

WOMEN IN WAR: MOTIVATIONS TO STAY AND REASONS TO LEAVE



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CONTENTS

Highlights	5
1. Situation Overview.....	7
2. Literature Review	8
3. Research Methodology.....	9
3.1. Sampling and Data Collection	9
General Methodology	9
Survey Design.....	10
3.2. Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)	11
3.2.1. Objective and Approach.....	11
3.2.2. Experimental Design	11
3.2.3. Choice Tasks	12
3.2.4. Design Optimization.....	14
3.2.5. Survey Implementation	15
3.2.6. Ethical Considerations.....	15
4. Respondents' Profile	15
4.1. Demographic Profile	16
4.2. Plans for Childbirth.....	20
4.3. Employment and Financial Situation.....	21
4.4. Need for and Provision of Assistance.....	27
4.5. Experience of Relocation During the War.....	29
4.6. Experience of War.....	33
4.7. Conclusions.....	35
5. Willingness and Reasons for Staying in Ukraine.....	36

5.1.	Willingness to stay in Ukraine and in one's settlement.....	36
5.2.	Main reasons for staying in Ukraine	41
5.3.	Detailed analysis of reasons for staying.....	46
5.4.	Conclusions.....	48
6.	Leaving Abroad: Intentions and Opportunities.....	50
6.1.	Willingness to leave abroad.....	50
6.2.	Reasons for leaving abroad	57
6.2.1.	Aspirations to leave and confidence in opportunities abroad	58
6.2.2	The Relationship between financial well-being and constraints to leaving abroad	59
6.2.3	Factors that motivate leaving and returning	60
6.3.	Restrictions on leaving abroad	61
6.4.	Agency in decision-making	67
6.5.	Conclusions.....	68
7.	Potential triggers for leaving abroad.....	69
7.1.	What will make people leave? From safety to international support.....	70
7.2.	IF leavong – then where? Decisions about migration destination.....	71
7.3.	Conclusions.....	73
8.	Risk perception and vision of the future	73
8.1.	Assessment of risky situations in Ukraine and abroad.....	73
8.2.	Assessment of risky situations abroad.....	76
8.3.	Vision of the future	77
8.4.	Risk assessment and vision of the future: Impact on the intention to stay in Ukraine or move abroad	79
9.	Conclusions and recommendations	80
9.1.	Conclusions.....	80

9.2. Recommendations.....	81
References.....	85
Appendices.....	87
Appendix 1. Results of regression analysis.....	87
Appendix 2. Data collection methodology	97
Appendix 3. Questionnaire	100
Appendix 4. List of figures.....	119

The Centre for Economic Strategy is an independent centre for public policy research. CES's mission is to support reforms in Ukraine in order to achieve sustainable economic growth. The Centre contributes to the development of Ukraine's economic growth strategy, provides independent analysis of the most important aspects of state policy, and works to strengthen public support for reforms. The Centre was founded in May 2015.

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This research was conducted with the support of the UK Government through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) as part of the project 'Support to the Government of Ukraine to Develop and Implement Evidence-Based Policies to Address Demographic Challenges', implemented by UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund in Ukraine'.

HIGHLIGHTS

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 forced millions of Ukrainians to flee their homes. Among those who have left, the majority are adult women and children. However, many more women, including those with children, have decided to stay, balancing family ties with security and economic threats. This research analyses the motivations of Ukrainian women to remain in Ukraine despite the ongoing hostilities, as well as the constraints that prevent those who would like to leave. Particular attention is paid to potential triggers that could influence such decisions in the future. The study was conducted based on data collected by Rating Online LLC on behalf of the Centre for Economic Strategy and the American University of Kyiv between January 23 and 30, 2025. The sample includes 2,018 women aged 18-60 residing in Ukraine, as well as 319 additional respondents from among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those who have returned from abroad.

Life in a country at war for three years is difficult. Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, 39% of Ukrainian women aged 18-60 have been forced to flee their homes, of whom more than half (53%) have already returned. Among women in this age group, 18% are internally displaced, 12% have returned from abroad, and 11% were IDPs but have also returned home. 90% of women have experienced traumatic events, including rocket attacks and bombings (55%), loss of a loved one (21%), and destruction or damage to housing (14%). 10% have experience of living in the occupied territory, and one in three has a loved one who serves or has served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

For the vast majority of women (79%), it is important to stay in Ukraine. The main motivations are family (91%) and a sense of belonging to the country (88%). Material factors such as housing (72%) or a good job (46%) also play an important role. Socio-demographic characteristics are also associated with the decision to migrate. Older and wealthier women are more likely to stay in Ukraine, while those who have returned from abroad show less motivation to stay.

Despite their strong attachment to the country, 20% of women would like to move abroad but do not have the means to do so. Among IDPs, this figure is even higher at 27%. At the same time, the widespread perception that women with children, rural residents, and IDPs are more likely to stay is not confirmed - their intentions do not significantly differ from the general sample.

Some of those who wish to move abroad do not even consider this option, mainly because of poverty. However, 15% of women are actively considering moving abroad. The main reasons for such considerations are the desire for a better standard of living (75%) and security (73%). Although women who stay in Ukraine assess risks as lower than those who go abroad, both groups recognise growing threats. The highest aspirations for leaving are observed among young people, those with low incomes, and Russian-speaking residents of the frontline and western regions. Those who have already had experience of moving outside the country are more likely to reconsider their decision to return. At the same time, the fear of starting over and psychological barriers deter many from realising their leaving intentions.

We looked at six potential factors that could influence women's decisions to leave their homes. The main trigger will be the security situation: an escalation of hostilities or the threat of occupation doubles the likelihood of migration, in particular, the probability of leaving for abroad increases by almost 1.5 times. The second most important factor is the loss of housing, even if free housing is offered in a new place in Ukraine. The complete loss of income has a similar effect to the loss of housing. In both cases, women are more likely to move within Ukraine. Long-term power and heating cuts, as well as reduced international aid, have a lesser impact on migration decisions in general. However, a political crisis and the cessation of international aid increase the likelihood of leaving abroad. The departure of acquaintances has virtually no impact on the decision to leave. However, if a woman does decide to leave because her friends have gone abroad, she is more likely to emigrate herself.

Ultimately, migration for Ukrainian women is neither an absolute necessity nor an inevitability. It is a dynamic decision that changes depending on circumstances and personal capacities. Understanding these nuances will allow policymakers to design measures that respect individual choice and promote stability for those who stay.

The decision to stay is often based on deep inner needs - ties with loved ones, love for the country, and moral sense. It is not only about 'I can't leave', but also about 'I want to be here'. Staying is a choice in favour of a well-known, though dangerous, environment.

For many Ukrainian women who remain in the country despite the war hardships, the housing situation plays an extremely important role in the decision to stay or leave, surpassing even income. It is the second strongest factor, after security, that increases the likelihood of leaving one's home. This indicates that housing is what nourishes a sense of rootedness. In this context, rental assistance programmes for IDPs, subsidies for the repair of damaged property, or support for local reconstruction should be continued. Such initiatives not only improve housing conditions but also strengthen the physical connection to the place — and thus the intention to stay.

Equally important is the public acknowledgement by the state of the resilience and patriotism of those who have consciously chosen not to leave, driven by a sense of belonging and a "this is my country" feeling. If the state does not demonstrate prospects and support, and if the social environment is dominated by stories of successful emigration, the barriers to leaving will melt away. A positive narrative about life in Ukraine needs to be shaped, even in such difficult circumstances: stories of those who stayed or returned, public visibility of local successes, and a clear state strategy for recovery.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has triggered a large-scale displacement crisis, characterised by unprecedented levels of forced migration both within and outside the country. According to the Centre for Economic Strategy, as of the end of 2024, about 5.2 million Ukrainians had left the country during the full-scale invasion (some of them were forcibly transferred to Russia and Belarus) (CES, 2025). At the same time, more than 31 million people remain in government-controlled territory, despite significant insecurity, economic instability, and damage to critical infrastructure (Ukrinform, 2024). The majority of those who have left are adult women, accounting for 44%. 29% of Ukrainian refugees are children under the age of 18 (CES, 2025). This gender structure of migration flows largely reflects legal restrictions that prohibit men aged 18-60 from leaving the country unless they fall under certain exceptions (e.g., having three or more children or certain health conditions).

Although women have relatively more freedom to leave, a significant number of them choose to stay in Ukraine. This decision has critical implications for the country's current stability and future recovery. The rapid outflow of human capital is already creating urgent economic, demographic, and security challenges, and the availability of a working-age population is a key condition for Ukraine's resilience and post-war recovery. In this context, understanding the motivations that influence decisions of certain groups to stay in the country is fundamental to developing effective public policies.

As women aged 18-60 years face fewer legal barriers to leaving and yet comprise a significant part of Ukraine's labour force, this study focuses on the factors that influence this group's decision to stay in Ukraine. Their continued participation in economic activities, social services, and community resilience efforts is key to the country's immediate survival and long-term prospects. For example, there is evidence that higher levels of women's labour market participation during conflict are positively correlated with improved community well-being (UN Women, 2012). Thus, the views and choices of these women are key for policymakers seeking to balance security challenges with socio-economic stability.

From a public policy perspective, a thorough understanding of the reasons why certain groups stay is necessary to develop targeted programmes aimed at maintaining the security of citizens and encouraging internal displacement as an alternative to cross-border migration. Such measures could include assistance with housing, job creation, access to healthcare (including psychological assistance) and stable electricity supply, all of which can make staying in one's home community or relocating within Ukraine more acceptable and less risky. In addition, retaining skilled workers and an economically active population is crucial to slowing the brain drain and ensuring the country's ability to rebuild.

Thus, by seeking answers to these questions, this study contributes to the broader academic debate on forced displacement by highlighting decision-making processes in extreme environments from a gender perspective. We aim to provide practical recommendations for governments, NGOs, and international partners seeking to stabilise populations in high-risk areas, strengthen support systems for internally displaced persons, and ultimately reduce the outflow of skilled and efficient citizens. The findings will be crucial for shaping

Ukraine's post-war recovery policy and ensuring long-term demographic sustainability and development, especially given extensive destruction of infrastructure and socio-economic disruption.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Migration and refugee studies have traditionally focused on displaced populations – those who move, often overlooking the experiences and decisions of those who stay in conflict-affected areas (Biehler, 2023). In migration studies, this phenomenon is known as *mobility bias*. Schewel (2020) defines this bias as “an overconcentration of theoretical and empirical attention on the determinants and consequences of mobility and, by extension, the concomitant neglect of immobility.” Consequently, much of the scholarly debate has centered on the “push” and “pull” factors that drive or facilitate displacement, with relatively little attention paid to understanding why some populations choose to stay.

This gap in the literature not only limits our understanding of broader migration dynamics but also biases policy responses toward facilitating out-migration rather than stabilizing or supporting those who remain. Existing studies on forced displacement have identified the main push factors, with *exposure to violence* being the dominant driver. However, economic and political issues are also significant (Morrison and May, 1994; Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009; Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010; Bohra-Mishra and Massey, 2011).

In the context of forced displacement, pull factors are generally considered determinants of *where* refugees go rather than *why* they move in the first place. Previous research suggests that refugees often choose neighboring countries with relatively high per-capita income levels, as well as accessible education and health services and established social networks (Lanati and Thiele, 2022; Di Iasio and Wahba, 2024). Meanwhile, older populations (over 60) frequently exhibit greater reluctance to relocate, shaped by deeper social networks, health constraints, and a desire to maintain established routines (Dorcas Aid International, 2022; HelpAge International, 2024).

By contrast, the decision to stay in conflict regions is far less studied. The scarce evidence indicates that insufficient financial resources, lack of contacts in prospective destinations, and the high opportunity costs of relocation can prevent individuals from fleeing (Ibáñez & Andrés, 2016). Yet people may also stay by *choice* rather than solely due to inability. Indeed, we know relatively little about the motivations behind the voluntary decision to stay during wartime.

Another limitation of many conflict-related studies is that they are often conducted after the end of hostilities, which imposes certain methodological limitations: respondents may rationalise their decisions retrospectively rather than recording their true motivations at the time of decision-making. What makes this study unique is that it is conducted during the active phase of the war, which allows us to document the genuine sentiments that influence women's decisions to stay or leave.

Understanding these motivations can also aid policymakers in persuading at-risk populations to evacuate when conditions become critically dangerous, a pressing issue given that many Ukrainians remain in place even as hostilities intensify (Martinez et al., 2023).

This study fills a critical gap by directly examining women aged 18-60 who could have left but chose not to, thus adding new dimensions to the literature on wartime forced displacement. As Ukraine continues to suffer the devastating effects of the war, data on the population that stayed will help to develop policies aimed at strengthening social cohesion, economic stability, and national resilience. Finally, a deeper understanding of immobility enhances existing knowledge on forced migration by providing a more comprehensive perspective on how conflict changes populations and territories over time.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this study, we employ a mixed-methods approach combining a survey and a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to investigate the factors that influence women's decisions to stay in Ukraine, relocate within the country, or move abroad during the war.

3.1. SAMPLING AND DATA COLLECTION

The survey was conducted by the company *LLC "Rating Online"* across the entire territory of Ukraine, excluding temporarily occupied areas and regions where Ukrainian mobile networks were unavailable at the time of the survey. The survey took place from January 23 to January 30, 2025, and targeted women aged 18–60 who were residing in Ukraine at the time of the survey.

The sample is representative in terms of age and region of residence for the target audience of the survey.

GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The survey was conducted using the CATI-CAWI¹ methodology, which consists of two stages. In the first stage, respondents were randomly recruited via CATI (using the Random Digit Dialing procedure (RDD)) and completed a short screening questionnaire, including consent to continue participating in the survey online. Once respondents completed this part and agreed to proceed with the online questionnaire, they automatically received a text message via Viber (or an SMS if Viber was unavailable) with a link to the questionnaire. By clicking on this link, respondents proceeded to the second stage of the survey (CAWI), during which they independently completed the online questionnaire on the *Rating Online* platform. The overall **response rate was 5.6%**.

The final sample size for Ukraine consisted of **2,018 female respondents** who completed the survey. The survey results were weighted based on the macro-region of residence and age groups.

¹ Computer Assisted Telephone Interview – Computer Assisted Web Interview

In addition to the main survey stage, a booster sample of **319 respondents** was conducted to ensure a minimum of **450 respondents** in each of the two target groups: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and those who had returned after temporarily leaving abroad (returnees). As a result, the total sample size, including the targeted booster selection, comprised **2,337 respondents**.

The sample size enables us to perform segmentation on age, rural/urban settlements, income, and other factors. By oversampling key subgroups, the survey provides robust insights into the heterogeneity of experiences and motivations across different contexts.

All participants provided informed consent and were informed they can exit the questionnaire at any time. The data collected was anonymized, with no personal identifiers included in the final dataset.

Full details of the data collection methodology are provided in *APPENDIX 1. Data collections methodology*.

SURVEY DESIGN

The questionnaire is organized in the following blocks of questions:

- socio-demographic data
- aspirations and reasons to stay
- risk perception
- aspirations and constraints to leave
- agency in moving decision-making
- vision of the future
- war experience
- discrete choice experiment (DCE)

The full questionnaire is available in *Appendix 3. Questionnaire*.

