate.” INT03 expresses a related but more formal view: “Work with the state should be more formalized — through official channels rather than personal connections.” These cases are useful because they show that external engagement can be process-led and collective even when it is not especially strategic in a broader sense.

Other cases are much more openly relational. INT02 is actually a bridge here. It values associations, but it also places strong emphasis on long-term trust. The best example is the selected quote: “At the first meeting, we do not talk about problems.” That single line compresses an entire logic of relationship-building. The connection is established first, and only later is it used for more difficult conversations. INT04 pushes this one step further. There the team values “the ability to build long-term win-win relationships, network, and systematically maintain contact with key stakeholders." That already sounds less like contact management and more like stakeholder architecture.

INT05 adds yet another layer. The emphasis there on the GR image of the company itself: "I believe this should be about long-term relationships... about building the company's GR image." That matters because it moves the discussion beyond personal ties. In this model, external effectiveness depends more on whether the company is seen as a credible and recognizable actor. INT06 gives the sharpest contrast to process-led logic by stating: "If there are no relationships, then processes will not really help. And if there are relationships, results can be achieved even without processes." That is a narrower and more person-dependent view, but it is analytically useful because it makes explicit a strongly relationship-dependent understanding of GR. Across the interviewed cases, stakeholder engagement is not just about channels. It is about the logic through which influence is built and sustained.

4.3.8. Effectiveness and KPI logic

The question of effectiveness reveals another uneven but important pattern. Most respondents can explain why GR matters. Far fewer respondents described a developed system for evaluating whether GR works. In the support-oriented and transitional models, effectiveness is usually recognized more informally: a difficult issue was solved, a risk was reduced, a proposal was delayed, or the company was heard where decisions were being made. That does not mean the function lacks value. It means the managerial logic of evaluation remains less developed than the practical recognition of usefulness. The matrix reflects this clearly, with low or medium measurement maturity in most cases and only one clearly high-maturity case.

INT04 stands apart most clearly. The selected quote is worth using almost in full because it captures a much more developed effectiveness logic: "Where the effect can be calculated, it is quantified. Where it is difficult to calculate directly, effectiveness is assessed through preservation of the level playing field, reputational indicators, and internal survey results." Another selected quote strengthens the same point: "The CEO even has a KPI that partly overlaps with the KPI of this function: influencing the operating environment." That is already a very different measurement model from simply recognizing a good result after the fact. It does not turn GR into a fully quantifiable function, but it does show a more mature attempt to define outcomes rather than only activities.

4.4. Cross-case tensions, constraints, and underdeveloped components of GR

Although the six cases differ substantially, some weaknesses repeat. Inside the companies, the most common ones are limited dedicated capacity, overload on hybrid roles, weak internal alignment, and the need to keep justifying the value of the function. INT03 expresses one side of this especially well: "GR is not an illusionist's or magician's function." That line works because it captures a familiar problem in several interviews: the expectation that GR can somehow fix difficult issues by itself, even where the company has not yet built enough alignment, time, or realism around the function. This points to a mismatch between expectations toward GR and the organizational conditions needed for GR to produce results. INT02 adds another side of the same problem in a more business-oriented way: "Without a GR function, business development can become more expensive, take longer, and become less predictable." That makes the cost of underbuilt GR more visible.

Other constraints are more external. Several respondents point to volatility, stakeholder turnover, and weakness in the broader policy ecosystem. INT04 is especially useful here because it is arguably the strongest internal model among the interviewed cases, yet even there the respondent still points to a weak ecosystem of media, think tanks, and advisors. That is worth stressing because it prevents an overly neat reading of the data. Even strong internal design does not remove all friction. Some of the limits of GR come from the environment itself. The matrix describes this particularly clearly in INT04, where external weakness remains a major constraint despite high internal maturity.

The sharpest structural weakness remains person dependence. INT06 says this very openly: "If the next manager does not want to deal with this, then there will be no GR function." This is the clearest illustration of structural fragility in the empirical material. These are not side problems. They show where the design is still thin. They also point quite directly to what the framework in Chapter 5 will need to address: clearer role boundaries, stronger continuity, better internal coordination, more dedicated resourcing, and more realistic expectations around what GR can and cannot do.

4.5. Ukrainian context as a catalyst of GR institutionalization

The Ukrainian context is not just background in these interviews. In several cases, it is part of the explanation for why GR became more visible, more necessary, and in some firms more formalized. Several interviews suggest that wartime disruption, eurointegration pressure, and regulatory volatility were important contextual drivers, especially in INT01, INT03, INT05, and INT06. This pattern suggests that the demand for stronger GR design did not come only from internal managerial logic. It also came from pressure in the wider institutional environment.

INT01 captures this shift by describing GR as a "must-have" for large "white" business in Ukraine, meaning companies that operate transparently and within formal rules. Other cases point in the same direction less through a single memorable phrase than through the organizational changes they describe: GR became more visible after 2022, regulatory issues became more frequent and consequential, and eurointegration created a longer-term need to monitor and interpret regulatory change. In this sense, the Ukrainian context appears to accelerate the movement from informal or dispersed GR activity toward more deliberate organizational design.

This helps explain why GR across the interviewed cases often looks like a function in motion. In a calmer environment, some companies might have continued to rely on underdeveloped or dispersed arrangements. In Ukraine, the combination of war, eurointegration, and regulatory volatility appears to push firms faster toward more structured models. Context here is therefore not merely background. It is part of the explanation for why GR institutionalization happens at all.

4.6. Emerging GR models and maturity logic

Before turning to the emerging models in more detail, Table 4.2 summarizes the main cross-case differences in how the six companies define, organize, and use GR. The table is not meant to rank the companies mechanically, but to make the main comparative patterns easier to see.

Table 4.2

Cross-Case Comparison of Government Relations Models

Case	Role orientation	Formalization	Sensing	Strategic integration	Stakeholder model	Measurement maturity	Overall GR model
INT01	Hybrid strategic-support	Formalized	Mixed-channel sensing	Medium	Association-led / mixed	Partial	Transitional strategicizing GR
INT02	Support-oriented	Partially formalized	Informal / mixed early-warning	Medium-high, but narrower	Relational support / association-capable	Low	Executive-led relational support GR
INT03	Support-oriented	Formalized	Association-led / internal	Low-medium	Formal / association-led	Medium	Formalized support GR
INT04	Strategic	Formalized and strongly embedded	Anticipatory sensing	High	Proactive relational / stakeholder architecture	High	Strategic integrated GR
INT05	Hybrid strategic-support	Partially formalized	Legal-monitoring + mixed signals	Medium-high	Institutional-relational	Medium	Transitional strategicizing GR
INT06	Support-oriented / reactive	Non-formalized	Legal-monitoring / association-based	Medium, but person-dependent	Relationship-dominant / association-led	Low	Embedded reactive GR

Note. The table summarizes the main cross-case differences in role orientation, organizational design, sensing, strategic integration, stakeholder logic, and overall maturity of GR across the six cases. It is intended as a comparative synthesis rather than a mechanical ranking of companies.