For exploring the leaving intentions, this study adopts the **aspirations–capability framework** developed by Hein de Haas (2021) in *A Theory of Migration: The Aspirations-Capabilities Framework*. Central to this approach is the idea that migration decisions result from the interplay between individuals' *aspirations* (their desire to move) and their *capabilities*, referring to the resources and opportunities that enable or constrain actual migration.

Rather than viewing migration solely as a response to external pressures, de Haas emphasizes that it arises from the interaction of these two dimensions, producing four distinct groups:

1. **High aspirations, high capabilities:** Individuals who both want to leave and possess sufficient resources (financial, social, etc.) to do so.
2. **High aspirations, low capabilities:** Individuals who have a strong desire to leave but are constrained by factors like insufficient funds, logistical challenges, or legal barriers.
3. **Low aspirations, high capabilities:** Individuals who can leave, but choose to stay due to attachments such as family, community, or national identity.

4. **Low aspirations, low capabilities:** Individuals who neither aspire to leave nor have the means to do so, resulting in “acquiescent immobility”.

This framework is especially relevant in a wartime context because it can capture both the structural constraints (e.g., safety concerns, financial resources) and the psychological factors (e.g., fear, national pride, family obligations) that shape people’s decisions. In applying this framework, the study will cluster respondents based on their aspirations to leave and their capabilities to act on those aspirations, thereby defining how each combination influences decisions to move or stay.

By leveraging the aspirations–capability perspective, this research aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how individuals weigh their options under exceptionally high-risk conditions. In addition, focusing on working-aged women who are the most mobile group in the Ukrainian wartime context, enables a deeper exploration of the motivations and constraints associated with staying, beyond the more obvious barriers such as legal restrictions affecting men and the reluctance to leave commonly observed among older populations.

To complement these findings, the analysis also incorporates data from the refugee survey conducted by the Center for Economic Strategy (CES) in November-December 2024². This dataset, which includes perspectives of Ukrainian refugees abroad, will enable a comparative analysis between stayers and refugees, providing a comprehensive view of migration dynamics during wartime.³

3.2. DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENT (DCE)

3.2.1. OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH

Within this project, we aimed to investigate the trade-offs individuals face when deciding whether to stay in their current settlement or to leave during the prolonged military conflict. Given the sensitivity of the topic, we employed a discrete choice experiment (DCE), also known as a factorial design or vignette method, to assess individuals’ preferences in a more comprehensive way. This method allows for a deeper understanding of how respondents weigh competing factors and helps quantify the relative importance of each attribute. By employing the DCE, the study moves beyond self-reported motivations and aims to uncover the underlying preferences and trade-offs that drive the decision-making process.

3.2.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The DCE was designed to present respondents with hypothetical **scenarios** described by a combination of six **attributes**: security situation, income, availability of basic utilities, social network, access to housing, and political situation.

² [Ukrainian refugees after three years abroad. The fourth wave of the study](#)

³ For comparability of results with refugee data, we analyse only a subsample of women aged 18-60

Each attribute has three ordered **levels** reflecting a progression from "no change", to "somewhat worsening" and "substantially worsening" for each attribute.

Table 1 outlines the six attributes and their respective levels, which describe hypothetical situations relevant to respondents' decision-making.

These six attributes were selected based on academic literature and reports from international organisations that study forced displacement during the Russian-Ukrainian War. For example, a series of regular UNHCR reports "Lives on hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees, Refugee Returnees and IDPs from Ukraine"⁴ consistently identifies security (shelling or occupation), domestic (access to water and electricity), financial (employment, resources for return and reintegration), and social (whether relatives can leave Ukraine) factors as those that influence refugees' decisions to leave or, possibly, return. The reports also highlight access to adequate housing as a precondition for the return of refugees and IDPs. Thus, the factors of 'no-leaving' that we have proposed mirror those of return. Similar factors (security, finances, housing, household services, social ties) are mentioned in regular IOM reports⁵ about Ukrainian refugees abroad, IDPs, and the local population. The impact of violence as a factor of forced migration is also described in the academic literature, for example, in Kosyakova et al. Political factors were chosen as an additional control, but political instability is also found in numerous studies of displacement during war conflicts.

3.2.3. CHOICE TASKS

Each respondent was presented with a choice task consisting of two alternative scenarios, both described by the six attributes. Respondents were asked to answer two questions:

1. In which of these two situations would you be more likely to leave your settlement?
2. If you happen to appear in the situation you have chosen in the first question, what would you do?
 - a) Stay in your settlement.
 - b) Relocate to another settlement within Ukraine.
 - c) Go abroad.

Each respondent completed three different choice tasks (cards), ensuring exposure to diverse scenarios.

⁴ Recent report <https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/media/lives-hold-intentions-and-perspectives-refugees-refugee-returnees-and-idps-ukraine-6-summary>

⁵ See <https://dtm.iom.int/ukraine>

Table 1. The attributes and levels of hypothetical situations for the Discrete Choice Experiment.

Attributes/Levels	1 did not change	2 got a little worse	3 got much worse
Security	The general security situation in the country has not changed	The situation at the front has worsened (Russia is advancing, capturing new cities, shelling of cities has intensified)	The situation at the front is catastrophic. There is a threat of occupation of the country.
Income	Your income has not changed	Your income has fallen by 50%	Your family has lost sources of income
Basic utilities	Power outages continue as they are now	There is no energy supply for up to 12 hours a day	There is no heat and energy supply for more than 20 hours a day
Social networks	Most of your friends remain in your settlement	Most of your friends have left your settlement	Most of your friends have left Ukraine
Housing	Your current housing has not been damaged.	Due to military operations, your current housing is no longer suitable for living. You are offered free housing in a new place.	Due to military operations, your current housing is no longer suitable for living. You will have to rent housing in a new place yourself
Internal political situation and international aid	The political situation and the volume of international aid have not changed.	The political situation has not changed. The volume of international aid has decreased sharply.	The country is in a political crisis. Street protests have begun. International aid has almost stopped.

3.2.4. DESIGN OPTIMIZATION

Such a design encompasses a full set of 729 (3⁶) possible alternative scenarios. Random pairing of scenarios with ordered alternatives often leads to trivial or unrealistic combinations. For example, a pair where one scenario is clearly dominant (e.g., one scenario with no changes across all attributes versus another with significant negative changes) is not informative and does not allow us to conclude anything about a person's preferences for separate attributes.

To avoid such situations, fractional factorial design principles were applied, focusing on main effects while ensuring meaningful trade-offs and balanced representation of the attributes.

As a result, the full set was reduced to a random subset of 72 situations, which were randomly combined into 36 pairs (tasks). Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the survey question on the respondent's mobile phone screen.

Figure 1. Survey questions on a mobile phone screen

В якій з двох наведених ситуацій Ви будете більш схильні виїхати з Вашого населеного пункту?	
Ситуація 1	Ситуація 2
Загальна безпекова ситуація катастрофічна. Виникла загроза окупації країни.	Ситуація на фронті різко погіршилась. (росія наступає, захоплює великі міста, обстріли міст посилюються)
Ваші доходи впали на 50%	Ваші доходи впали на 50%
Відключення світла тривають так само як зараз	До 12 годин на добу немає енергопостачання
Більшість ваших знайомих залишаються у вашому населеному пункті	Більшість ваших знайомих залишаються у вашому населеному пункті
Ваше нинішнє житло постраждало і не придатне до проживання. У новому місці вам доведеться самостійно знімати житло	Ваше нинішнє житло не постраждало
В країні політична криза. Почалися вуличні протести. Міжнародна допомога майже припинилася.	В країні політична криза. Почалися вуличні протести. Міжнародна допомога майже припинилася.
Ситуація 1	Ситуація 2

Ви будете більш схильні виїхати з Вашого населеного пункту у...

У ситуації 1 (ліворуч)

У ситуації 2 (праворуч)

Note. N=72 ensures that our design satisfies the mathematical rules for balance and structure of a fractional factor design for a 3-level system, and at the same time ensures that each pair is shown to a sufficient number of respondents in the sample of 2,018 respondents. The R package (DoE.base) was used to implement the design.

3.2.5. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION

During the survey, each respondent was presented with three randomly selected tasks (chosen from among the 36 pairs). With a sample size of 2,018 respondents, each task was shown, on average, to 168 respondents. Pilot testing ensured that the design was comprehensible and that the task load was manageable for respondents.

The data collected from the DCE are analyzed using discrete choice models, focusing on the relative importance of each attribute and its level in driving respondents' decisions.

3.2.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Given the sensitive nature of the topic, the study adhered to strict ethical standards. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and their anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed throughout the study. Ethical approval was secured before the data collection started from the institutional review board at the American University of Kyiv.

Overall, this mixed-method design, grounded in both survey data and a discrete choice experiment, aims to provide a nuanced examination of how Ukrainian women assess risks and opportunities, revealing the relative weight of various factors in their stay-or-leave decisions.

4. RESPONDENTS' PROFILE

In this study, we refer to *internally displaced persons* (IDPs) as those respondents who indicated in the survey that after 24 February 2022 they left their permanent place of residence as a result of Russia's armed aggression to another settlement in Ukraine and never returned, or went abroad, then returned to Ukraine but not to their previous settlement. This does not take into account whether the respondent had the formal status of an internally displaced person under Ukrainian law. If a respondent relocated to another settlement after 2014 but did not move after February 2022, she is not considered an IDP for the purposes of this study. In our sample, IDPs make up 18% of the sample.

By *returnees*, or ex-refugees, we mean female respondents who travelled abroad because of Russian aggression and returned to Ukraine. If they did not return to their own place of residence, these respondents are also included in the category of IDPs. This group makes up 12% of the sample.

For the purpose of analysis, we also identified a group of *ex-IDPs*, i.e. those who left their settlement within Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion and have already returned home as of the survey date. If, in addition to displacement within Ukraine, they travelled abroad, these respondents were also included in the category of returnees. In total, there are 11% of ex-IDPs.

This study only examines the experiences of women who resided in Ukraine at the time of the survey and excludes those who had moved abroad and stayed there.

4.1. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The largest number of respondents, 39%, reside in the central regions (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Cherkasy regions, and the city of Kyiv). In the western region (Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi regions) 28% of the sample live, while the frontline regions (Dnipropetrovs'k, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Kherson regions) comprise 18%. The lowest number of respondents came from the southern regions (Mykolaiv, Odesa), 9%, and the northern regions (Sumy, Chernihiv), 6% (Figure 2)⁶. 32% of respondents live in regional (oblast) centers, and almost 30% reside in villages and towns. The lowest number of people, only 15%, live in small towns (with a population of less than 50,000), while the remaining 23% live in cities with over 50,000 inhabitants (Figure 3).

Among the female respondents, women aged 40-49 comprise the largest **age group**, 30% of the sample. Two other age groups, 30-39 y.o. and 50-60 y.o., comprise almost 25% each. The youngest group, aged 18-29 years, comprises 20% of all respondents (Figure 4).

Almost half of the respondents (47%) have no **children** under the age of 18 living with them in Ukraine. 28% have only one child, 17% have two children and 7% have three or more children (Figure 5).

Figure 2. Breakdown of respondents by region of residence





Figure 3. Breakdown of respondents by type of settlement



⁶ The division into regions does not fully correspond to the classical division used in other studies of the Ukrainian population. This was done for further regional analysis, based on the presumption that during the war, living in frontline regions, as well as those with an unterrestrial border with Russia or access to the sea, from which missile attacks or landings could come, may be an important factor for the decision to stay in one's settlement or leave.

Figure 4. Breakdown of respondents by age






Figure 5. Breakdown of respondents by having children under 18, living with them



Almost half of the respondents (46%) **are married** and live with their spouse (Figure 6). Overall, 67% have a partner (married or not, living together or not). Overall, the situation among those currently living in Ukraine has not changed significantly since the full-scale invasion. The largest change occurred in the "married, living separately" category, which increased from 3% to 9%.

Figure 6. Marital status by February 2022 and now




For the vast majority of respondents (80%), Ukrainian is **the main language of communication** in everyday life. 18% claim Russian is their main language. Regional language differences are traditionally pronounced. Thus, in the West, 94% speak Ukrainian, while in the Centre and the North, 81% report using Ukrainian as their main language. In the eastern and southern regions, this figure is lower, 66% and 63% respectively.

The demographic profile of women who have **experienced displacement** is significantly different from those who have not left their settlements. Thus, among those who have returned from abroad, the share of the youngest category is significantly higher: 34%, compared to 20% in the total sample. At the same time, this category has a critically small share of respondents aged 30-39 years, only 6%, while in the entire sample, they make up 26% (Figure 7).

IDPs and those who have returned home after relocating within Ukraine share a very similar age structure. That is, IDPs returning home are evenly distributed across age groups.

Figure 7. Age breakdown of returnees, IDPs, and those who did not leave their settlement




It is interesting to compare the age structure of Ukrainian women currently living abroad and those who have returned (Figure 8). Among returnees, there are significantly higher shares of the 18-29 y.o. and 40-49 y.o. age groups: 34% and 31% respectively, compared to 24% and 28% among refugees. The largest difference is observed in the 30-39 y.o. category. Among refugees, they make up 29%, while among returnees, it is only 6%. That is, the return of Ukrainian refugees from abroad is uneven, with the lowest number of women aged 30-39 returning, despite this being one of the largest categories that had left.

This low proportion of women aged 30-39 who have returned from abroad is noteworthy. We have not been able to find other studies that assess the demographic structure of the population returning from abroad; therefore, it is not possible to validate our findings externally. We assume that such a small percentage of

returnees in this age group is due to the fact that most females in this age group are likely to be mothers of children under the age of 18, which may be a major factor that discourages their return.


Figure 8. Age distribution of refugees and returnees⁷



Groups with different experiences of forced displacement also differ in terms of the presence and the number of children (Figure 9). Thus, among IDPs and former IDPs, about 60% have children under the age of 18, while among returnees and refugees, only about 40% do. We can see that IDPs and refugees return home regardless of whether they have children.

⁷ Hereinafter, data on refugees are taken from the study ‘Ukrainian refugees after three years abroad. The Fourth Wave of the Study’ conducted by the Centre for Economic Strategy (<https://ces.org.ua/en/refugees-fourth-wave/>). For the compatibility of results from the foreign sample, only women aged 18-60 are analysed.

Figure 9. Number of children of returnees, refugees, IDPs, and those who did not leave their settlement



4.2. PLANS FOR CHILDBIRTH

Among all respondents aged 18-49, only 26% plan to have children (Table 2). In particular, 7% plan to give birth within the next three years, 3% plan to do so after three years, and 5% plan to do so only after the war is over. Another 10% plan to have a child, but cannot say when exactly.

58% of Ukrainian women do not intend to have (another) child, and the majority of them (88%) already have children.

Table 2: Plans to have children (respondents aged 18-49, number of respondents = 1,538)

Which of the following statements best describes your future plans for having children?	
I already have and do not plan to have children	51%
I do not have children and do not plan to have children at all	7%
I'm planning to have a baby, but I don't know when exactly	11%
I plan to have a child within the next 3 years, regardless of the end of the war	7%
I plan to have a child in 3 or more years, regardless of the end of the war	3%
I plan to have a child only after the war is over	5%
Hard to say	16%

Ukrainian women, both with and without children, have different plans for having children. Thus, among those who do not yet have children,⁸ 41% plan to have children. Among respondents with one child, 23% plan to have more children, while those with two or more children plan to have more children in only about 12% of cases. At the same time, 18% of women without children do not plan to have them.

4.3. EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL SITUATION

The majority of Ukrainian women (63%) are employed in the labour market, with almost equal numbers working in the private and public sectors (25% each), and the remaining 7% are entrepreneurs (Table 3). 35% are not employed, the main reasons being: parental leave (10%), retirement (4%), studying at college (3%), and caring for a person with a disability (2%). 16% indicated that they are not employed, without indicating any of the above reasons.

Table 3. Employment status of the respondents

Which of the following categories best describes your current main employment status?	
I am a salaried employee working in the private sector	25%
Employee, working in the public sector	25%
Not working	16%
Parental leave to care for a child	10%
Entrepreneur, owner of her own business	7%
Pensioner (age, disability), not working	4%
Student, not working	3%
I am a pensioner (by age, disability), I work	3%
Student, working	3%
Caring for a person with a disability	2%
Female soldier	1%

Among **IDPs**, the proportion of respondents who reported not being employed is higher than in the total sample (21% vs. 16%). Also, the share of IDPs on parental leave is significantly higher, 15% compared to 10% in the total sample.

⁸ No children under the age of 18 living with the respondent in Ukraine.

By **regions**, the highest share of unemployed people is in the southern and frontline regions, at around 21%. In other regions, this figure ranges from 14% to 17%.

Among those who reported being employed, the largest share of Ukrainian women, 26%, is in the administrative sector, specifically in roles such as office managers, secretaries, and accountants (Table 4). This category is followed by workers without formal qualifications (15%), teachers (14%), and skilled service workers (12%).


Table 4. Occupations/qualifications of employed respondents (number of respondents = 1,123)

Which of the following categories best describes your profession/qualification?	
Administrative staff: office managers, secretaries, accountants.	26%
Workers without formal qualifications: workers and agricultural labourers without formal education, salespeople, waiters, cleaners	15%
Teachers	14%
Skilled service workers: chefs, photographers, fitness trainers, seamstresses.	12%
University scientists, researchers, engineers, doctors, agronomists	9%
Middle medical staff: nurses, paramedics, pharmacists, and medical assistants.	8%
Legislators, senior civil servants, top managers	5%
Skilled workers: builders, electricians, plumbers, drivers, skilled agricultural workers	4%
Creative professions: designers, artists, writers, journalists.	4%
IT specialists: programmers, developers, cybersecurity specialists.	3%
Other	1%

In terms of **financial situation**, 14% of respondents have the lowest income level: they do not have enough money even for food (Figure 10). The largest category (34%) comprises respondents who have sufficient funds to purchase food but struggle to afford clothing. Thus, almost half of Ukrainian women are in the two poorest categories. Every fourth respondent has an average level of income (representing the middle class). The richest category, which can afford any purchases, comprises a mere 2%⁹.


⁹ For further analysis, the two wealthiest categories were combined into one.

Figure 10. Financial situation of the respondents




Among all categories, **internally displaced persons** have the lowest income level, with 56% of them belonging to the two poorest categories. In contrast, this share ranges between 40% and 48% in other categories (Figure 11). The highest share of the richest respondents is among the returnees (former refugees and ex-IDPs). It is interesting to compare Ukrainian women who have returned from abroad with those who still remain there. Refugee women report the highest incomes compared to all other categories. At the same time, returnees are much poorer: 40% of them cannot even buy groceries, or can only afford groceries, while among refugees, only 11% are in this category. This implies that women with the lowest incomes are most likely to choose to return.

Figure 11. Financial situation of returnees, refugees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement




By **region**, incomes in the border (southern and northern) and frontline regions are significantly lower than in the central and western regions, with 56 to 59% of women falling into the two poorest categories, compared to 40 to 46% in the central and western regions (Figure 12). At the same time, in the border and frontline regions, 11% of respondents belong to the richest category, while in the Centre and West, this share is 16%.

Figure 12. Financial situation by region




During the full-scale invasion, 74% of respondents reported that their financial situation had significantly or somewhat worsened (Figure 13). Only 6% of respondents reported an increase in income, while 13% reported no changes.

Figure 13. Changes in financial situation since February 2022




Over the past three years, internally displaced persons have suffered the most financially, with 53% experiencing a significant deterioration in their financial situation and another 25% experiencing a slight deterioration (Figure 14).

Figure 14. Changes in the financial situation of returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.



Respondents from the northern, southern, and eastern regions report the greatest deterioration in their financial situation, with about half reporting a significant deterioration (Figure 15). In the central and western regions, 40% and 32%, respectively, report a significant deterioration. Only 4% to 6% of respondents in all regions reported an improvement in their financial situation.

Figure 15. Changes in financial situation by region




The housing situation varies among different groups. The majority of respondents (61%) live in their own housing, 23% rent, and 12% live in housing provided by relatives or friends at no cost. The remaining 4% live in dormitories or housing provided by their employer or the local community.

The housing situation for internally displaced persons differs significantly from that of other groups. Only 16% of IDPs live in their own housing, whereas in other categories this figure ranges from 63% to 72%. Most IDPs, 64%, live in rented housing (Figure 16). Among IDPs who had lived in their own housing before displacement, only 18% had this opportunity at the time of the survey, while 64% rented.

Among those who have returned from abroad and previously owned their housing, 15% currently live in rented accommodation. Among former IDPs, the number is 4%. Thus, IDPs have the most vulnerable housing situation.

Figure 16. Housing situation of returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement



4.4. NEED FOR AND PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE

To understand the reasons and motivations for staying in Ukraine during the war, it is also important to understand the barriers to leaving. A potential limitation could be poor health or the need to care for relatives who need regular assistance. That is why we study this issue in detail.

Among all women surveyed, 18% indicated that they required external assistance in their daily lives, such as due to disability or poor health. Specifically, 3% required regular assistance, while 15% needed it occasionally. 73% of respondents reported no need for regular external assistance.

The women who reported the need for assistance most often received it from their husbands/partners (39%) and children (32%). Less frequently, respondents receive assistance from their parents (20%), other family members (11%), and neighbours or friends (8%) (Table 6). Less than 10% of respondents reported receiving assistance from volunteers and international organisations, social services, and hired caregivers.

Table 6. Who provides assistance to respondents in need (several options were available) (number of respondents = 369)

Who provides assistance to you	
Spouse/partner	39%
Children	32%
Parents.	20%

Other family members	11%
Neighbours and friends	8%
Volunteers, international organisations	3%
Social services	2%
Hired carer/assistant	1%
Other	1%
No one provides	15%
I don't want to answer	4%

It is worth noting that 15% of respondents who require assistance with everyday life reported not receiving it. Most often, respondents living in the Southern and Northern regions reported not receiving any assistance: 22% and 20%, respectively, compared to 12% to 15% in other regions. There is no significant difference between IDPs, returnees, and those who never left.

Additionally, 52% of women reported having people in their environment who required their regular assistance in everyday life. Most often, in 39% of responses, these were the parents of the respondent or of her partner (Table 7).

Table 7. Are there any people near you who need your constant help in everyday life (respondents could choose multiple options)

Who needs your assistance?	
My parents or my spouse/partner's parents	39%
Other relatives who need my help	14%
Friends who need my help	4%
There are no such people	38%
Difficult to answer	10%

There is no significant difference in the answers between the groups of those who have left their settlements, returned, or never left. At the same time, regional differences are pronounced. In the northern regions, the need for care for someone close to them is most often mentioned (72% of respondents), while in the western regions it is the least frequently mentioned (58%). The need for care for parents also increases with age. While in the 18-29 y.o. group, 19% say that their parents need their assistance, in the 30-39 y.o. group, the

share increases to 34%. Among respondents aged 40 and above, nearly half indicate a need to care for their parents.

4.5. EXPERIENCE OF RELOCATION DURING THE WAR

In total, since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, 39% of Ukrainian women aged 18-60 have left their homes, and more than half of them (53%) have already returned. Thus, a total of 18% of respondents were internally displaced at the time of the survey¹⁰.

Most often, women relocated within Ukraine (69% of those who left their settlements), whereas a much lower share left abroad (24%). 7% reported experiencing a move both abroad and within Ukraine.

Women mostly left for a long period of time, over a year (39%). In 37% of cases, the longest period of absence from home lasted between one and six months. 11% of women left for up to one month, and almost the same amount reported a leave of seven to twelve months.

Among those who left their settlement after February 2022 and have already returned home, the largest share of people is from Kyiv and Kyiv region (Table 8). They account for 24% and 13% respectively. This is followed by residents of Kharkiv (9%), Mykolaiv (7%), Dnipro (6%) and Rivne (5%) regions. Less than 5% left and returned from other regions.

Table 8. In which region did you live before 24 February 2022?


	Yes, I did, but I came back home	Yes, I left and did not return
Kyiv	24%	3%
Kyiv Oblast	13%	1%
Kharkiv Oblast	9%	17%
Mykolaiv Oblast	7%	1%
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	6%	3%
Rivne Oblast	5%	1%
Chernihiv Oblast	3%	1%

¹⁰ The question was formulated to ask about leaving their settlement after 24 February 2022, so women who became internally displaced after 2014 but did not move after February 2022 are not included in the IDP category for the purposes of this study. We also do not take into account whether the respondent is registered as an IDP under Ukrainian law.

Lviv Oblast	3%	3%
Odesa Oblast	3%	2%
Vinnitsia Oblast	3%	1%
Poltava Oblast	3%	1%
Zhytomyr Oblast	3%	1%
Zaporizhzhya Oblast	2%	11%
Sumy Oblast	2%	2%
Cherkassy Oblast	2%	1%
Donetsk Oblast	2%	25%
Kherson Oblast	1%	16%
Zakarpattia Oblast	1%	1%
Ternopil Oblast	1%	0%
Chernivtsi Oblast	1%	1%
Kirovohrad Oblast	1%	1%
Volyn Oblast	1%	0%
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	1%	1%
Khmelnyskyi Oblast	1%	1%
Luhansk Oblast	0%	5%
N	422	369

Among those who left their previous place of residence, 30% lived in regional (oblast) centers, 29% came from large cities (with over 50,000 inhabitants), 27% moved from rural communities, and 15% left small towns (with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants). Figure 17 clearly shows a tendency to move to settlements of a similar type to the one where the respondents had lived before relocation. Specifically, residents of rural areas tended to relocate mainly to other rural areas, whereas residents of oblast centers tended towards regional centers, etc.

Figure 17. Breakdown by type of settlement before and after displacement (number of respondents = 790), %.




32% of respondents who had lived in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions before the relocation (which comprises 47% of all those who relocated because of the war) indicated that their previous settlement was under **occupation** at the time of the survey. Another 14% did not know the status of their settlement or whether it was in the combat zone.

Of all the respondents who indicated that their home settlement was under russian occupation, 84% stated that they did not consider returning home while the settlement remained occupied, whereas 4% considered such a possibility. 12% have not decided on the answer.

Some respondents' family members also moved abroad. 43% of respondents reported that one of their relatives moved abroad during the full-scale invasion and stayed there. Most often, these were distant relatives (22%), followed by close relatives (such as brothers or sisters) (16%), then children over 18 (6%), parents (3%), and children under 18 (2%).

Women who left for other countries during the invasion were much more likely to have had a close relative abroad (Figure 18). 60% of returnees reported this fact, while in other groups this share is 38% to 47%. Women who never left their settlement are the least likely to have relatives who left because of the war and currently live abroad.

Figure 18. Relatives abroad among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement (multiple options were available)



Most of the respondents' relatives live in Poland (34%) and Germany (30%) (Table 9). 15% of women have relatives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova, and 14% in Canada and the USA.

Table 9. Countries to which relatives of respondents left during the war and where they currently live (several options were available)


Poland	34%
Germany	30%
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Moldova	15%
Canada, USA	14%
United Kingdom	5%
Turkey	1%
Other European countries	20%
Other countries	14%
Russia / Belarus	0%

During the full-scale invasion, a large number of Ukrainians ended up (including being forcibly deported) in Russia and Belarus. Although there is no reliable data on the number of Ukrainians in the aggressor countries, the UN estimates that they are 1.2 million in Russia and 44,500 in Belarus (<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>). Such large numbers suggest that our sample should include respondents with relatives in Russia or Belarus. We assume that the null result is due to the reluctance of respondents to say that they have relatives in the aggressor countries (a phenomenon known as social unwillingness to answer).

4.6. EXPERIENCE OF WAR


90% of women have experienced traumatic events related to the war (Figure 19). More than half of the women respondents (55%) have experienced rocket attacks or shelling. Approximately one in three women has a loved one who serves or has served in the Defence Forces and has also experienced prolonged separation from family members. 21% of women have lost a loved one in the war, and 14% have suffered destruction or damage to their property. Every tenth woman had experience of living in the occupied territory.

Figure 19: Which of the following events have you experienced since 24 February 2022? (Multiple options possible)




IDPs are much more likely to report various war-related events (Figure 20). Thus, 77% of them have experienced shelling /rocket attacks (compared to 55% in the entire sample), 37% report their house destroyed or damaged (compared to 14% in the entire sample), and 30% had experience of living in the occupied territory (compared to 10% in the sample). Women who have returned from abroad or are IDPs are much more likely to report having experienced emotional violence: 12% and 14% respectively, compared to 5% to 6% in other groups.

Figure 20. Events of the war experienced by returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlements (respondents could choose multiple options)



Of the women who fled the war and still stay abroad, 54% indicated that there was fighting or shelling in or near their settlement (Figure 21). 17% of refugees felt unsafe, despite the fact that their settlement was far from the frontline. 6% had their homes destroyed.

Figure 21. War-related events experienced by refugee women (respondents could choose multiple options)



4.7. CONCLUSIONS

Since the onset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a significant number of Ukrainian women aged 18 to 60 have experienced changes in their lifestyle and socio-economic situation. In particular, 39% of women in this age group were forced to leave their homes. The majority of them (69%) were displaced within Ukraine, 24% went abroad, and 7% experienced displacement in both Ukraine and abroad. More than half of those who were forced to leave their homes have already returned. The youngest women predominate among those returning from abroad, with 34% being under 30 years old, while only 6% of the returnees are aged 30-39 (compared to 26% in the entire sample). The likely reason for this is the presence of minor children in this age group, which complicates or constrains their return.

At the time of the survey, 63% of women were employed. The distribution by sector is almost even: 25% work in the public sector, 25% work in the private sector, and 7% run their businesses. At the same time, the unemployment rate among internally displaced persons (IDPs) is significantly higher: 21% are unemployed, compared to 16% in the entire sample. The largest number of unemployed women is found in the southern and frontline regions, accounting for approximately 21%. In contrast, unemployment among females in the central and western regions ranges from 14% to 17%.

The financial situation of Ukrainian women is generally challenging: 14% have the lowest income and cannot afford even basic necessities, including food. Another 34% are only able to buy groceries, but buying clothes is already a challenge for them. Thus, almost half of the respondents are in the two poorest categories. The worst situation is among IDPs: 56% of them fall into one of the two lowest categories. Women who have left abroad and still reside there have the highest incomes, while returnees are in a much more difficult situation: 40% cannot cover even the most basic needs, compared to 11% of those who stay abroad.