As the table shows, the cases differ in degree of maturity, and also in the overall configuration of the function. This makes it more useful to think in terms of emerging GR models rather than a simple stronger-versus-weaker continuum.

When the six cases are compared, they do not form a simple linear maturity sequence. They cluster more naturally into a small number of recognizable GR models. The strongest one is clearly the strategic integrated model represented by INT04. It is formalized, well positioned, strongly embedded in top management, anticipatory in sensing, relational and deliberate in stakeholder engagement, and much more outcome-oriented in how it understands effectiveness. It is also the only case where GR is fully and consistently described as shaping the operating environment rather than mainly supporting the business inside it.

A second type is the transitional strategicizing model, represented by INT01 and INT05. These cases already show a broader strategic logic than the support-oriented ones. They emphasize earlier involvement, foresight, internal mobilization, and long-term dialogue with the regulatory environment. Still, both remain incomplete in different ways. INT01 is stronger structurally, but still transitional in integration and process design. INT05 is strategically aware and relatively sophisticated in logic, but remains underdeveloped in dedicated structure and internal capacity. These are not weak cases, but they are still moving toward a more complete strategic model rather than fully operating as one.

The third model is the executive-led relational support model, represented most clearly by INT02. Here GR has strong executive sponsorship, a well-developed relational style, and clear value for business development, operations, and difficult cases. At the same time, it remains narrower and more support-oriented than the strongest models. The fourth cluster includes the more formalized or embedded support models, represented by INT03 and INT06 in different ways. INT03 is more formalized and process-aware, but not deeply strategic. INT06 has useful GR activity, but it remains highly person-dependent and structurally fragile.

What separates the stronger models from the weaker ones is not one feature only. It is a bundle of things that tend to come together: broader role definition, earlier involvement, more anticipatory sensing, stronger internal coordination, more durable stakeholder logic, and a somewhat more developed understanding of outcomes. That is why maturity in this study is better understood as a configuration than as a simple scale. Companies are not just “higher” or “lower.” They combine different strengths and weaknesses in ways that produce recognizably different GR models.

4.7. Chapter synthesis and bridge to framework design

Taken together, the findings suggest that GR in Ukrainian companies is neither organizationally uniform nor strategically uniform. Some firms use it mainly as business support and selective advocacy. Others are moving toward a more strategic model, with stronger foresight, more internal coordination, and earlier involvement in decisions. One case demonstrates what a deeply integrated strategic GR capability can look like. Across the cases, the most important differences concern role definition, structural design, sensing sophistication, issue filtering, stakeholder logic, and the ability to turn GR from useful practice into a more stable managerial system.

Chapter 5 therefore does not develop the framework as an abstract ideal type. Instead, the framework is grounded in the empirical patterns identified above: what stronger GR designs tend to have in common and where weaker ones tend to break down. The practical framework can therefore be built directly from the material: clearer role definition, stronger placement and formalization, better sensing, clearer prioritization and escalation logic, more deliberate internal coordination, and a more explicit outcome logic for effectiveness. In that sense, the empirical part of the study does not end with classification. It ends by making design choices more visible.

The synthesis of findings also provides the empirical basis for assessing the research assumptions. The overall comparison of the six cases supports the main research assumption by showing that more developed and strategically integrated GR models are associated with earlier issue detection, clearer prioritization, stronger cross-functional coordination, more deliberate stakeholder engagement, and closer integration with senior management decision-making.

The findings support the assumption on mandate and senior management access because cases with clearer mandates, stronger organizational placement, and better access to senior decision-makers showed earlier and more legitimate involvement in regulatory issues.

The findings support the assumption on cross-functional coordination because effective regulatory positions repeatedly depended on the ability of GR to coordinate legal, operational, financial, communications, and management expertise inside the company.

The findings provide partial support for the assumption on institutionalization and continuity: institutionalized routines, role clarity, and organizational memory reduce excessive person-dependence, but personal credibility, experience, and trusted relationships remain important in GR practice.

These findings should not be interpreted as statistical confirmation or causal proof. Rather, they show recurring qualitative patterns that connect GR design with more effective regulatory issue management across the interviewed cases.

CHAPTER 5. DESIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT RELATIONS CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK

5.1. Purpose and logic of the framework

This chapter develops a framework for designing GR as a strategic capability for managing regulatory issues. The framework is not intended to provide a universal model for all companies. Its purpose is more practical: to help managers assess how GR is positioned, how regulatory issues are identified and prioritized, how internal expertise is coordinated, and how external engagement is connected to management decisions.

The need for such a framework follows from the empirical findings. Chapter 4 showed that large companies organize GR in different ways. Some arrangements remain fragmented, person-dependent, and reactive. Others are more formalized, better connected to senior management, and more capable of early issue detection and coordinated response. These differences matter because they affect whether regulatory issues are treated as late-stage problems or as management issues that require timely interpretation, prioritization, and action.

The framework translates these cross-case differences into a practical design logic. It is built around recurring contrasts identified in the interviews: person-dependence versus institutionalization, ad hoc monitoring versus anticipatory sensing, informal coordination versus structured cross-functional work, and access-based engagement versus deliberate stakeholder architecture.

This framework can serve as a management tool when adapted to specific management contexts. It is based on the theoretical logic outlined in Chapter 2, which encompasses non-market strategy, dynamic capabilities, and GR as an organizational capability. At the same time, its structure is grounded in recurring patterns from the six interviews discussed in Chapter 4. The practical value of this tool is to help companies better understand how GR is positioned, structured, managed, and utilized in practice.

The framework should be interpreted as a diagnostic and design tool, not as a causal model or a rigid implementation roadmap. It was developed based on limited qualitative research and draws on recurring patterns from relevant cross-case studies. The main objective of the framework was to provide a structured way of thinking about what strong GR models have in common and what weak ones lack.

The framework is intentionally context-sensitive. It focuses primarily on large companies in Ukraine operating in sectors that are, to a greater or lesser extent, exposed to state regulation. Although some elements may have broader relevance, the framework should be interpreted with regard to the specific Ukrainian context. Regulatory uncertainty and instability, wartime disruption, and eurointegration pressures heighten the need for early issue detection, stronger coordination, and more deliberate organizational design. Therefore, this framework cannot be viewed in isolation from the environment in which the research was conducted.

For this reason, the framework should be seen as a way of thinking about how GR is designed, not just as a checklist. It shows what needs to be in place for GR to work as a strategic capability, how different elements are connected, and how companies can assess their current level of development. The next section sets out the design principles behind this framework.

5.2. Design principles of Government Relations as a strategic capability

The framework is based on design principles derived from a review of the literature and the results of a cross-case analysis. These principles are not abstract rules. They are intended to explain what strong GR models look like, as well as why some models are more effective than others in regulatory issue management.

The first point is straightforward: GR operates differently when viewed as part of strategy rather than as a support function. This does not mean that every company must immediately develop a fully strategic GR model. However, GR becomes more valuable when it is not limited to troubleshooting, representation, or responding to issues that are already affecting the business. The stronger cases show that GR is more effective when it aligns with business priorities, is engaged early, and is recognized as relevant to the operating environment.

The second principle is that GR's effectiveness depends on external access and also on its internal structure. More contacts or meetings do not, in and of themselves, make GR more effective. GR works better when external contacts are supported by: a clear mandate, a stable position within the organization, and sufficient internal authority to link external signals to internal decisions.

The timing of engaging GR is the third design principle of the framework. In weaker models, GR is brought in late, when the issue is already visible, urgent, or politically complex. In stronger models, GR is introduced earlier, during the issue formation stage. The difference is that at the early stage, the value of GR is often highest before the company is forced into a defensive response. Once the issue escalates, the scope for influence narrows.

The next principle is that GR must operate through coordinated internal governance rather than just solely through individual efforts. While this approach may be successful in the short term due to the leadership of functional heads, it will not be sustainable in the long term. This is one of the points where weaker and stronger models diverge sharply. This is important because GR does not operate in isolation; it depends on legal, communications/PR, compliance, business leadership, and other functions, as well as senior management—sometimes all at once. If the GR function is person-dependent or poorly coordinated, issue management can become slower, more fragmented, or more reactive. With a strong GR setup, backed by clearer internal procedures and stronger internal legitimacy, the company is better able to coordinate internal actions to respond to external issues.

Another principle is that both relationship-building and process discipline are necessary. The findings indicate that relationships matter. Similarly, trust, continuity, credibility, and long-term engagement with stakeholders all appeared to be important, especially in stronger cases. In other words, personal relationships remain one of the important assets of GR professionals and cannot be fully replaced by formal processes. But what distinguishes strong models is that stakeholder engagement was supported by internal processes such as early issue monitoring, prioritization, and internal coordination, even if these were not formalized in policies.

The final principle is that the GR framework must take context into account. The framework does not impose a single model on all companies or markets. It is grounded in the Ukrainian context, and this matters. Regulatory volatility, wartime disruption, and eurointegration pressures all heighten the need for GR and increase the complexity of organizing it effectively. Here, the importance of early detection, access to leadership, and cross-functional response is particularly heightened. Therefore, the framework distinguishes between core elements that appear necessary in more robust GR models and contextual solutions that may vary across different companies.

Taken together, these principles explain the framework's logic. A stronger GR design does not depend on a single feature. It depends on the combination of strategic positioning, internal organization, process discipline, and enabling conditions. The next section turns from these principles to the architecture of the framework itself.

5.3. Core architecture of the framework

The framework is organized around four layers. The first layer is structural foundations: role definition, mandate, organizational placement, and formalization. The second layer is core management processes: regulatory sensing, issue prioritization, escalation, cross-functional coordination, and stakeholder engagement. The third layer is capability enablers: expertise, analytical capacity, internal legitimacy, institutional memory, and process discipline. The fourth layer is outcomes: earlier issue detection, clearer priorities, more coordinated responses, fewer regulatory surprises, and stronger alignment between GR and business decision-making.

This layered structure helps distinguish between the principles behind the framework and the concrete organizational elements through which GR capability is built. It also prevents the framework from being treated as a single organizational chart or a rigid model. Instead, it presents GR as a set of mutually reinforcing structural, process, and enabling conditions that support more effective regulatory issue management.

The framework should therefore be understood as a managerial architecture rather than as a list of separate recommendations. Its purpose is to show how structural, process, and enabling conditions work together to support GR as a holistic organizational capability.

As the cross-case analysis shows, some characteristics of stronger models pertain to structure: mandate, placement, reporting logic, and internal authority. Others belong to processes: how issues are detected, prioritized, escalated, and coordinated. There are also less visible supporting elements: expertise, internal legitimacy, trust, and institutional memory. The goal of the framework is to bring all these elements together into a single model.

The complete operationalized version of the GR Capability Framework is presented in Appendix C, which includes the full framework table, the maturity logic, and a visual synthesis of the model.

5.3.1. Structural foundations

The first level of the framework is the structural foundations of GR. A strong GR function does not start with contacts, but with an internal understanding of exactly what GR should be doing within the company. Companies answer this question in different ways: ranging from narrower roles such as support, troubleshooting, and selective advocacy, to broader ones—strategic interpretation, early engagement, and a role in shaping the operating environment. This difference is fundamental, because without a clear role, GR "drifts," overlaps with adjacent functions, becomes person-dependent, and operates based on implicit expectations rather than by design.

That is why the first structural element of the framework is Strategic Positioning and the GR Mandate. In practice, this means that GR must have a defined purpose, a clear scope, and a clear link to business strategy. And this is not about immediately creating the "most advanced" GR model, which the company may simply not need, but about the company being clear on whether GR is a support function, strategic support, or an integrated strategic capability. This choice determines when GR is engaged, how it is evaluated, and what internal authority it holds.

The second structural element is the organizational design and placement of GR. As the study's results show, where GR is located within the organizational structure affects its visibility, access, and internal reach. In a weak configuration, GR is positioned low or ambiguously: it is brought in late, has weak authority, relies on personal initiative, meaning it has limited influence, although it may be quite active and successful. Stronger models tend to have clearer placement, more stable reporting logic, and at least some recognized route into executive attention.

This does not mean there is a single universally correct reporting line; rather, it demonstrates that various formats work. The findings suggest that stronger GR requires a structural position from which the function can identify issues early enough, mobilize other units, and be heard when escalation is necessary.

The next part of the structural foundation is the degree of formalization of GR. The cases show that formalization alone does not make GR strategic, and a formal role can remain strategically narrow. However, formalization is still important. Where the function has no stable structure, unclear ownership, or no existence beyond a single individual, its stability becomes fragile. Therefore, formalization is needed not as an end in itself but as part of the institutionalization necessary for the function's survival in the event of personnel changes and to move beyond ad hoc practice.

Thus, the structural level must answer the following questions: What is GR for? Where does it sit? Who owns it? How stable is it as a function?