The regional distribution of incomes also reveals disproportions: in the border (southern and northern) and frontline regions, 56% to 59% of women fall into the lowest income categories, whereas in the central and western regions, the figure ranges between 40% and 46%. Overall, 74% of Ukrainian women reported that their financial situation has significantly or somewhat deteriorated since the beginning of the invasion.

The living conditions of Ukrainian women also vary depending on their status. Overall, 61% live in their own homes, 23% rent, and another 12% live in free accommodation provided by relatives. In contrast, only 16% of IDPs own their housing units, whereas 64% rent them.

Finally, it is worth noting that 90% of women have experienced traumatic events related to the war. 55% survived rocket attacks, and one in three had a loved one in the Armed Forces of Ukraine or experienced prolonged separation from their family. 21% lost someone close to them in the war, and 14% reported damage or loss of property. One in ten had experience of living in the occupied territory. All these factors form a complex and vulnerable demographic profile of Ukrainian women in wartime.

5. WILLINGNESS AND REASONS FOR STAYING IN UKRAINE


In this section, we analyse women's intentions to stay in Ukraine during wartime and the reasons they indicate as major drivers of their choice.

5.1. WILLINGNESS TO STAY IN UKRAINE AND IN ONE'S SETTLEMENT

To assess the respondents' intentions to stay in Ukraine and in their settlement, we directly asked how important it was to them on a scale from 1 ("not important at all") to 7 ("critically important"), with "4" meaning "cannot answer".

As Figure 22 shows, the majority of women currently living in Ukraine express a strong willingness to stay in the country and in their town or village. 79% of Ukrainian women indicated that it was important for them to stay in Ukraine, and for 72% it was important to stay in their settlement. Moreover, for 45% and 40%, respectively, it is critically important to remain in Ukraine or their settlement. For 6% of respondents, staying in Ukraine is not important, and for 11%, staying in their settlement is not important.¹¹

Figure 22. How important is it for you to stay in Ukraine and your settlement?



¹¹ For further analysis, we use a three-point scale of answers, where answers 1-3 mean 'not important', 4 - 'difficult to answer', answers 5-7 - 'important'.

The correlation between these questions is high, 64%, i.e. for the majority of respondents who find it (un)important to stay in Ukraine, it is also (un)important to stay in their settlement. There are 67% who answered “important “ to both questions. Only 1% stated that it was not important for them to stay in Ukraine, but rather to stay in their settlement. Conversely, 5% expressed the opposite view, indicating that they want to stay in Ukraine, but not necessarily in their current settlement (Table 10).

Table 10. Importance of staying in Ukraine and in the settlement



How important is it for you to stay in your settlement	Not important	Difficult to answer	Important
Not important	4%	2%	5%
Difficult to answer	1%	9%	7%
Important	1%	4%	67%

Next, we analyse the relationship between intentions to live in Ukraine and demographic factors.

There is a strong relationship between **age** and intention **to stay in Ukraine** (Figure 23). While there is no statistically significant difference between the 18-29 and 30-39 age groups, women aged 40-49 and 50-60 express stronger intentions to stay, by 7 and 14 p.p., respectively. In the oldest age group (50-60 years), 86% of respondents indicate that it is important for them to stay in Ukraine.

Figure 23: Intentions to stay in Ukraine, by age group

Figure 24. Intentions to stay in their settlement, by age group



The difference between the age groups is even greater in terms of **intentions to stay in one's settlement** (Figure 24). In the youngest cohort (18-29 years old), 55% say it is important for them to stay in their current settlement, whereas in the oldest cohort (50-60 years old), 84% agree with this statement. In each subsequent age group, the intention to stay in Ukraine increases by 14, 21, and 29 p.p., respectively, compared to the 18-29 year old group.

Thus, although it is more important for younger women to stay in Ukraine, they are less attached to their locality. On the contrary, older respondents, in addition to their willingness to stay in Ukraine, want to stay in their town or village.

Unmarried women who live with a partner or are not in a relationship, as well as widows, demonstrate lower intentions to stay in Ukraine compared to married women who live with their husbands (by 5 to 14 p.p.). Interestingly, neither the presence nor the number of **children** is related to the desire to stay in Ukraine or in the settlement. The household size also seems to be unrelated to the willingness to stay.

Residents **of oblast centers** demonstrate the highest willingness to stay in Ukraine (82%). Those who live in other cities claim it is less important to stay in Ukraine (by about 7 p.p.). There is no difference between residents of the oblast centres and villages.

Interestingly, contrary to expectations, it is less important for rural residents to stay in their localities than for residents of oblast centers (by 5 p.p.). The biggest difference is in the 30-39 y.o. category. Among them, 62% of rural residents and 74% of those from the oblast centers want to stay at home. This is likely due to the fact that women of this age see better career opportunities and, possibly, a generally higher standards of living in larger cities, hence they consider relocating there.


There are no **regional differences** in the willingness to stay in Ukraine or in one's city or village. Over 70% of residents of all regions indicate that this is important to them.

Women with different **experiences of displacement** during the war assess the importance of staying in Ukraine and their settlement differently. For example, for IDPs, it is 5 p.p. less important to stay in Ukraine compared to those who did not leave their settlement (Figure 25). There is no statistically significant difference for other categories of displacement.

Willingness to stay in the same settlement indicates a different pattern. The prior hypothesis was that IDPs would have the lowest sentiment for the place where they currently live. However, the data do not confirm it: more than half of IDPs (57%) wish to remain in their current location. On the other hand, both IDPs and returnees state it is less important for them to stay in their current settlement compared to those without relevant experience (by 19 and 12 p.p., respectively). At the same time, for ex-IDPs who returned home, it is by 6 p.p. more important to stay there compared to those without such experience.

Women who have returned from abroad to a place other than their own (currently IDPs) have the least attachment to their current place of residence. Of these, only 43% consider it important to stay in their current town/village.

Figure 25. Desire to stay in Ukraine and settlement among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.



We do not find evidence to support the common narrative that people whose home **settlements are under occupation or in the area of active hostilities** are less likely to stay in Ukraine. For them, it is as important as for residents from other regions. However, they are less attached to their current place of residence: for IDPs whose settlements are currently occupied or close to the frontline, it is 12 p.p. less important to stay in their current place of residence compared to IDPs from other regions (65% vs. 53%, respectively).

The **housing** situation is another important factor for choosing a place of residence. For women whose homes were destroyed during the war and are uninhabitable, it is less important to stay in Ukraine (by 9 p.p.) than for those whose homes were not damaged. Interestingly, even for those respondents whose housing was damaged and uninhabitable, i.e. they have nowhere to return, it is less important to stay in their current settlement (by 15 p.p.) than for women whose housing was not damaged.

In addition, housing ownership is important. Those who rent housing or live with relatives or friends for free are expected to have less attachment to both Ukraine and their current place of residence. Among those who rent housing, 73% say it is important for them to stay in Ukraine, and 59% say it is important for them to stay in their current settlement. For women who own their own housing, these figures are 82% and 79%, respectively.


Among internally displaced persons, the share of those who rent housing is the highest, 64%, compared to 12% to 22% among other categories. However, IDPs who rent housing express the same level of willingness to stay in Ukraine and their locality as other respondents who also rent housing but have never relocated or who have already returned.

Relatives who moved abroad during the full-scale invasion and still live there do not affect the respondents' willingness to stay in Ukraine. At the same time, those with relatives abroad are less willing to stay in their settlement (by 4 p.p.). In particular, there is a negative effect if parents or other close relatives live abroad.

Women's **employment** status affects their willingness to stay in Ukraine. For example, among all categories, entrepreneurs demonstrate the highest intention to stay in Ukraine, with 86% expressing this sentiment. At the same time, working students and unemployed women show lower intentions to stay compared to those who work in the private sector (by about 10 p.p.). Interestingly, public sector employees have the same intention to stay in Ukraine as private sector employees, but for the former, it is much more important to stay in their locality (by 8 p.p.). This may be due to fears that they will struggle to find a similar job in another city.

Intentions to stay in Ukraine are clearly linked to financial status: the higher the income, the greater the willingness of women to stay in Ukraine (Figure 26). Thus, while 66% of the poorest category, who do not have enough money even for food, say it is important to stay in Ukraine, 85% of the richest category, who can afford almost any purchase, say it is important to stay. Financial status is similarly linked to the desire to stay in one's locality.

Figure 26: Importance of staying in Ukraine and financial situation



Examining the change in financial situation since the full-scale invasion reveals a significant difference only for those whose financial situation has deteriorated substantially (41% of all respondents). They are 12 p.p. less likely to stay in Ukraine compared to those whose financial situation has not changed. However, even among those who have become the most impoverished, the willingness to stay in Ukraine is high (72%). Thus, the lowest intentions to stay in Ukraine are among women whose incomes have declined significantly during the war and who now lack sufficient funds to purchase food. There are 12% of them in the sample. However, even in this group, it is important for the majority of women to stay in Ukraine (64%) and their settlement (61%).

Another important link to living in Ukraine is the **language of communication**. For example, for women who indicated Russian as their main language of communication, it is 8-9 p.p. less important to stay in Ukraine and their current settlement than for women who speak Ukrainian.

It is interesting to compare the demographic factors that correlate with the willingness to stay in Ukraine and the factors that correlate with the willingness of refugees to return home. We see similar patterns: according to the regression analysis conducted by the Centre for Economic Strategy in the study "Ukrainian Refugees after Three Years Abroad: How Many and Who Will Return? The Fourth Wave of Research"¹², older refugees and those with higher pre-war incomes are more likely to return. Similarly, older and wealthier women in Ukraine are more likely to stay.

5.2. MAIN REASONS FOR STAYING IN UKRAINE


In addition to the willingness to stay in Ukraine, we also examined women's motivations to understand the primary reasons for living in a country at war.

We presented the respondents with 15 possible reasons and asked them to rate their level of agreement with each statement. Each statement was evaluated on a 7-point scale, where one was 'strongly disagree', four was 'can't answer/do not know/not applicable', and seven was 'fully agree'¹³. Figure 27 shows the answers.

¹² [Ukrainian Refugees After Three Years Abroad. Fourth Wave of Research - Centre for Economic Strategy](#)

¹³ For further analysis, responses 1-3 were recoded as 'Disagree', 5-7 as "Agree", and 4 as 'Difficult to say'.

Figure 27: Reasons for staying in Ukraine. “I am staying in Ukraine...”



The most common motivation for staying in Ukraine is the wish to be with their families. 91% of women chose this option. The second most popular answer is ‘I stay in Ukraine because it is my country’ (88%). Among the material and financial factors, the most important is the availability of housing (72%). In comparison, a smaller share of women stay because they have a good job in Ukraine or can provide a better standard of living than they could abroad (46% and 47%, respectively).


20% of women indicated that they would like to move abroad, but do not have the opportunity to do so.

Although all respondents chose to stay in Ukraine, most of them do not believe it is safe, with only 39% believing it is relatively safe to do so.

It is interesting to examine at the perception of safety by region (Figure 28). Not surprisingly, the western regions, which are farthest from the frontline and the Russian border, have the highest proportion of respondents who believe it is safe enough here. However, even in the West, only half of the respondents believe Ukraine is a safe place. In the central and southern regions, where there is no frontline and no land border with Russia, 37-38% of women assess the situation as relatively safe. In the frontline and northern regions (those with a land border with Russia), the assessment of the security situation is similar: 29% and 31%, respectively, agree with the statement that they stay in their settlements because it is safe enough. From

the regional aspect, the lowest sense of security is reported by residents of Zaporizhzhia region (16%), whereas the highest is reported in Volyn and Zakarpattia regions (65% each).

Figure 28: Answers to the question “I stay in Ukraine because I think it is safe enough / relatively safe here” by the regions



Other motivations for staying in Ukraine, which have significant regional differences, include **the need to care for relatives or friends**. This reason is most often mentioned in the North (61%) and South (58%), somewhat less often in the Central and Frontline regions (52% and 55% respectively), and least often in the West (48%). Other proposed reasons, including economic factors, do not have significant regional differences (no more than 8 p.p. of difference).

Further analysis focuses on the study of motivation by different **age groups**. Thus, for female respondents of different ages, the general trend in the reasons for leaving is very similar (Table 11). In all groups, the first two places are occupied by the same motives: ‘I stay to be with my family’ and ‘I stay because it is my country’. They have a significant difference from the rest.

Table 11. Motivation to stay in Ukraine by age group

I stay in Ukraine...	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
to be together with my family	87%	91%	93%	93%
because it is my country	80%	89%	89%	92%
because I have better access to medical services here than abroad	66%	64%	62%	69%
because it is important for me to be close to my friends	64%	55%	63%	74%
because I have better access to other services (banking, administrative, taxes, internet, etc.) here than abroad	59%	56%	57%	59%
I just don't want to go anywhere	58%	65%	69%	75%
because I have a home/household in Ukraine	55%	68%	79%	84%
because my children are better off here than abroad	55%	63%	58%	53%
because I have better opportunities to develop professionally here than abroad	42%	49%	57%	56%
because I can provide a better standard of living here than abroad	41%	46%	49%	50%
to care for relatives or friends	38%	48%	61%	61%
because I think it is safe enough/relatively safe here	37%	35%	37%	43%
because I have a good job here	36%	43%	49%	54%
because I want to get an education/completing my studies in Ukraine.	34%	23%	23%	20%
I want to leave, but do not have the opportunity	23%	23%	21%	14%

The share of women who say they would like to leave but are unable to is the lowest in the 50-59 age group (14%). Among other age groups, this share is almost the same (21-23%). This correlates with the results of answers to the question about the importance of staying in Ukraine and in one's settlement: for the oldest group, it is the most important (Figure 23 and Figure 24).

Despite the general trend in the reasons for leaving, some reasons are more relevant for certain age groups. For example, for older women respondents, the availability of housing or households is more important: 84% in the 50–59-year-old group and 55% in the 18-29-year-old group. Also, the opportunity to develop professionally and have a good job in Ukraine is more important for the oldest group than for the youngest (by 14 p.p. and 18 p.p., respectively).

In addition, women over 40 are much more likely to say that their reason for staying in Ukraine is to care for their relatives or friends. 61% of respondents aged 40+ chose this reason, compared to 38% in the 18-29 group and 48% in the 30-39 group.

We also offered respondents the option ‘I just don't want to go anywhere’ as an opportunity to express their willingness to stay in Ukraine without giving a specific reason. Overall, 67% of women agreed with this statement, with the popularity of this option increasing with age: from 58% among 18-29 y.o. to 75% among 50-59 y.o.

Additionally, we analyzed whether there are differences in the motivation to stay in Ukraine among those with different experiences of displacement during the war: IDPs, returnees, and those who did not leave their settlement (Table 12). In general, there is a common trend among these categories: they identify the same reasons as more or less important.

Table 12. Motivation to stay in Ukraine among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.