5.3.2. Core management processes

While the structural level answers the questions of what GR is and where it is located, the second level (process-based) explains how GR works in practice. It is here that the framework focuses more directly on the practical management of regulatory issues. The study suggests four core process elements: regulatory intelligence, prioritization and escalation logic, cross-functional governance, and external engagement architecture.

The first of these is regulatory intelligence. The difference between models begins with when GR "notices" a problem. In reactive models, GR becomes visible only after an issue has been formalized, made public, and become urgent. More effective models detect weak signals even before a problem fully materializes and rely on broader channels for issue detection. Therefore, the framework includes official monitoring and also issue detection through internal signals, stakeholder feedback, associations, open sources, and broader horizon scanning, or GR intelligence.

The second process element is prioritization and escalation logic. Not every change in legislation deserves the same level of attention, and not every issue should be addressed at the same level within the organization. More effective models employ clearer filters, including business impact, strategic importance, urgency, political weight, and, in some cases, legitimacy or public value. This requires an escalation logic: what can be resolved within a department, what requires broader coordination, and what must be brought to the attention of top management. Without such filters, companies may either underreact or overreact to certain issues, which carries both additional risks and the waste of resources.

The third element is cross-functional governance. This is crucial because regulatory issues rarely fall entirely within the purview of a single department. As research shows, the GR function depends on legal, compliance, communications, operations, finance, commercial leadership, senior management, and others. However, the effectiveness of such coordination varies significantly. In less effective models, coordination is ad hoc and depends on individual personnel. In stronger models, the function has clearer internal mechanisms for drawing on expert knowledge, aligning positions, and formulating a coordinated response. These mechanisms are not always formalized in written policies. In many cases, they rely on regular interaction, internal corporate culture, practical routines, and sufficient legitimacy to mobilize other functions when necessary.

The fourth element is external engagement architecture. Research findings indicate that the effectiveness of external engagement depends on a clear logic regarding who is important, through which channels, on which issues, and on what basis of trust. Some companies rely more on associations. Others use direct engagement channels. Some emphasize a relational approach, formal engagement, and institutional trust. There is no one-size-fits-all approach here, and the main conclusion is that effective GR requires more than just occasional contacts. It requires a more thoughtful approach to identifying stakeholders, selecting channels, ensuring continuity, and balancing relational and process-oriented engagement.

Taken together, these elements of the process are closely intertwined and transform GR from a visible activity into an organized capability.

5.3.3. Capability enablers

The third layer of the framework concerns the conditions that enable GR to function effectively in practice. Often, these factors determine whether a function exists on paper or works effectively in practice. Such factors include person dependence, overloaded hybrid roles, weak internal legitimacy, limited analytical support, and difficulties in ensuring long-term stability.

The first enabling factor is expert knowledge. This function depends on the ability to understand regulatory and legal acts, interpret signals from institutions, translate them into practical insights for the business, and communicate information to external and internal audiences while demonstrating competence. This expert knowledge does not necessarily have to be concentrated in a single person, but the company must have access to it in a stable form.

A second contributing factor is analytical capacity. Effective GR requires awareness and also the ability to interpret information. This includes the ability to distinguish noise from signals, compare issues, assess consequences, and set priorities so that the organization can take appropriate action. In less effective models, this analytical capacity often remains underdeveloped. It allows the organization to respond to each problem individually and also to develop a comprehensive understanding of the situation.

The third contributing factor is internal legitimacy. GR may formally exist but still lack sufficient authority within the company to attract attention, obtain information, or coordinate actions. If internal legitimacy is weak, this function is often heeded too late or treated as secondary. If legitimacy is stronger, there is a higher likelihood that GR will be involved at an early stage and taken seriously across all departments.

The framework also treats trust capital and institutional memory as necessary enabling conditions. Trust matters both externally and within the organization. A function that is trusted is more likely to receive information earlier, coordinate actions effectively, and represent the company credibly. Institutional memory matters because managing regulatory issues often unfolds over long periods, involving changing stakeholders and recurring policy cycles. If knowledge remains tied to a single individual, the organization becomes vulnerable. If knowledge is retained, the function becomes less vulnerable to staff turnover.

Finally, the framework treats process discipline as an enabling condition. Monitoring, prioritization, coordination, and engagement depend on whether a company can maintain routine procedures over the long term, rather than improvising from one issue to the next. These are part of what makes GR institutional.

5.3.4. Managerial outcomes of stronger GR design

The final layer of the framework concerns managerial outcomes. These should be framed carefully. The study does not claim hard causal proof that a single GR design feature produces a single measurable performance outcome. That would go beyond what a qualitative cross-case design can support. Still, the findings point to recurring managerial differences between weaker and stronger models, which are meaningful enough to be incorporated into the framework.

The first outcome is earlier issue detection. Stronger GR models tend to identify relevant developments sooner and with more context. The second is clearer prioritization, which means fewer resources wasted on low-value issues and fewer important issues missed through late recognition. The third is a faster coordinated response. Where stronger internal governance exists, firms appear better able to translate regulatory developments into timely internal action. A fourth outcome is stronger executive awareness, especially where GR is more clearly integrated into management discussion. Finally, stronger models appear to be associated with reduced regulatory surprises and greater overall preparedness.

These outcomes are best understood as managerial signals of a stronger function rather than as formal proof of performance impact. That distinction matters for the credibility of the framework. The argument is not that stronger GR guarantees success. It is that certain design features appear to support better handling of regulatory issues under conditions of uncertainty. For the purposes of this study, that is both a more cautious and a more defensible claim.

5.4. The Government Relations Capability Maturity Model

For the framework to be more useful in practice, it is important to distinguish different stages of GR capability development. According to the study's findings, a three-level maturity model is sufficient for this purpose: reactive, developing, and strategic.

Maturity in this model should be understood as a configuration rather than a simple ladder. A more mature GR function is not merely more active, more visible, or better connected externally. It combines a clear mandate, appropriate organizational placement, systematic sensing, structured prioritization, cross-functional coordination, deliberate stakeholder engagement, explicit effectiveness logic, and institutional memory. Higher maturity therefore means a more coherent configuration of mandate, structure, processes, and enablers, rather than simply a larger volume of GR activity.

Given this logic, the GR Capability Maturity Model can be presented at three levels:

Level 1: Reactive / ad hoc GR. GR is mainly used for troubleshooting, case-by-case support, or reaction to already visible regulatory problems. The mandate is weak or informal, sensing relies on legal monitoring or occasional information flows, coordination depends on personal networks, and effectiveness is rarely assessed systematically. This level is usually highly person-dependent.

Level 2: Developing / partially institutionalized GR. GR is recognized as useful and may have a basic mandate or identifiable owner, but its processes remain uneven. The company has some monitoring, some coordination with legal or business units, and some stakeholder engagement routines, but prioritization, escalation, and outcome assessment are not fully formalized.

Level 3: Strategic / integrated GR capability. GR has an explicit mandate, appropriate access to senior management, systematic regulatory sensing, structured prioritization and escalation, regular cross-functional coordination, deliberate stakeholder architecture, defined effectiveness indicators, and institutional memory. At this level, GR is a part of strategic management.

This maturity logic should not be interpreted as a rigid ladder that every company climbs in exactly the same sequence. Examples suggest a more uneven pattern. Companies may be stronger in one dimension and weaker in another. A company may have relatively strong external engagement but weak internal institutionalization, or stronger formalization but weaker strategic integration. Thus, the value of the maturity level lies not in mechanically ranking companies. It lies in helping to interpret how different GR mechanisms are grouped and where the main gaps in development lie. The detailed maturity logic is provided in Appendix C as part of the full GR Capability Framework.

5.5. Managerial application of the framework

The framework is intended primarily for managers who are directly involved in designing, leading, or restructuring the GR function. In some firms, this will mean the Head of GR. In others, especially where the function remains distributed, it may be more relevant to a Legal Director, Public Affairs lead, or a senior executive who effectively owns the function in practice. The framework is also relevant for firms that are not building GR from zero, but trying to understand why the function remains too reactive, too fragmented, or too dependent on one individual.

In practice, the framework is intended to support a set of organizational decisions. These include where GR should sit in the structure, how broad its mandate should be, when it should be involved in decision-making, how regulatory issues should be monitored and prioritized, and how coordination with legal, communications, compliance, and business leadership should be organized. It also helps identify what is missing. In some firms, the problem may be unclear role definition. In others, the main issue may be weak executive access, poor issue escalation, or a lack of internal legitimacy. The framework is useful precisely because it helps separate these problems rather than treating all weak GR models as the same.

This framework can also be used as a diagnostic tool. One of its practical advantages is that it allows managers to determine whether a GR function or GR-related responsibility exists, and also what role it actually plays inside the company. For example, a company may find that it already has fairly close engagement with stakeholders but a poorly developed system for monitoring regulatory requirements, or that a formal position exists but is not backed by a real cross-functional management system.

The company can ask a short set of direct questions: Does GR have clearly defined authority? Is it engaged early enough? Are regulatory issues systematically tracked? Are there visible criteria for setting priorities? Is there regular coordination with key internal departments? Does this function depend on just one person? Are senior management and business units truly engaged when escalation is needed? The purpose of these questions is not to create an assessment for the sake of assessment. It is to provide companies with a clearer basis for judging whether their GR model remains reactive, is evolving, or is already moving toward a more strategic form.

At the same time, this framework should not be applied too mechanically. It is not a rigid implementation plan or a one-size-fits-all sequence of steps. Different companies face different constraints, and some decisions regarding the framework will remain context-specific. Therefore, this framework works best as a structured guide: a way to better understand what a stronger GR function requires and where the main weaknesses of the current model likely lie.

The practical applicability of the proposed framework was additionally supported through its transfer for use in selected companies. The companies confirmed the relevance of selected conclusions, recommendations, and managerial tools for improving internal processes related to GR and regulatory issue management. The corresponding certificates of implementation are provided in Appendix D.

5.6. Summary of the Chapter

This chapter presents a framework for designing GR as a strategic capability for managing regulatory issues. The framework was developed not as an abstract ideal type, but as a practical and context-oriented management tool based on the literature and refined through the empirical findings. Its logic is based on four layers: structural foundations, core management processes, capability enablers, and managerial outcomes. These layers are supplemented by a simple maturity logic that distinguishes between reactive, developing, and strategic forms of GR.

The value of the framework lies in making managerial decisions about GR more transparent. It shows that more effective GR does not depend on a single isolated feature, but on a combination of role clarity, organizational placement, regulatory sensing, prioritization discipline, internal governance, stakeholder logic, and enabling conditions that support the stability of the function over time. At the same time, the framework remains cautious in its claims. It does not propose a single universal model, nor does it claim to provide hard evidence of a causal link to performance outcomes. Instead, it offers a structured way of understanding how companies can move from fragmented and reactive mechanisms for managing regulatory issues toward more integrated and strategically useful approaches. This logic underpins the study’s broader conclusions.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This study examined how large companies organize and use Government Relations (GR) functions to manage regulatory issues, and how these practices can be translated into a practical managerial framework. GR is considered as a company-level capability that connects changes in the external regulatory environment with decisions made inside the company. The practical objective was to understand why GR operates more or less effectively across companies and, based on the empirical findings, to propose a structured management tool for designing and integrating an effective GR function.

The practical orientation of the study is also supported by certificates of implementation from selected companies, confirming that selected results of the project were considered and used in practice. These certificates should be viewed as evidence of practical applicability rather than as a long-term assessment of the framework's effectiveness.

The results show that large companies organize their GR functions in different ways. Some rely on fragmented and reactive arrangements, while others use more formalized and strategically integrated models. These differences matter because GR effectiveness depends not simply on the existence of the function, but on how it is positioned, how early it is involved, how well it coordinates internal expertise, and how closely it is linked to senior management decision-making. In weaker arrangements, GR often remains a late-stage support or troubleshooting mechanism; in stronger models, it becomes an earlier and more coordinated capability for regulatory issue management.

Answer to the research question and sub-questions.

The study shows that large companies do not organize GR according to one common model. In the cases studied, GR appeared as a formal strategic function, as an executive-led responsibility, as a legally embedded role, and as a hybrid arrangement involving legal, communications, public affairs, and senior management. This variation matters because the mere presence of GR does not explain how well regulatory issues are managed. The more important distinction is how the function is positioned, how early it is involved, and whether it has enough internal authority and coordination capacity to influence company decisions.

The interviews also clarified the more specific research questions. GR positioning differed substantially across companies, from clearly formalized and management-level functions to more dispersed and case-by-case responsibilities. Regulatory issues were usually managed through a sequence of practical activities: detecting regulatory signals, interpreting their business relevance, prioritizing issues, escalating them internally, coordinating expert input, and deciding whether and how to engage externally. The comparison of cases also showed that reactive and strategic GR models differ mainly in mandate clarity, senior management access, sensing capacity, cross-functional coordination, stakeholder engagement, and institutionalization. These findings formed the basis for the GR Capability Framework developed in Chapter 5 and Appendix C.

Assessment of the research assumptions.

The empirical findings are broadly consistent with the main research assumption and the first two supporting assumptions, while the assumption on institutionalization and continuity is only partially consistent with the interview evidence. These assumptions are not confirmed in a statistical sense, because the study is based on a qualitative cross-case design and does not measure causal effects quantitatively. Instead, they are assessed through recurring patterns in the six interviews, thematic coding, and comparison of reactive, developing, transitional, and strategic GR models.