I stay in Ukraine...	Returned		Former	Never left
	from abroad	IDPs	IDPs	their place
to be together with my family	85%	88%	95%	92%
because it is my country	85%	83%	89%	90%
because I have a home/household in Ukraine	73%	44%	77%	78%
because I have better access to healthcare services here than abroad	69%	65%	71%	64%
because I have better access to other services (banking, administrative, taxes, internet, etc.) here than abroad	61%	56%	61%	57%
because it is important for me to be close to my friends	57%	52%	72%	67%
because my children are better here	57%	61%	56%	61%
I just don't want to go anywhere	53%	60%	66%	71%
to take care of relatives or friends	50%	45%	52%	55%
because I have better opportunities for professional development here than abroad	46%	46%	59%	52%
because I have a better level of living here than abroad	41%	42%	51%	48%
because I have a good job here	40%	36%	48%	48%
because I believe that it is sufficient / relatively safe here	28%	30%	32%	45%
because I want to get an education / finish my studies in Ukraine.	21%	23%	22%	25%
I want to leave, but do not have the opportunity	18%	27%	14%	20%

There are significant differences in the assessment of some factors by internally displaced persons. Thus, housing as a factor for them to stay in Ukraine plays a much smaller role than for other categories, as IDPs most often live in rented accommodation. Also, IDPs are less likely than other respondents to mention work and the desire to be close to friends as factors that prevent them from emigrating (by 12 p.p. and 15 p.p. less than women who have not left their settlement, respectively). This may be due to the fact that IDPs have a higher proportion of unemployed people and do not have established social ties in their new places of residence. In addition, IDPs are much more likely to indicate that they would like to go abroad, but do not have such an opportunity (27% compared to 14-20% in other categories).

Interestingly, for those who have returned to Ukraine from abroad so they can directly compare life in Ukraine and another country), better access to medical and other services is an important reason to live in Ukraine (69% and 61%). Although these women decided to return to Ukraine, they have the lowest estimations of safety compared to all displacement groups. Only 28% say it is safe enough here. This is compared to 45% of those who did not leave their settlements.

Women who have not left their town or village are much more likely to agree with the statement 'I just don't want to go anywhere' - 71%.

5.3. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR STAYING

Next, we take a closer look at the reasons that keep women from emigrating, in particular in the context of housing, family, community, children, and the desire to support their country (Figure 29).

Thus, when discussing **housing** as a factor that motivates them to stay in Ukraine, respondents most often say that they are afraid of losing their property if they go abroad (28%). 24% admit that their current living conditions are difficult, but despite this, they do not want to leave. Only 4% say that their living conditions are difficult and therefore they would like to move abroad.


In the context of **family**, the most important thing for respondents is to be together with their families (56%). The need to take care of family members and be closer to relatives who are or have been involved in hostilities is twice as rare.

Speaking about **community and communication** as important motivators to stay in Ukraine, women most often say that they cannot leave as long as the people important to them remain in Ukraine, as they want to help and support them (35%).

In the context of **children**, the most important factor is for the child to grow up in his or her native language and cultural environment. This factor is mentioned about twice as often as the best school and healthcare for a child in Ukraine.

Support for the **country** is one of the most important motivations for not moving abroad. Only 14% of respondents indicated that this was not the main reason to stay. If we look at why it is important for women to support their country, they most often say that it is their home country, where they have their roots and love it (59%). Approximately half as many women mean economic support (paying taxes) and moral obligation by ‘supporting the country’.

Figure 29: Breakdown of motivations to stay in Ukraine



When looking at these detailed factors preventing people from moving abroad among groups with different displacement experiences (IDPs, returnees, former IDPs and those who have not left their settlement), they are very similar. In each group, the main motivators are the same. The only exception is housing. As we saw earlier, housing is less important for IDPs to stay, as most IDPs live in rented accommodation. Nevertheless, even difficult housing conditions do not always lead to displacement. Thus, 36% of IDPs say that their living conditions in Ukraine are difficult, but they still do not want to move anywhere. In other categories, this option was chosen by 20-21%. At the same time, 22% of IDPs say that their current housing conditions are difficult, and they are considering returning to their place of residence before February 24, 2022.

Interestingly, IDPs are more likely than other categories to say that it is easier for them to find a good school/kindergarten, clubs, sports sections for their children in Ukraine than abroad (36% of IDPs vs. 24-34% of other categories), even though they live in new communities where they often face the need to find new schools/kindergartens for their children.

Another significant difference is the motivation to support the country economically. For example, among IDPs, 25% say they stay to work and pay taxes here and contribute to Ukraine's victory in the war. This is the lowest figure among all displacement groups. And the highest - 37% - is among former IDPs who have returned home. On average, 33% of the sample indicate economic support from the country as an important motivation to stay in the country.

In addition to choosing from the options, respondents could write their own reasons for staying in Ukraine. One of the most common responses to this open-ended question is the desire to stay because 'this is my country', 'this is my homeland', 'this is my home'. One of the respondents describes these feelings in more detail: "Because Ukraine is my home, only here I feel at home in any city. I feel comfortable living at the level we have. Our service sector, language, traditions". Another frequent motivation for staying is that a husband, father, or son is at war, or has been captured or gone missing, and women feel it is their duty to be in the country. In addition, some women want to stay in Ukraine because their loved ones died and are buried here. "I stay here because my family died in the war, and their bodies are in the occupied territory, people are dead! And they cannot be taken away from there," writes a female respondent (25 years old, Odesa region).

For many respondents, it is important to stay together with their spouse and family. Sometimes, this is the main reason why they do not want to move. "Because my family is here. If I had the opportunity to take my husband abroad, I would not think for a minute about staying here," shares her thoughts a woman (35 years old, Zaporizhzhia region).

5.4. CONCLUSIONS

For most women, it is important to continue living in Ukraine and in their current settlement. This is due to a number of demographic and economic factors. Thus, older respondents show a stronger desire to stay in

Ukraine and in their cities/villages. Unmarried women living with a partner or not in a relationship, as well as widows, show lower intentions to stay in Ukraine. For internally displaced persons and those who have returned from abroad about it is less important to stay in the same place. Women who have returned from abroad to a place other than their own (currently IDPs) have the lowest attachment to their current place of residence. Women whose homes were destroyed due to the hostilities show less desire to stay in Ukraine.

The higher the income, the more important it is to stay in Ukraine and own town or village. Those with the lowest incomes and those whose incomes have fallen the most during the war are the least willing to stay.

Availability of housing is also an important factor. For renters, it is less important to stay in Ukraine and their current place of residence than for homeowners.

Women whose main language of communication is Ukrainian are more willing to stay in Ukraine and their towns/villages than Russian-speaking women.

Contrary to expectations and widespread stereotypes, women with children have the same desire to stay in Ukraine as those without children. Rural residents do not show stronger intentions to live in Ukraine or in their home village than urban residents. For women whose settlements are currently under occupation or in the area of active hostilities it is no less important to stay in Ukraine.

Among the most important reasons for staying in Ukraine, women mention the desire to be with their families and patriotic feelings towards Ukraine. Among the economic factors, the most important is the availability of housing, while a good job and the opportunity to secure a better standard of living in Ukraine are mentioned less often. One in five respondents said they would like to leave, but are unable to. Among IDPs, this number is 27% (the highest among all categories in terms of experience of displacement during the war). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are significantly less likely than other groups to cite having housing, the desire to be close to friends, or a good job as factors that deter them from emigrating. .

For women with children, it is important that their children grow up in their native language and cultural environment. This factor outweighs other child-related considerations, such as better access to education or healthcare in Ukraine.


6. LEAVING ABROAD: INTENTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES

6.1. WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE ABROAD

In this section, we analyze Ukrainian women's reflections on the possibility of long-term migration abroad. We look at key demographic and economic characteristics of women, as well as their experiences of forced displacement during the war, which may correlate with migration plans.

A significant majority of women currently residing in Ukraine, 72%, are not presently considering moving abroad for a long term (Figure 30). More than half (55%) categorically reject this idea, while 15% are more or less actively considering it, and 13% are undecided¹⁴.


Figure 30. Are you currently considering leaving abroad for a long period of time?



Age plays a significant role in these considerations, as young women aged 18-29 are 1.5 times more likely to consider migration (Figure 31). In particular, among this cohort, 26% express interest, compared to only 6% among women aged 50 to 60. Marital status also has an impact: 22-24% of single women consider migration, which is twice as high as the share of married or widowed women, among whom 11% consider migration. Divorced women are also more likely to think about migration (16%) than married or widowed women. Interestingly, neither the presence nor the number of children significantly affects migration considerations, nor does the number of adults in the household.


¹⁴ For further analysis, we use a three-point scale of answers, where answers 1-3 mean 'do not consider', 4 - 'difficult to say, and answers 5-7 - 'consider very actively'.

Figure 31. Intentions to leave abroad by age group



In terms of settlement type, women from medium-sized cities with a population of over 50,000 are more likely to consider migration, with the share ranging from 19 to 23%. Those living in rural areas may lack the necessary resources, while those living in large regional centers may feel more comfortable in Ukraine for various reasons due to the advantages of a large city. Regional factors matter to a lesser extent, although interest in migration is somewhat lower than average in the northern regions bordering Russia (10%), especially compared to the western region (17%) (Figure 32). In contrast, in the southern and central regions of Ukraine and in the frontline areas, the share of women considering migration abroad ranges between 13 and 15%.


Figure 32. Intentions to leave abroad by region



The history of displacement is an important factor, as women who have previously moved abroad and returned are 14 p.p. more likely to consider moving again compared to those who have never left their place of residence after February 2022 (Figure 33). If the respondent has not only left abroad but also moved to another settlement in Ukraine, this increases migration intentions by an additional 20 p.p. (if she has already returned home) and 4 p.p., respectively (if she is currently an IDP). However, internal displacement alone does not affect interest in migration.

Despite the widespread narrative, women who came from the currently occupied territories or the frontline zone do not demonstrate significantly higher migration intentions than the average. There is also no additional interest in leaving among IDPs or those whose homes have been destroyed.

Figure 33. Intentions to moving abroad among returnees, IDPs, and those who did not leave their settlement




At the same time, family ties play an important role in migration plans. Thus, 42% of women reported that they have relatives who moved abroad after February 2022. Women whose parents have left the country are 19 p.p. more likely to consider migration than those whose relatives have not left. Women whose other close or distant relatives have left the country are 10 and 5 p.p. more likely to consider leaving, respectively. In contrast, the migration intentions of women whose children have moved abroad since February 2022 do not differ significantly from those of women who have no relatives abroad. This result applies to children both below and above the age of 18. In terms of geography, the effect of "relatives" is largest among women whose relatives moved to the UK - 12 p.p. This is followed by Germany - 10 p.p., the United States and Canada - 8 p.p. Having relatives in Poland and other European countries increases the likelihood of going abroad by 5-6 p.p.

Labor market status also matters, but not as much as one might expect. In particular, women entrepreneurs are 7 percentage points less likely to migrate, while students are 13-18 p.p. more likely to consider moving

abroad. This result strongly resonates with the higher migration intentions of young people. At the same time, there is no significant difference in the probability of migration among those employed in the public and private sectors, the unemployed, and pensioners.

Financial status plays a role in migration plans. Women in the lowest economic category - those who cannot afford basic necessities - are 10 p.p. more likely to consider migration compared to other groups (Figure 34).

Figure 34. Intention to leave abroad and financial situation



Housing conditions are also linked to considerations of migration. Prior to the full-scale invasion, 72-74% of women owned their homes, and 13-14% rented. This distribution remains the same for those who have not moved since 2022. However, among those who have relocated within Ukraine or returned from abroad, the shares of owners and renters have almost reversed: 65% of women now rent accommodation. In general, renters are 5 percentage points more likely to consider migration compared to homeowners. In addition, 12% of women live in housing provided by their relatives for free. They are 8 p.p. more likely to consider leaving than women who own housing. In addition, compared to homeowners, women living in a dormitory are 32 p.p. more likely to consider moving abroad. However, their share in the total population is small (2%). Among those who lived in another settlement before February 2022, the type of housing is not significantly related to migration considerations.

Language is another factor related to migration considerations. In general, Russian-speaking women are 4-5% more likely to consider migration. In particular, Russian-speaking residents of frontline areas are 8 p.p.

more likely to think about migration, while Russian-speaking people currently living in the western region are 12 p.p. more likely to consider leaving.

It is expected that the need to stay in Ukraine or in one's own locality is negatively correlated with the consideration of leaving. In particular, women who rated this need by 5-7 points on a scale from 1 - "not important at all" to 7 - "critically important" are 17-23 p.p. less likely to think about moving abroad compared to those who have not decided. At the same time, those who consider staying in Ukraine unimportant (1-3 points) are 23-31 p.p. more likely to consider the possibility of leaving. A similar pattern is observed with attachment to one's local community, although the positive effect of connection to one's hometown is less pronounced (an increase of 11–15 percentage points). Overall, national-level attachment outweighs local attachment when it comes to considerations of leaving the country.

We also analyzed the importance of different factors on the desire to stay in Ukraine, in their settlement or to move abroad using regression analysis. Figure 35 and Figure 36 graphically present the main results of the regression analysis, which generally confirm the previous findings.¹⁵

As we can see, when controlling for the main demographic factors, a higher level of income significantly increases the desire to stay in Ukraine, while the intention to leave increases if the main language is Russian and the respondent lives in the West. Interestingly, residents of regional centers are more likely to want to stay in their city than rural residents. Also, women who have already moved abroad have higher intentions to go again.

¹⁵ The full regression results are available in Table 16.

Figure 35. Effect of demographic factors on the willingness to stay or leave. Results of linear regression





Figure 36. Effect of other factors on the willingness to stay or leave. Linear regression results



One of the hypotheses we wanted to test in this study is that for women who do not intend to move abroad, the main reasons for staying are strong attachment to family, community and national identity. Table 13 ranks the reasons for staying for two groups: those who want to leave and those who do not. Indeed, respondents who want to stay in Ukraine cite the desire to be with their family and patriotic feelings as the main reasons (94% each). The importance of being with friends is also among the most common reasons (69%). And although those considering moving abroad cite the same main reasons for staying, they mention them significantly less often. In particular, the desire to be together with family was mentioned by 81% of women as the main reason to stay, and a sense of belonging to their country by 65% (13 and 29 p.p. less than those who want to stay).

The only answer in which there is no statistically significant difference between the groups of those who want and do not want to move to another country is the desire to finish their studies in Ukraine. This option was chosen by 26% and 22% respectively.

Table 13. Reasons for staying in Ukraine for those who want and do not want to go abroad


I stay in Ukraine...	I am not considering moving abroad	I am considering moving abroad
...to be with my family	94%	81%
...because this is my country	94%	65%
... because I have a home/household in Ukraine	77%	56%
I just don't want to go anywhere	77%	29%
...because I have better access to medical services here than abroad	69%	53%
...because my children are better off here than abroad	69%	29%
...because it is important for me to be close to my friends	69%	46%
...because I have better access to other services (banking, administrative, tax, internet, etc.) here than abroad	64%	41%
...because I have better opportunities to develop professionally here than abroad	59%	28%
... to care for relatives or friends	54%	46%
...because I have the opportunity to provide a better standard of living here than abroad	54%	20%
...because I have a good job here	52%	27%
... because I think it is safe enough / relatively safe	47%	16%
...because I want to get an education / finish my studies in Ukraine	26%	22%
I want to leave, but I don't have an opportunity	11%	59%

6.2. REASONS FOR LEAVING ABROAD

To gain a deeper understanding of the migration sentiments among women currently living in Ukraine, we asked them to 'put themselves in the shoes' of others by reflecting on a series of statements about reasons that might prompt someone to consider long-term emigration. The responses of the 288 women who had considered long-term emigration are summarized in Figure 37. Based on the existing literature¹⁶, we categorized the main reasons behind migration intentions into several key groups: economic opportunities, safety, living conditions, and the future of children.