The findings are broadly consistent with the main research assumption. The evidence suggests that companies with more developed and strategically integrated GR functions are better positioned to manage regulatory issues effectively. This pattern is reflected in repeated interview evidence suggesting that stronger GR models are associated with earlier issue detection, clearer prioritization, stronger cross-functional coordination, more deliberate stakeholder engagement, and closer integration with senior management decision-making. In contrast, weaker GR models were more likely to be reactive, person-dependent, weakly formalized, and involved only after regulatory issues had already become urgent.

The findings are consistent with the supporting assumption on mandate and senior management access. The interviews indicate that where GR has a clearer mandate, stronger organizational placement, and access to senior decision-makers, regulatory issues are more likely to be identified and escalated earlier. This was visible in the cases where GR was treated as a management-level function rather than only as legal support, communications support, or ad hoc problem-solving. These cases showed earlier involvement of GR in regulatory issues and stronger connection between regulatory information and management decisions.

The findings are also consistent with the supporting assumption on cross-functional coordination. The interviews indicate that structured cross-functional coordination is important for developing coherent and credible company positions on regulatory issues. Interview responses repeatedly showed that GR cannot operate effectively as an isolated function. Credible positions usually require input from legal, compliance, finance, operations, communications, strategy, or senior management. The stronger cases were those where such coordination was easier to activate, more regular, and more clearly connected to decision-making.

The findings are partially consistent with the supporting assumption on institutionalization and continuity. The evidence indicates that institutionalized routines, role clarity, documentation, and organizational memory can reduce excessive dependence on individual relationships and make GR more stable over time. At the same time, the interviews also show that personal credibility, experience, and trusted relationships remain important in GR practice. Therefore, the study does not suggest that institutionalization replaces personal expertise. Rather, it indicates that institutionalization can strengthen the function by making it less fragile and less dependent on one individual.

Overall, the research assumptions are assessed as broadly consistent, or partially consistent in the case of institutionalization and continuity, with the qualitative evidence from interview responses and cross-case comparison. The findings indicate that effective regulatory issue management depends not only on external access to public authorities, but also on the internal design of GR: its mandate, organizational placement, sensing capacity, escalation logic, cross-functional coordination, integration with senior management, and degree of institutionalization.

The study contributes to the literature on GR, non-market strategy, and corporate political activity (CPA) by shifting attention from external engagement alone to the internal organization of GR. It shows that GR should be analyzed not only through interaction with public actors, but also through mandate, authority, structure, coordination, and internal capability-building. The Ukrainian context adds further relevance, as companies operate under wartime disruption, European integration pressures, and frequent regulatory change.

The main practical result of the study is the framework developed in Chapter 5. The framework is an evidence-based and context-sensitive tool for companies that need to manage regulatory issues more systematically. Its purpose is to help managers assess how GR is positioned, how it identifies and prioritizes regulatory issues, how it coordinates internal expertise, how it engages stakeholders, and how it can become more stable over time.

The study has several limitations. It is based on a limited group of qualitative interviews, which allows for detailed analysis but does not support broad statistical generalization. Because the research focuses on Ukraine, the findings may not fully apply to companies operating in more stable institutional environments. The framework is based on interviews and cross-case comparison rather than direct quantitative performance data. Therefore, the study identifies useful patterns and relationships, but not direct cause-and-effect links.

These limitations also suggest areas for future research. Later studies could apply the framework in other sectors, compare industries with different levels of regulatory exposure, or examine how GR capability develops over time. It would also be useful to study how the framework works outside Ukraine, especially in countries with different institutional systems. Another important direction is the measurement of GR effectiveness, including how internal design choices affect long-term regulatory, reputational, or business outcomes.

The main conclusion follows from patterns observed across all cases: effective regulatory issue management depends on the combination of external stakeholder engagement and the internal organization of the GR function. GR becomes strategic when it has a clear mandate, appropriate organizational positioning, early involvement in regulatory issues, structured coordination with internal experts, and a stable connection to management decision-making.

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Appendix A. Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Study Title: Designing Government Relations as a Strategic Capability for Managing Regulatory Issues

Research Method: Semi-structured elite interviews

Target Respondents: Senior practitioners responsible for company-level GR or equivalent regulatory management functions

Estimated Interview Duration: 30–40 minutes

Purpose of the Interview

The purpose of the interview is to examine how large companies organize and use GR, or equivalent regulatory management functions, to manage regulatory issues. The interview focuses on internal organizational arrangements, including the role of GR, issue identification and prioritization, organizational placement, cross-functional coordination, top-management involvement, and perceived determinants of effectiveness.

Introductory Statement

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. I am conducting this interview as part of my capstone research on how large companies organize GR, or equivalent regulatory management functions, to manage regulatory issues. The purpose is to understand internal organizational practices rather than confidential details of specific political interactions.

The interview will take approximately 30 to 40 minutes. With your permission, I would like to audio-record the conversation for transcription accuracy. The material will be used for academic purposes only, and anonymization can be applied if needed. You may decline to answer any question at any time.

Consent questions:

Do you agree to participate in this interview?

Do you agree to the audio recording?

Interview Questions

1. Could you briefly describe your current role and your involvement in GR or regulatory issue management within the company?

2. Does your company have a formalized GR function, or is this responsibility distributed across several functions?

Possible prompts: separate department; separate role; legal; communications/public affairs; executive office; informal arrangement.

3. How is the role of GR understood in your company? What is its main purpose?

4. To what extent is GR involved in strategic management rather than only reacting to regulatory developments?

5. How does your company identify emerging regulatory issues in practice?

6. How are regulatory issues prioritized once they are identified?

Possible prompts: financial impact; legal risk; urgency; reputational implications; operational effect; strategic importance.

7. Where is the GR function located within the organizational structure, and why is it positioned there?

8. Which internal functions does GR work with most closely when managing regulatory issues, and how does that coordination usually work in practice?

9. How involved is top management in major GR or regulatory decisions?

10. Would you describe your company's approach to public stakeholders as more reactive or proactive, and more transactional or relational?

11. In your view, what does effective regulatory issue management look like, and what makes a GR function effective?

12. If you were designing a strong GR function from scratch, what three elements would be absolutely essential?

Optional Follow-Up Questions

These questions may be used if clarification is needed or if time permits.

13. What are the main weaknesses or pain points in how GR is organized in large companies in Ukraine?

14. How early is GR involved in business decisions that may have regulatory implications?

15. What is most often missing in companies that remain reactive?

16. Does your company use any formal indicators or criteria to assess whether GR is effective?

17. To what extent can effective GR be institutionalized through internal processes rather than relying on personal relationships?