Daily life during the war is extremely difficult. The two most common factors driving women's migration sentiments are the desire to secure a better standard of living abroad than in Ukraine and insecurity - 75% and 73% of women identified these reasons as relevant to them.

Figure 37. Reasons for moving abroad (N = 288). "I would like to go abroad..."



The prospect of a better standard of living as an argument in favor of leaving is also evident in other responses. More than 65% believe that they will find a better job in another country, and 62% say that emigration offers them the opportunity to receive high-quality social protection, including state benefits and housing assistance. Financial stability is one of the most important factors influencing the desire to change the country of residence. In addition, respondents who indicated "other" reasons reiterated the need for security and better financial and professional prospects abroad.

¹⁶ See, for example, Biehler, N. (2023), de Haas (2021), Schewel, K. (2020)

Although the feeling of insecurity due to shelling makes 73% of women look for a more secure place to live, the share of those who are tired of constant power, water and heat cuts is slightly lower - 53%, but still quite high.

Taking care of children also plays a big role in the decision to move. About 63% of respondents believe that their children will have better opportunities for development abroad, and a similar share say that quality education - either for themselves or their children - is a significant incentive for them to emigrate.

Among the whole range of reasons, some remain less relevant for most women surveyed. Contrary to expectations, difficulties with housing in Ukraine are listed as a less important or irrelevant reason. Although it is important for 38% of respondents, it does not play a decisive role in the overall picture. Also, only 24% of respondents agree that their main motivation for moving is to reunite with family members living abroad. This suggests that most of those thinking about emigration see it primarily as a personal decision rather than a way to be closer to relatives.

Thus, the findings suggest that in the third year of the war, women's decision to migrate is shaped primarily by economic and security factors. While financial stability and better living conditions are perceived as strategic motivations, security acts as a trigger that forces people to take active steps to leave. At the same time, basic needs, such as housing and living conditions and access to better healthcare, are perceived as less important for a long-term migration decision.

6.2.1. ASPIRATIONS TO LEAVE AND CONFIDENCE IN OPPORTUNITIES ABROAD

Is it possible to say that the willingness to leave increases with increasing confidence in opportunities abroad? To analyze this hypothesis, we estimated the results of three regressions. In each case, the dependent variable is the answer to the question "Are you currently considering going abroad for a long time?" (yes/no), and the independent variables are the categories of answers to the following questions (scale: 1 - strongly disagree, 4 (base category) - can't answer / don't know / not applicable, 7 - strongly agree):

- I would like to go abroad because I can provide a better standard of living there than in Ukraine
- I would like to go abroad because I can find a better job there than in Ukraine
- I would like to go abroad because there are better opportunities for professional development

The results of the analysis do not indicate a gradual increase in the desire to leave with increasing confidence in perceived opportunities abroad (Table 13). The only group that is statistically more likely to consider leaving is women who are fully convinced that they will be able to ensure a better standard of living, find a better job or get better opportunities for professional development abroad.

In particular, women who strongly agree with the statement about the possibility of a higher standard of living abroad are 38 p.p. more likely to express their intention to leave compared to those who are undecided. Similarly, those who are confident in better employment opportunities are 34 p.p. more likely to consider

emigration, and those who are convinced of better professional development prospects are 38 p.p. more likely to consider emigration.

In contrast, women who have weak or moderate confidence in better economic opportunities abroad do not show a significant difference in their desire to leave compared to those who are undecided.

Table 14. The relationship between leaving probability and confidence in opportunities abroad. Linear regression results¹⁷

	I would like to go abroad because I can get a better standard of living there than in Ukraine	I would like to go abroad because I can find a better job there than in Ukraine	I would like to go abroad because there are better opportunities for professional development
Strongly disagree	37.74	14.67	32.29
	21.51	37.78	42.83
	24.86	26.68	39.51
I can't answer / I don't know	35.45	41.65	42.00
	21.35	28.54	43.91
	56.01**	54.95	45.94
I completely agree	75.31***	75.34***	79.56***

Dependent variable - "I am actively considering going abroad for a long time" (levels 6 and 7 out of 7). N=288. Comparison with the category "Can't answer/don't know". The coefficient shows the increase in the probability of leaving depending on the level of confidence in percentage points.

6.2.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL WELL-BEING AND CONSTRAINTS TO LEAVING ABROAD

One of our hypotheses is that the availability of financial resources reduces the constraints to leaving. To test this, we analyzed how women's financial well-being is related to the constraints they report as barriers to leaving. In all regressions, categories of financial status are included as an independent variable and specific restrictions as dependent variables. Five categories are used to assess financial status, with the baseline category being "Mostly enough, but I need to save or borrow to buy expensive items" (category 3). Women in categories 1 and 2 ("Not enough money even for food" and "Enough for everyday expenses, but it is difficult to buy clothes", respectively) are relatively less well off. And women from categories 4 and 5 ("Almost enough

¹⁷ Full regression results are presented in Table 17

for everything, but buying an apartment or house is unaffordable" and "Can afford almost everything) are relatively well off.

Women with lower levels of financial well-being are more likely to cite economic and psychological constraints as reasons to stay. They are 13 p.p. more likely to mention lack of financial resources to move, 29 p.p. more likely to mention lack of housing in a new place, and 34 p.p. more likely to mention difficulties in finding a job as a constraint than women with a basic income. Also, women with lower incomes are more likely to report fear of the unknown and feel ashamed of their acquaintances who have participated or are participating in hostilities. This suggests that financially vulnerable women are more likely to face material difficulties and emotional barriers when deciding to move.

On the other hand, wealthier respondents are generally less likely to mention any restrictions on relocation, and their decisions are less likely to be driven by the specific obstacles included in the analysis. In particular, women with higher levels of financial well-being are much less likely to mention economic factors as an obstacle to moving. In particular, they are 41-57 p.p. less likely to mention such constraints as lack of financial resources, 41 p.p. less likely to worry about lack of housing in a new place, and 34 p.p. less likely to mention difficulties with employment abroad. Also, fear of the unknown is less relevant for them, as they have more opportunities and confidence in their future. Thus, financially secure women have more freedom of choice regarding migration and are less likely to perceive any factors as significant barriers to changing their place of residence.

At the same time, some constraints are not significantly related to financial well-being and are equally common among all women, regardless of their income level. These include negative attitudes of the host country's population, condemnation by Ukrainians who remain in Ukraine, problems with documents, language barriers, and the inability of a husband or son to leave. This suggests that such obstacles are more related to social, legal, and cultural factors than to financial circumstances.

6.2.3 FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE LEAVING AND RETURNING

We assumed that while for women living in Ukraine, the main factor that could force them to go abroad is the deterioration of the security situation, for refugees, the decision to return from abroad to Ukraine is more influenced by economic rather than security reasons. The results in Table 14 show that for Ukrainian women currently living abroad, security is also the most important factor, with about 58% of respondents mentioning it. The next most important factors are higher living standards in Ukraine and the opportunity to find a good job.

Thus, the war in Ukraine is both the main pull factor and the main push factor for return.

Table 14. Factors for refugee return to Ukraine

Which of these factors might encourage you to return to Ukraine?	Refugees 18-60	Refugees 18-60 who want to return
The war is over with the signing of a document that will allow civil aviation to resume flights over Ukraine	58%	59%
A higher standard of living in Ukraine (e.g. in education, healthcare, rule of law, fight against corruption, etc.)	48%	39%
Opportunity to find a decent-paying job in Ukraine	41%	38%
No hostilities and air strikes by Russia in the place you plan to return to	34%	38%
Cessation of hostilities in my region	28%	26%
Restoring infrastructure in my region	17%	16%
Expiry of the temporary protection status in the host country	16%	19%
Financial assistance from Ukraine (e.g. for housing reconstruction, etc.)	11%	10%
De-occupation of my settlement	10%	9%
Assistance in returning to another region of Ukraine (assistance in finding a job and/or providing housing or paying rent)	10%	8%
Restoring my home	6%	7%
Inability to get free or discounted accommodation in the host country	4%	6%
Termination of financial assistance to Ukrainians in the host country	3%	3%
Your employer will not allow you to work remotely	1%	1%


6.3. RESTRICTIONS ON LEAVING ABROAD

Not everyone who considers leaving has a real opportunity to take this step. Moreover, some women do not even consider emigration due to certain restrictions. To find out what exactly limits women currently living in Ukraine, we offered all respondents a list of factors that can significantly deter potential migrants. These constraints not only affect decision-making, but are often the main reason why people even if they wish to leave, end up staying.

The most common barrier is the psychological aspect of relocation (Figure 38). For the majority of respondents (60%), the main difficulty is the need to start from scratch in another country. This uncertainty about the future is only exacerbated by the general fear of the unknown, which is felt by more than 57% of respondents. In addition, language barriers and cultural differences are a significant factor for 54%, making adaptation difficult. So, even if a person has a desire to emigrate, uncertainty and potential difficulties often become a serious obstacle.

Financial and organizational difficulties also play an important role among the constraints. Around 60% of female respondents indicated the lack of their own housing abroad as a factor that makes relocation less attractive, as finding and renting a new place to live can be a complicated and expensive process. Almost half of the respondents (51%) indicated that lack of financial resources is a critical factor preventing them from leaving the country. Another 45% of respondents are concerned that finding a job in another country will be difficult, which creates a risk of losing their livelihood after moving.

Figure 38. Constraints for leaving abroad



Family-related obligations form a separate category of constraints. Almost 52% of respondents do not want to leave their homes or property unattended, which is especially true for rural residents or property owners. About 35% said they were responsible for caring for relatives or friends, which makes it impossible for them to leave. For 32%, employment at their place of residence serves as a barrier, as it currently provides stability and compels them stay in the country.

Another important factor is legal and social aspects. Almost 49% of respondents said that restrictions on travel for men of military age were a significant obstacle for them.

There is also a certain fear of stigmatization in society: 33% fear negative attitudes in host countries, and 23% admit to feeling shame or guilt towards friends who are participating in combat. At the same time, only 12% are concerned about being judged by other Ukrainians.. Although these are relatively low figures, they point to social tensions around the issue of migration. This suggests that most potential migrants are more

focused on the practical aspects of moving than on the social perception of their choice by those who stay behind. The least significant barriers to leaving were problems with documents and possible conviction by Ukrainians who remained in the country. Only 13% of female respondents believe that difficulties with paperwork are a serious obstacle for them. This is a very interesting result, as administrative difficulties are often mentioned as a serious obstacle in the actual practice of migration, .


Among the factors listed as "other" (where female respondents could describe their limitations and concerns on their own), the most important was the reluctance to leave for patriotic reasons. "I like my Ukraine! This is the best country for me! ... The fact that they don't shoot there? Well, we'll throw this shit out and come back as we lived! And even better!" - wrote one of the respondents.

Thus, the main barriers to travelling abroad identified by women can be divided into three broad categories: psychological, material and social. While uncertainty about the future and fear of change are internal psychological barriers, the expected difficulties in finding housing and work abroad are more material problems. However, both have a direct impact on migration sentiment. At the same time, social factors such as guilt or social stigma play the least important role in the decision to leave.

Additionally, we analyzed the barriers mentioned by women who want to move abroad (Figure 39). The general trend remains the same: almost the same reasons are the most and least important. The main difference is that those who plan to move abroad are more likely to mention almost all barriers. The fear of the unknown is on the first place. 69% of women who intend to go abroad said so. This figure is 13 p.p. higher than in the sample as a whole. Lack of financial resources for moving is another obstacle that is much more often mentioned by those who intend to leave (67% vs. 51% in the sample as a whole). Finally, the inability of a husband or son to leave is a deterrent to migration for 61% of women who would like to leave (compared to 49% in the entire sample). These three factors are much more important for women with migration intentions than for the entire sample.

The only factor that is less important for them is the unwillingness to leave their home or property (44% vs. 52% in the entire sample). All other barriers differ by 3-8 p.p.

Figure 39. Barriers to going abroad for those who intend to leave (N = 288)



In addition, we assumed that young women from urban areas are more likely to stay in Ukraine of their own free will, while older women and those from rural areas face more financial and logistical obstacles. To test this, we analyzed the answers to the question "I want to leave, but I am unable to" by age group and settlement type (Figure 40 and Figure 41). As we can see, our hypothesis is not confirmed. Among young people (18-29 years old), 23% say they would like to leave but are unable to, while among the oldest (50-60 years old) this share is 14%. This means that, on the contrary, young women who want to leave are more likely to have perceived restrictions.

There is no significant difference in terms of the type of settlement: everywhere about 20% want to go abroad but are unable to do so.

Figure 40. Answers to the question "I want to leave, but I don't have the opportunity" by age groups






Figure 41. Answers to the question "I want to leave, but I don't have the opportunity" by type of settlement




We have also analyzed whether financial and logistical constraints to leaving are more prevalent among older women. As shown in Figure 42, women aged 50-60 are more likely than 18-29-year-olds to say that they cannot leave due to lack of housing and difficulty finding a job in a new country, as well as being constrained by work and housing in Ukraine. At the same time, lack of financial resources is a bigger problem for young people.

Figure 42. Share of respondents with financial and logistical constraints to leave, by age group



Rural and urban women have similar barriers to moving abroad (Figure 43). Lack of financial resources for relocation and work in Ukraine has almost the same impact on women from different settlements. The lack of housing in a new place is more of a concern for women from region centers while the unwillingness to leave their current home unattended is more typical for women from villages and small towns (by 6-10 p.p.).


Figure 43. Share of respondents with financial and logistical constraints to leave, by settlement



6.4. AGENCY IN DECISION-MAKING


One of our research questions was about women's decision-making agency, i.e. whether they make decisions to stay in Ukraine (their home community) or move abroad. Figure 44 shows that half of women make decisions on their own, another quarter make decisions together with their partner and children, and almost one in five make decisions together with their partner.

Figure 44. Who makes the decision to stay in your settlement or move to another (in Ukraine or abroad)?



Interestingly, there is no significant difference in who makes the decision to stay or go among women who find it important and unimportant to stay in Ukraine and their settlement. However, women who want to go abroad are more likely to consult their partners than those wish to stay (Figure 45).

Figure 45. Who makes the decision to stay or go and intentions to go abroad



6.5. CONCLUSIONS

A variety of demographic, geographic, economic, and social factors are associated with considerations of migration from Ukraine. Young people, single and women with previous experience of relocating abroad are more likely to consider migration, while private entrepreneurs or those with strong local ties tend to be less inclined to migrate. The presence of relatives abroad, financial situation, and housing conditions also play an important role in this issue for women currently living in Ukraine.

At the same time, the data do not confirm many common beliefs. In particular, women with children do not consider moving abroad more often than women without children. This also applies to women who are currently unemployed or not looking for work. Contrary to general belief, IDPs do not report greater migration intentions, even those who rent accommodation. Neither do women whose homes have been destroyed or remain occupied.

In general, the results show that the desire to leave does not grow steadily with increasing confidence, but is primarily observed among those who express the highest level of confidence in opportunities abroad.

Also, poorer women are more likely to face economic constraints and fears that make it difficult to move, while women with higher financial status have more opportunities for mobility but may face other barriers. Since some of the barriers do not depend on financial status, this may indicate that women's mobility depends on other factors. Comparing the factors that stimulate leaving abroad and the factors that restrain it, several interesting observations can be made. They show how the desire to leave correlates with the ability to implement this decision, as well as the contradictions in the motivations of female respondents.

1. The desire to leave often encounters psychological restrictions

The most common reasons that drive people toward emigration relate to economic prospects and safety. However, despite these strong motivations, many are unable to take the step due to fear of starting over, language barriers, and fear of the unknown. In other words, even when circumstances push individuals toward emigration, psychological barriers often become a major obstacle.

2. Material aspects play a twofold role

One of the key reasons for leaving is to find a better job and a higher standard of living. However, about half of respondents say they do not have sufficient financial resources to move. That is, people are aware that they have better financial prospects abroad, but at the same time, the lack of start-up capital makes the move difficult.

Another interesting discrepancy is that although job opportunities abroad are one of the key incentives to leave, almost half of the respondents fear that finding a job will be difficult. This suggests that, despite expectations, many people are not confident in their own employment chances after moving.

3. Family responsibilities

In general, women whose children live with them in Ukraine do not exhibit a higher tendency toward migration intentions, regardless of the number of children. The fact that children have already gone abroad is also not a decisive factor for mothers' decisions to emigrate for family reunification. At the same time, among those respondents who are considering emigration, 63% want to leave primarily to secure a better future for their children. This is one of the strongest motivations for migration. At the same time, only 35% of respondents noted that caregiving responsibilities for relatives or acquaintances are holding them back. This demonstrates the complex and often conflicting considerations of what is the best solution for children and families as a whole.

4. Social factors and cultural barriers

Language barriers and cultural differences are a serious deterrent. This suggests that people rarely consider a foreign culture as a reason to emigrate, but at the same time are aware of the difficulties of adaptation when they think about leaving. Migration decisions are largely made at the individual level, without much influence from social opinion.

To summarize, the biggest contradictions are between the desire to improve the quality of life and the real or perceived barriers to doing so. People want to emigrate for economic and security reasons but often face fear of change, lack of money, and anticipated difficulties with adaptation. Caring for children is a powerful motivator for leaving, but family responsibilities and the need to care for loved ones are significant obstacles. Cultural and social aspects, although seen as challenges, are rarely the main reason for not migrating. These findings suggest that emigration decisions are at the intersection of rational considerations (economics, security, future prospects) and emotional constraints (fear, uncertainty, cultural barriers).

Thus, for many respondents, migration is more than just a choice; it is a complex decision that requires balancing risks, resources and psychological readiness for change.

7. POTENTIAL TRIGGERS FOR LEAVING ABROAD

This section of the study analyses the relationship between the main factors determining people's willingness to leave their place of residence in times of war using the discrete choice experiment (DCE) method. The respondents evaluated two hypothetical scenarios describing potential changes in six areas: security, income, access to basic utilities, social connections, housing conditions, and the domestic political situation, along with international assistance. Each of these factors had three levels, reflecting a progressive deterioration of conditions from a current state to a gradual or sharp deterioration.

First, the participants had to choose in which of the two simulated situations they would be more likely to decide to leave. The results of this experiment are presented in Section 7.1. After that, the respondents were asked to answer the question: "If the situation you have chosen were to happen in reality, what would you

do?". The choice offered included three alternatives: 1) staying in my settlement, 2) moving to another settlement in Ukraine, and 3) moving abroad. These results are presented in Section 7.2.

7.1. WHAT WILL MAKE PEOPLE LEAVE? FROM SAFETY TO INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

The data obtained allow us to assess which factors have the greatest impact on the likelihood of making a decision to leave a settlement. The most powerful trigger was the overall security situation. The loss of new territories, the fall of large cities, and intensified shelling increase the likelihood of leaving by 19 p.p., while the catastrophic situation at the frontline and the threat of occupation raise this likelihood by 24 p.p. (up to 45%). No other factor has such a strong impact, which underscores the dominant role of security in the decision to leave. It is also important to note that 55% of respondents refuse to leave their settlement, even in the face of a catastrophic frontline situation and the threat of occupation.

While safety is a key factor, material aspects also play an important role. Housing is the second most important factor of displacement. The destruction of a home increases the likelihood of displacement by 13-15 p.p.. It is also important to note that there is no statistical difference between respondents who are offered free housing in a new location and those who would have to find housing on their own. This indicates that owning housing remains a significant factor that keeps women in their current place of residence.

The financial situation of respondents also has a significant impact, as a halving of income increases the likelihood of leaving by 9 p.p. And a complete loss of income source increases the likelihood of leaving by 13 p.p. - an effect similar to the loss of own housing. This suggests that economic hardship alone is a significant, but not decisive, motive for migration among women if they have housing.

Problems with basic utilities, such as prolonged power and heating outages, have a moderate impact. If power outages last up to 12 hours a day, the probability of leaving increases by 4 p.p., and if they last more than 20 hours a day, this figure increases by another 8 p.p. This means that problems with civil infrastructure can increase migration sentiment, but they are not the main trigger for the decision to move.

The decline in international support and the political situation also has a minor impact. In particular, the reduction of international aid has little or no effect on the decision to leave one's city or village. Even in the case of a cessation of external assistance and a political crisis, the likelihood of deciding to leave one's place of residence increases by only 8 p.p. This suggests that the general state of the country, including political changes or international support, has very little impact on individual migration decisions.

Social ties have the least impact among the six factors studied. The departure of most acquaintances from one's hometown increases the probability of migration by only 4 p.p., and if acquaintances move abroad, this effect increases to 5 p.p. . However, these effects are statistically insignificant (i.e., not distinguishable from zero). This indicates that this factor plays virtually no role.

To understand the relative impact of each factor, their marginal effects can be compared with each other, taking the risk of occupation as a reference (1.00). In this case, the loss of housing gets a weight of 0.57, the loss of half of the income - 0.50, difficult living conditions - 0.35, the departure of most of the people you know abroad - 0.21, and a sharp decrease in international aid - only 0.09. This means that security is twice as important as financial difficulties, and the loss of housing affects the decision to leave one and a half times more than the lack of electricity.¹⁸

7.2 IF LEAVONG – THEN WHERE? DECISIONS ABOUT MIGRATION DESTINATION

The results of the experiment also show that security, income, and housing, which influenced the propensity to leave one's town or village, also influence the choice of whether a person would rather leave to another settlement in Ukraine or to another country. However, the deterioration of different factors affects this choice in different ways.

The most significant factor contributing to emigration is security (Table 15). If the security situation becomes catastrophic and there is a threat of occupation of the country, the likelihood of moving abroad increases by 12 p.p.. Although social ties do not have much influence on the decision to leave one's settlement, if a woman does decide to move because her friends have moved abroad, she is 9 p.p. more likely to emigrate herself. The political situation and international assistance also have an important impact on the decision to leave for other countries. In particular, the political crisis and the cessation of international assistance increase the likelihood of leaving abroad by 7 p.p..

On the other hand, material factors have the greatest impact on internal migration. The loss of housing is the most powerful factor of internal migration - it increases the probability of moving within the country by 9 p.p.. If a person loses all his or her income, the probability of moving within Ukraine increases by 8 p.p..

Some factors were found to be statistically insignificant ($p > 0.10$), meaning that they do not have a significant impact on decisions about the direction of movement. In particular, the deterioration of utility services does not have a significant impact on internal migration, and only the near-complete absence of heat and electricity forces women to move abroad. Also, housing conditions do not affect the likelihood of emigration. In addition, a significant reduction in international aid, provided that the political situation does not change, does not have a significant impact on migration.

¹⁸The full results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 15 (Appendix 1).

Table 15. Marginal effects on decisions about destinations

Factor	Impact on relocation within Ukraine (compared to refusal to leave)	Impact on emigration (compared to refusal to leave)
Security	Partial deterioration (+6.72 p.p., p = 0.058), Significant deterioration (+4.89 p.p., p = 0.135)	Partial deterioration (+6.21 p.p., p = 0.071), Significant deterioration (+12.16 p.p., p < 0.01)
Income	Partial deterioration (+1.23 p.p., p = 0.659), Significant deterioration (+7.70 p.p., p = 0.018)	Partial deterioration (+3.40 p.p., p = 0.236), Significant deterioration (-0.15 p.p., p = 0.962)
Utilities	Partial deterioration (+1.41 p.p., p = 0.604), Significant deterioration (-1.09 p.p., p = 0.688)	Partial deterioration (+1.60 p.p., p = 0.547), Significant deterioration (+5.21 p.p., p = 0.050)
Social ties	Partial deterioration (+1.78 p.p., p = 0.489), Significant deterioration (-0.94 p.p., p = 0.730)	Partial deterioration (+4.77 p.p., p = 0.050), Significant deterioration (+9.27 p.p., p < 0.01)
Housing	Partial deterioration (+9.05 p.p., p < 0.01), Significant deterioration (+9.15 p.p., p < 0.01)	Partial deterioration (+2.79 p.p., p = 0.404), Significant deterioration (+0.36 p.p., p = 0.899)
International aid, political situation	Partial deterioration (-3.89 p.p., p = 0.263), Significant deterioration (-5.59 p.p., p = 0.077)	Partial deterioration (+2.55 p.p., p = 0.442), Significant deterioration (+7.43 p.p., p = 0.015)

For all factors, partial and significant deterioration is compared to the baseline scenario.

7.2. CONCLUSIONS

The findings confirm that Ukrainian women's migration decisions are based primarily on physical security issues. In the context of escalating hostilities or the growing threat of occupation, most people see leaving as a necessity, regardless of their financial well-being or the availability of basic services. Material aspects, such as loss of housing or a significant decrease in income, also play an important role, although their effect is much less.

Problems with utility services and political factors have proven to be secondary. This allows us to conclude that people who are currently staying in Ukraine are making their migration decisions based primarily on concrete survival conditions, rather than abstract political issues or social ties.

When it comes to the decision to emigrate or relocate within Ukraine, the most important triggers for emigration are security, the departure of most of the people they know from Ukraine, the political crisis and the complete cessation of international assistance. In contrast, the loss of housing and income mainly influence internal migration. This suggests that policymakers seeking to reduce emigration should primarily focus on ensuring security and maintaining social stability, while improving housing conditions and economic opportunities helps reduce internal migration.

Thus, the results of this study can help predict future migration trends. In any crisis situation, safety and housing conditions are likely to be the primary triggers for leaving, while economic factors and social ties will have a somewhat moderate impact. This also implies that any policy aimed at reducing forced migration should primarily focus on providing security and affordable housing, rather than relying solely on financial assistance to the population.

8. RISK PERCEPTION AND VISION OF THE FUTURE


8.1. ASSESSMENT OF RISKY SITUATIONS IN UKRAINE AND ABROAD

In this section, we explore how women living in Ukraine and abroad assess various risks and envision their future – as well as the state of the war – three years from now. We also analyze how risk assessments and visions of the future influence their desire to stay in Ukraine or move abroad.

We first examine how respondents assess the various risks associated with living in Ukraine. We asked symmetrical questions to both women currently residing in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees abroad, in order to determine whether there is a difference in how the situation is perceived. As shown in Figure 46, Ukrainian women living abroad assess all risks related to life in Ukraine significantly higher than those who remain in the country. For example, both groups rate the likelihood of experiencing difficult living conditions due to constant power and heating cuts as the highest. However, 42% of women in Ukraine consider this likely,

compared to 82% among those living abroad. For all other events, women abroad also perceive the likelihood to be one and a half to two times higher than women in Ukraine.

Figure 46. Share of women who believe that the following situations may happen to them in Ukraine¹⁹



Thus, Ukrainian women living abroad assess all the risks associated with living in Ukraine much higher than those who are inside the country. This may reflect a form of self-selection, where relatively more optimistic or resilient women have stayed or returned to Ukraine, while those who remain abroad tend to perceive such hardships more acutely. In addition, people outside the conflict zone often receive information through social media, where news is presented more dramatically, which can increase the sense of insecurity. This can lead to an overestimation of risks due to a lack of direct experience. In any case, higher risk assessments affect, among other things, intentions to return to Ukraine

Interestingly, there are no significant **regional differences** in risk assessment (Figure 47). Contrary to expectations, in the frontline regions, which are most affected by the war, respondents generally do not mention the likelihood of the proposed scenarios more often than in other regions. Even the risk of death or injury, which is more likely closer to the contact line due to more frequent shelling, is mentioned by 30% of women from the frontline regions and 25-28% in other regions.


The destruction of housing due to shelling is considered likely by 36% of women in the frontline regions. In the North and South, the figures are very similar - 31%. The figure is slightly lower in the West - 24%.

¹⁹ For women in Ukraine, the question was formulated as follows: ‘How likely do you think it is that the following situations could happen to you’. For women abroad - ‘If you were to return to Ukraine right now, how likely is it that the following situations would occur?’

The inability to provide quality education for children, medical care, and difficult living conditions due to electricity and heating cuts are most likely to be experienced by residents of the South (34%, 32%, and 47%, respectively).

We believe that the similar risk assessment across different regions is a result of exposure to the dangers and difficulties over the course of three years of the war.


Figure 47. Risk perception by region (responses from women residing in Ukraine only)



At the same time, respondents with different **income levels** assess risks differently. The poorest category has the highest estimates of the likelihood of all the proposed situations (Figure 48). Even such situations as death/injury or destruction of housing, which do not directly depend on income, are assessed as more likely by the poorest category. In other words, respondents who cannot cover even basic needs feel most vulnerable

Interestingly, even among those who are currently in the richest category, every fourth woman believes that there might be a situation when she does not have enough income. Also, in this category, every third respondent believes that she may face difficult living conditions due to electricity/heating cuts.


Figure 48. Risk perception by financial status (responses from women residing in Ukraine only)



8.2. ASSESSMENT OF RISKY SITUATIONS ABROAD

Next, we analyzed how respondents in Ukraine and refugees abroad assess **the risks associated with living abroad**. Figure 49 shows that the situation is the opposite to that observed for risk perception in Ukraine: this time, women living in Ukraine perceive the likelihood of various negative events abroad higher than those who already live abroad. The greatest concern for both groups relates to access to medical care: 22% of refugee women and 37% of those in Ukraine see this as a likely risk. The least likely event is the inability to provide a child with a quality education (12% and 24%, respectively).


Figure 49. Share of women who believe that the following situations may happen to them abroad²⁰



8.3. VISION OF THE FUTURE

In addition to assessing current risks, we also explore how women currently living in Ukraine imagine the future, both personal and related to the war in Ukraine. We began by examining the extent to which respondents engage in long-term planning. To do this, we asked: "When you say 'the near future', what is the maximum period you usually mean?" As Figure 50 shows, women in Ukraine and abroad think very similarly about the "near future". More than two-thirds have the next year or the next few years in mind.

Figure 50. When you say "the near future", what is the maximum period you usually have in mind?




We also asked how women in Ukraine and abroad envision their lives three years from now. Among those currently living in Ukraine, 75% believe they will be living in the same place where they lived before the

²⁰For women in Ukraine, the question was formulated as follows: 'If you were to go abroad because of the war in Ukraine, how likely do you think the following situations would happen to you?' For women abroad - 'How likely do you think it is that the following situations could happen to you while you are living abroad?'

full-scale invasion (Figure 51). Only 6% plan to move to another country. Among women currently living abroad, 37% think they will be living in Ukraine in three years' time, while half expect to remain in their current country of residence.