Appendix B. Compact Cross-Case Analytical Matrix

Table B1
Compact Cross-Case Analytical Matrix

Case	GR model	Organizational design	Sensing & prioritization	Coordination & integration	Engagement model	Effectiveness logic	Maturity / key insight
A	Transitional GR model	Formalized group-level GR function	Mixed-channel sensing; impact-based prioritization	Leader-centered coordination; medium strategic integration	Association-led engagement	Partial results-based measurement	**Medium maturity.** Early strategic aspiration, but routines and measurement remain transitional.
B	Executive-led relational support model	Partially formalized function with board/executive placement	Informal intelligence sensing; impact-based prioritization	Agile informal coordination; high strategic integration	Relational engagement	No formal measurement	**Medium maturity.** Strong executive visibility and relationship logic, but weak process codification.
C	Formalized support/process model	Formalized function placed within communications/PR logic	Association-led sensing; annual planning logic	Structured meeting coordination; low strategic integration	Association-led engagement	Issue-based measurement	**Low-medium maturity.** More structured than some peers, but still support-oriented rather than fully strategic.
D	Strategic integrated GR model	Formalized corporate affairs function with high executive access	Anticipatory sensing; situational escalation	High-access coordination; high strategic integration	Proactive stakeholder management	Outcome-based KPI system	**High maturity.**Most mature case: anticipatory, executive-level, and outcome-oriented.
E	Transitional GR model	Partially formalized, legally embedded GR function	Legal-monitoring sensing; impact-based prioritization	Working-group coordination; medium strategic integration	Institutional-relational engagement	Partial results-based measurement	**Medium maturity.**Strategic logic is strong, but organizational architecture remains underdeveloped.
F	Embedded legal-GR model	Non-formalized function embedded in legal responsibilities	Legal-monitoring sensing; impact-based prioritization	Expert-input coordination; medium strategic integration	Association-led engagement	No formal measurement	**Low-medium maturity.** Useful in practice, but person-dependent and structurally fragile.

Note. *Developed by the author based on the qualitative cross-case analysis.*

Appendix C. Government Relations Framework - Full version

This appendix presents the full version of the GR Capability Framework developed in Chapter 5. The framework is based on the qualitative cross-case findings and is intended as a practical diagnostic and design tool for assessing how GR is organized as a strategic capability for managing regulatory issues.

Table C1

Full Government Relations Capability Framework

Framework level	Core dimension	Purpose	Key design questions	Stronger GR configuration
1. Structural foundation	**Strategic positioning and GR mandate**	Defines what GR is expected to do within the company.	Is GR treated as troubleshooting, business support, advocacy, or strategic capability? Is its mandate formally understood by senior management and business units?	GR has a clear mandate linked to business strategy, regulatory risk, and operating environment management.
1. Structural foundation	**Organizational placement and reporting line**	Determines GR's access, visibility, and internal authority.	Where is GR located in the organization? Does it have direct or indirect access to top management? Is its reporting line stable and clear?	GR has recognized access to senior decision-makers and sufficient authority to mobilize internal responses.
1. Structural foundation	**Role separation and interface with adjacent functions**	Clarifies boundaries between GR, legal, compliance, PR, communications, and business functions.	What belongs to GR and what belongs to legal, PR, compliance, or operations? How are overlapping issues coordinated?	GR has clear interfaces with adjacent functions and avoids both duplication and under-ownership of regulatory issues.
2. Core management processes	**Regulatory sensing and external environment scanning**	Enables early identification of regulatory changes, policy signals, institutional shifts, and stakeholder concerns.	How does the company detect regulatory issues? Are sources limited to legal monitoring, or do they include associations, stakeholders, informal signals, and business intelligence?	GR combines formal monitoring with stakeholder intelligence and anticipatory assessment of emerging issues.
2. Core management processes	**Issue interpretation and business impact assessment**	Translates external regulatory developments into business implications.	Who assesses the business relevance of regulatory issues? Are legal, financial, operational, reputational, and strategic implications considered together?	Regulatory issues are interpreted through both legal and business lenses before they become urgent.
2. Core management processes	**Priority setting and escalation logic**	Helps allocate GR attention and resources to the most important issues.	Which issues deserve active GR involvement? What criteria are used: financial impact, operational risk, reputational exposure, urgency, feasibility of influence, or strategic relevance?	The company has explicit prioritization criteria and a clear escalation route for high-impact issues.
2. Core management processes	**Cross-functional coordination**	Ensures that GR does not operate separately from internal business expertise.	How does GR coordinate with legal, PR, compliance, finance, operations, strategy, commercial teams, and senior management? Are working groups or task forces used?	GR acts as a coordinator of internal expertise and builds issue-specific coalitions inside the company.
2. Core management processes	**Stakeholder engagement model**	Structures external engagement with public authorities, regulators, business associations, industry	Does the company rely mainly on associations, direct relationships, coalitions, expert dialogue, public communication, or a mix of channels?	Stakeholder engagement is deliberate, credible, long-term, and matched to the nature of each regulatory issue.

		peers, experts, and other stakeholders.		
2. Core management processes	**Advocacy and response strategy**	Converts company position into a practical engagement plan.	Does the company only react to proposed changes, or can it proactively shape agenda, prepare positions, build coalitions, and propose solutions?	GR develops evidence-based positions and uses appropriate advocacy channels before issues escalate.
3. Capability enablers	**Internal legitimacy of GR**	Determines whether GR is trusted and involved early by business units and top management.	Do internal stakeholders understand GR's value? Is GR invited early into discussions? Is it seen as strategic or only as an emergency tool?	GR is recognized internally as a necessary function for managing regulatory uncertainty and business exposure.
3. Capability enablers	**Expertise and analytical capacity**	Provides the knowledge base for credible internal advice and external engagement.	Does GR have enough sector knowledge, legal/regulatory understanding, communication ability, and political/institutional awareness?	GR combines regulatory understanding, business knowledge, stakeholder awareness, and communication skills.
3. Capability enablers	**Institutional memory and continuity**	Prevents GR from becoming overly dependent on one person or isolated relationships.	Are previous positions, stakeholder history, lessons learned, and regulatory issue files preserved?	GR knowledge is documented, transferable, and embedded in routines, not only in individual experience.
3. Capability enablers	**Resources and management support**	Provides practical capacity to act.	Does GR have enough people, budget, time, analytical support, external advisors, and executive sponsorship?	GR has resources proportionate to the company's regulatory exposure and strategic ambition.
3. Capability enablers	**Ethical and compliance boundaries**	Protects the company from reputational, legal, and governance risks.	Are engagement practices transparent, lawful, and aligned with internal compliance rules? Are sensitive interactions properly documented?	GR operates within clear ethical boundaries and supports legitimate, transparent business-government engagement.
4. Managerial outcomes	**Earlier issue detection**	Reduces late-stage reaction and crisis-driven engagement.	Are regulatory issues identified before they become urgent?	The company detects relevant regulatory signals early enough to prepare an informed response.
4. Managerial outcomes	**Better prioritization**	Focuses attention on strategically relevant issues.	Does the company distinguish between routine monitoring, selective engagement, and high-priority intervention?	GR resources are directed toward issues with meaningful business, regulatory, or reputational consequences.
4. Managerial outcomes	**Improved internal response**	Links external regulatory issues to internal business decisions.	Are business units, legal, finance, operations, and top management aligned around the company's position?	Regulatory response is coordinated across functions and translated into management action.
4. Managerial outcomes	**More credible external engagement**	Improves the quality and consistency of interaction with public stakeholders.	Is the company's position evidence-based, consistent, and credible to external stakeholders?	Engagement is based on expertise, continuity, stakeholder understanding, and constructive policy arguments.
4. Managerial outcomes	**Greater strategic adaptability**	Helps the company adjust to regulatory uncertainty and institutional volatility.	Can the company adapt its internal plans, investments, compliance approach, or external engagement strategy in response to regulatory change?	GR supports strategic adaptation by connecting external regulatory change with internal decision-making.

Note. Developed by the author based on the qualitative cross-case analysis. The table operationalizes the GR Capability Framework by linking framework levels, core dimensions, design questions, and stronger GR configurations. GR = Government Relations; PR = Public Relations.

Table C2

Government Relations Capability Maturity Logic

Maturity level	Description	Typical characteristics	Main development need
Level 1 — Reactive / ad hoc GR	GR is activated mainly when regulatory problems become visible or urgent.	Weak or informal mandate; late involvement; dependence on individual contacts; limited coordination; low measurement logic.	Clarify mandate, ownership, basic monitoring, and escalation responsibilities.
Level 2 — Developing / partially institutionalized GR	GR is recognized as useful and has some structure, but processes remain uneven.	Basic mandate or identifiable owner; some monitoring; partial coordination with legal/business units; emerging stakeholder routines; limited outcome assessment.	Build regular issue review, prioritization, cross-functional coordination, and institutional memory.
Level 3 — Strategic / integrated GR capability	GR is integrated into management decision-making and regulatory issue management.	Clear mandate; senior management access; systematic sensing; structured prioritization; cross-functional coordination; stakeholder architecture; effectiveness logic; institutional memory.	Maintain adaptability, continuity, context sensitivity, and strategic integration.

Note. Developed by the author as a practical extension of the framework presented in Table C1. The maturity levels are intended as diagnostic categories rather than fixed or universal stages of organizational development.

Figure C1

Government Relations Capability Framework: Full Visual Version



Note. Developed by the author based on the qualitative cross-case findings and the full framework presented in Tables C1 and C2. The model conceptualizes Government Relations as a strategic organizational capability for managing regulatory issues.

Note. *Framework developed by the author based on the qualitative cross-case findings and the full framework presented in Tables C1 and C2. Visual layout was prepared with AI assistance and revised by the author. The model conceptualizes GR as a context-sensitive organizational capability for managing regulatory issues in large companies operating under regulatory uncertainty.*

Appendix D. Certificates of Implementation

This appendix contains formal certificates confirming the practical use of selected conclusions, recommendations, and managerial tools developed in this capstone project.

Document D1
Certificate of Implementation

ТОВАРИСТВО З ОБМЕЖЕНОЮ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЮ
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Вих. № 01/05-26
від «01***»*** 05 ***2026 р.***

ДОВІДКА

про впровадження результатів наукової роботи

Ця довідка видана Мартиненку Артуру Сергійовичу, студенту ТОВ «ВИЩИЙ НАВЧАЛЬНИЙ ЗАКЛАД "АМЕРІКАН ЮНІВЕРСІТІ КИЇВ"», на підтвердження використання матеріалів його магістерської роботи на тему «Проєктування Government Relations як стратегічної спроможності для управління регуляторними питаннями» у роботі ТОВ «ЦФР ГРУП».

У практичній діяльності підприємства використовуються такі результати роботи:

1. рекомендації щодо системної роботи з регуляторними питаннями;
2. підходи до організації взаємодії між GR-функцією, юридичною функцією та керівником;
3. пропозиції щодо раннього виявлення та пріоритизації регуляторних змін;
4. управлінський інструмент для оцінки стану та подальшого розвитку GR-функції.

Вказані розробки використовуються для покращення внутрішніх управлінських процесів, пов'язаних із регуляторними питаннями та співпрацею з публічними стейкхолдерами.

З повагою
директор ТОВ «ЦФР ГРУП» **Сергій ТРОЯН**

ТОВАРИСТВО З ОБМЕЖЕНОЮ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЮ «ЦФР ГРУП» Код 42926957 УКРАЇНА, м. Київ

Document D2
Certificate of Implementation

ТОВАРИСТВО З ОБМЕЖЕНОЮ ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЮ «РОЗВИТОК ПОБУЖЖЯ»

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Вих. № 05/01-02-26 від 01.05.2026р.

ДОВІДКА
про впровадження результатів наукової роботи

Дана Мартиненку Артуру Сергійовичу, здобувачу вищої освіти ТОВ «ВИЩИЙ НАВЧАЛЬНИЙ ЗАКЛАД "АМЕРІКАН ЮНІВЕРСІТІ КИЇВ"», який навчається за освітньою програмою «Глобал менеджмент» за спеціальністю 073 «Менеджмент», у тому, що матеріали його магістерської роботи на тему «ПРОЄКТУВАННЯ GOVERNMENT RELATIONS ЯК СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ СПРОМОЖНОСТІ ДЛЯ УПРАВЛІННЯ РЕГУЛЯТОРНИМИ ПИТАННЯМИ» розглянуті в діяльності ТОВ «РОЗВИТОК ПОБУЖЖЯ».

Висновки та практичні пропозиції автора становлять інтерес для удосконалення підходів компанії до організації Government Relations та управління регуляторними питаннями.

Практичне значення мають такі результати роботи:

1. підхід до розгляду Government Relations як управлінської функції;
2. управлінський інструмент для оцінки та розвитку GR-функції;
3. рекомендації щодо виявлення, пріоритизації та опрацювання регуляторних питань;
4. пропозиції щодо посилення координації між GR, юридичною функцією, керівництвом та іншими підрозділами.

Зазначені розробки прийняті для практичного використання в діяльності ТОВ «РОЗВИТОК ПОБУЖЖЯ» під час удосконалення внутрішніх процесів управління регуляторними питаннями.

З повагою
Директор
ТОВ «РОЗВИТОК ПОБУЖЖЯ» **Віталій МІСЮТИНСЬКИЙ**

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