Figure 51. Expectations about place of residence in three years




Women's expectations about the job they will have in three years differ between those in Ukraine and abroad (Figure 52). The majority of women (59%) currently residing in Ukraine believe that in three years they will be working in the same profession they had before the war. Among refugee women, this figure is 47%. At the same time, the share of refugee women who believe they will have unskilled jobs is higher - 16% compared to 12% of those living in Ukraine.

The perception of their living standards in the next three years is very different. 80% of refugee women expect their standard of living to improve compared to today, and only 7% think it will deteriorate. While in Ukraine, 46% of women expect their lives to improve and 20% expect them to deteriorate.

Women in Ukraine have a more optimistic view on the military situation. The majority of respondents (45%) believe that in three years the war will be completely over. While among Ukrainian women abroad, the most common expectation is that the war will remain frozen (45%). A worsening of the frontline situation compared to today is expected by 10% of women in Ukraine and 12% of those abroad.

Figure 52. Expectations about work, living standards and the situation about the war in three years



8.4. RISK ASSESSMENT AND VISION OF THE FUTURE: IMPACT ON THE INTENTION TO STAY IN UKRAINE OR MOVE ABROAD

We assume that the perception of risks in Ukraine and abroad, as well as the vision of the situation in the next three years, affects the desire to stay in Ukraine or move to another country. We estimate this effect using three linear regressions in which the dependent variables are the desire to stay in Ukraine and their city and to move abroad. All dependent variables take values from 1 to 7. We explain these desires through the perception of risks in Ukraine and abroad, as well as the perception of what life will be like in three years. To control for external factors, we included demographic variables such as age, macro-region, financial status, and number of children. The main results of the regression analysis are presented below²¹.

So, the **desire to stay in Ukraine increases** if²²:

- a respondent believes there is a risk of death or injury
- a respondent believes that she will not be able to receive medical care if she goes abroad
- a respondent expects that she will not be able to get used to local customs and rules when moving
- a respondent expects the war in Ukraine to end completely in three years.

²¹ The full results of the regressions are presented in Table 18.

²² We cannot directly compare the coefficients due to the difference in scale: the variables assessing risks are measured on a scale from 1 to 7, while the variables relating to the future are binary.

The desire to stay in Ukraine decreases if:

- a respondent believes that she will not be able to financially support herself and her family members
- a respondent expects that in three years she will neither work nor study
- a respondent expects that in three years her standard of living will not change or worsen compared to the current situation.

At the same time, factors that increase the desire to go abroad:

- expectation that there is a risk of death or injury as a result of hostilities
- expectations that there will be no opportunity to financially support herself or to ensure a quality education for her children in Ukraine
- the belief that in three years the respondent will be working in a different, non-skilled profession or will be studying expectations that in three years the war will continue and the situation will worsen or the conflict will be "frozen".

Statistically significant factors that reduce the desire to go abroad:

- expectations that a respondent will not be able to adapt to local customs and rules in a new country
- the belief that in three years the war will be completely over.

Thus, positive expectations about the future increase the desire to stay in Ukraine. Conversely, a pessimistic view of the future makes people think about moving. It is worth noting that this type of analysis does not allow us to establish a causal relationship, i.e. we cannot say that it is the negative image of the future that shapes migration attitudes. The relationship may be the opposite: a person wants to move to another country and rationalizes her decision by thinking that the situation in Ukraine will be very unfavorable.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

This study identifies the key needs of women who remain in Ukraine during the war. These needs are not always articulated directly but are systematically evident in the respondents' answers - through their motivations, barriers to leaving, reactions to changes, and plans for the future.

One of the primary needs is **the need for stability and predictability**. Women stay in Ukraine because they have their own homes, jobs, familiar surroundings, and relationships that have been formed over the years. For many, owning their own home is not just about having a roof over their heads, it is a symbol of stability, attachment to a place, and security. The same applied to employment: even if the job is not perfect, it provides a sense of control over your life. In contrast, relocation, especially abroad, is associated with the loss of everything familiar.

Closely related to this is **the need for confidence in the future**. The report shows that more than half of women are afraid of "starting from scratch", and almost as many are afraid of the unknown. These fears are

powerful psychological barriers to emigration. At the same time, many of the responses reflect a request not just for security, but also for a clear understanding of whether there will be a future in this country, whether it is possible to plan, invest time and efforts here. In the absence of such confidence, the inclination to leave tends to grow.

Another important need is **the need for belonging and connections**. For many women, the decision to stay is not about economics, but about relationships. This includes caring for loved ones (children, parents, husbands), as well as a broader sense of "my people are here", "I am known and needed here". Ties to the local community, familiar faces in shops, on the streets, in the hospital form the foundation of social rooting. Where these ties are weak or broken, women are more likely to consider relocating.

Another key dimension is **the need for self-realization**. Some women leave because they see no opportunities to fulfill themselves in Ukraine – whether professionally, in starting their own business, or in the role of an active citizen. In contrast, those who have the opportunity to develop professionally in Ukraine are significantly less likely to consider emigration. Self-realization is not only about the economic prospect, but also about dignity, self-belief, and the value of being needed.

At the same time, many of the responses reflect a strong **need to protect ones' family**. This is a two-sided need: some stay because they want their children to grow up at home, within their family, in the Ukrainian environment. Others, by contrast, are driven to leave specifically for their children: to ensure a safer and more predictable life, better education or healthcare. But in both cases, children, parents, and partners remain at the heart of decision-making.

And finally, no less important is the **need for moral meaning**. For some respondents, the decision to stay is a matter of dignity, loyalty, and identity. Their responses include phrases like: "I cannot leave", "this is my home", "I am needed here", "staying is also a form of resilience". Nine out of ten women stated that they are staying in Ukraine because it is their country.

In summary, women stay in Ukraine not only because they *cannot* leave but often because they *see meaning, value, and a life perspective in staying*. Public programs that address these needs - stability, confidence, belonging, self-realization, care for family, and moral sense - are much more likely to be effective than those that focus solely on cash assistance or restrictions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Support for those who consciously chose to stay in Ukraine**
2. Focusing on those who have remained in Ukraine is critically important for maintaining a country's internal resilience, especially in times of war. Such support does not always require significant financial resources - in many cases, political recognition, support for access to basic services, and the cultivation of a sense of belonging to a shared cause are sufficient. First and foremost, it is essential to **recognize this choice** and to foster a **sense of participation in a collective project** "The war

against Russia is our common cause for the sake of our existence as a nation". Public campaigns like “Those Who Stayed” can give a voice to those women who consciously chose not to leave because "this is my country". Their stories, resilience and motivation should become part of the public narrative. A separate direction for action is **educational and informational support**. Simple and accessible resources should be developed to help people "stay here" - information on how to find housing, work, and support. Maps or online platforms that collect initiatives from NGOs and volunteer networks that help people stay in Ukraine can play an important role. Such resources reduce anxiety and restore a sense of control over one's life. **Strengthening ties with the place of residence**

Finally, it is important to foster **social rootedness**. Encouraging participation in local initiatives is not just a form of activism, but a way to strengthen the connection to the place where one lives, to the people around, and to the local community. Programs that support micro-initiatives of mutual aid, many of which have already proven effective, can be particularly impactful. These include everything from clothing exchanges to informal support groups for mothers or women caring for elderly parents. Such initiatives create a space of mutual support and a sense that staying is not only about survival, but also about collective resilience.

3. Housing policy and expanding local employment and income opportunities

Having one's own home is one of the strongest factors that keep people in place. The importance of housing is evident in the respondents' answers to all the topics surveyed - both as their motivation to stay, as a barrier to leaving, and in their reactions to potential deterioration of the situation. Notably, half of the women reported that they do not leave because they do not want to leave their homes unattended. After security, housing is the second most influential factor increasing the likelihood of leaving one's settlement. It is also important to note that in the case of house destruction, women tend to relocate within Ukraine. This highlights the need to support the stability and sense of 'rootedness' associated with housing. In this context, it is essential to continue rental assistance programs for IDPs, subsidies for the repair of damaged property or support for local reconstruction. Such initiatives not only improve living conditions, but also strengthen the physical connection to a place - and thus increase the likelihood that women will choose to stay. Employment is another key factor keeping women in Ukraine. On the contrary, job loss or lack of economic prospects is a powerful trigger for leaving. Therefore, the state and communities should actively cooperate with companies that create decent jobs despite the war. It is important to encourage women's entrepreneurship and employment. Mini-grants or microloans for starting a small business, online retraining courses for women in villages and small towns in collaboration with businesses and educational institutions, and government orders for women's social enterprises, particularly in the care, education, or household services. Such programs, including those under the State Employment Service and other public-private partnerships, can help build the economic foundations for the decision to stay.

4. Support for IDPs and internal relocation

If a woman is forced to leave her place of residence, it is preferable that this relocation occurs within Ukraine. To enable this, **support for the most vulnerable internally displaced persons** is essential. A thorough understanding of the effectiveness of existing IDP support programs, their limitations, and their scalability is needed. While housing should remain a top priority, given its central role for women, IDP support programs should offer a comprehensive approach with a focus on security, access to housing and social integration. This allows people to adapt to a new place within the country rather than completely uproot their lives through emigration.

This includes both financial assistance and simplified access to existing services, such as certificates, subsidies, training or retraining. Such actions send a clear message that the choice to stay does not turn life into a series of bureaucratic obstacles.

5. Policy to encourage internal mobility

Many women stay mainly in Ukraine because they are caregivers for elderly parents or children with disabilities. At the same time, caregiving responsibilities often limit their mobility, even within the country. This creates a need to support local caregiving infrastructure. For example, "mobile support" programs could be developed for women caring for loved ones in case of relocation - in particular, for internally displaced persons. Such programs would allow them to avoid being tied to one place due to lack of alternatives.

6. Targeted support policy for returnees

Data show that women who have returned from abroad are, on average, more financially secure than other groups. At the same time, returnees are more likely to consider leaving again as they often lack a sense of rootedness. Therefore, reintegration policies for returnees are essential. Given the limited resources, such policies should be targeted - prioritizing those with the greatest needs and vulnerabilities, especially in relation to housing. The narrative 'We have nowhere to go back to' is often rooted in strong emotional attachment to one's place of origin, which is very high among returnees. However, promoting the narrative 'New roots in another region, but in your own country, at home' may strengthen the intention to return. The relocation package should include assistance with housing and employment, access to basic infrastructure, and psychological support for the most vulnerable. It is also important to ensure simplified registrations, access to schools, kindergartens, and healthcare services. This will create not only a sense of acceptance but also an incentive to stay.

7. Supporting a sense of stability and confidence despite difficult times

One of the main reasons why women stay in Ukraine is not only the availability of resources but also psychological barriers. They act as a kind of "invisible barriers" that keep people from stepping into the unknown. However, if the state fails to deliver clear and positive communication about life in Ukraine, and the personal networks are increasingly filled with stories of friends and acquaintances who have successfully adapted abroad, the balance is shifting. In this case, the fear of the unknown abroad is gradually diminishing. At the same time, the feeling that nothing holds in Ukraine, there are no prospects or support ("the state has

abandoned us") is growing. As a result, the intention to leave, which was previously only a potential possibility, can quickly turn into a real decision.

Fear of the unknown abroad is one of the main deterrents to emigration. That is why it is important to maintain this barrier, not through intimidation, but by shaping the image of Ukraine as a place where there is a future. This requires positive communication: sharing stories of those who stayed, returned, were forced to move to another region and continue to grow; public coverage of local successes; demonstration of opportunities to live and build "here". such efforts help maintain a balance between the risks of the unknown abroad and confidence in the opportunities to stay. It is also important to clearly communicate about the state's plans for recovery and security, and to develop psychological support programs for those who are uncertain about their choice. All these measures - from recognition to housing assistance and rootedness - form a policy that not only discourages leaving, but also makes it feel like staying in Ukraine is a realistic and dignified choice.

The study shows that women's decisions to stay in Ukraine during the war are driven not only by circumstances, but by deeply held values, social ties, and psychological motivations. Having their own home, work, and connections with loved ones and local communities foster a sense of belonging that deters emigration. At the same time, the need for stability, confidence in the future, and opportunities for self-realization are central to decision-making. Effective policies must take these factors into account, strengthening support for those who choose to stay or return and creating conditions under which this choice becomes meaningful and sustainable.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Table 16. The impact of socio-demographic factors on the desire to stay in Ukraine, in own settlement and to move abroad. Linear regression results

	Desire to stay in Ukraine	Desire to stay in own settlement	Desire to go abroad
Age			
18-29	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
30-39	0.248** (0.107)	0.367*** (0.117)	-0.393*** (0.126)
40-49	0.473*** (0.103)	0.804*** (0.113)	-0.466*** (0.121)
50-60	0.773*** (0.106)	1.209*** (0.116)	-0.831*** (0.124)
Live with partner	-0.012 (0.069)	0.125* (0.075)	-0.021 (0.081)
Household size	0.056*** (0.022)	0.051** (0.024)	-0.041 (0.026)
Have children under 18	0.021 (0.081)	0.230** (0.090)	0.117 (0.096)

Own housing	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Rented housing	-0.131	-0.193*	-0.023
	(0.097)	(0.107)	(0.114)
Provided with free housing	-0.095	-0.071	0.316**
	(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.126)
Main language is Russian	-0.570***	-0.489***	0.387***
	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.105)
Financial situation			
Very poor	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Poor	0.336***	0.262**	-0.496***
	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.123)
Average income	0.550***	0.425***	-0.781***
	(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.136)
High income	0.641***	0.323**	-0.757***
	(0.132)	(0.145)	(0.156)

Income decreased	-0.047	-0.172	0.229*
	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.121)
Income did not change	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Income increased	-0.079	-0.413**	0.231
	(0.162)	(0.179)	(0.191)
Employed	0.109	-0.022	0.050
	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.087)
Type of settlement			
Village	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Small town (up to 50 thousand inhabitants)	-0.150	-0.086	0.159
	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.121)
Town (more than 50 thousand inhabitants)	-0.014	0.162	0.161
	(0.093)	(0.103)	(0.110)
Regional center	0.084	0.356***	0.072
	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.104)

Region			
North	0.072	-0.067	-0.179
	(0.157)	(0.172)	(0.184)
South	0.073	0.033	-0.266*
	(0.131)	(0.144)	(0.155)
Centre	0.000	-0.182*	-0.050
	(0.095)	(0.105)	(0.112)
Frontline	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)
West	-0.202*	-0.344***	0.252**
	(0.104)	(0.115)	(0.123)
Settlement is under occupation	-0.011	-0.171	0.025
	(0.145)	(0.160)	(0.171)
No relatives abroad	0.121*	0.130*	-0.534***
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.079)
IDPs	0.084	-0.283**	0.094
	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.136)
Returnees	-0.203**	-0.257**	0.787***

	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.121)
Former IDPs	0.023	-0.041	0.168
	(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.126)
Constant	4.884***	4.611***	3.161***
	(0.200)	(0.220)	(0.235)
Adj. R-Square	0.074	0.124	0.112
N obs.	2018	2018	2018

Standard errors are in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dependent variable:

- (1) How important is it for you to stay in Ukraine (answers on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (critically important))
- (2) How important is it for you to stay in your settlement (answers on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (critically important))
- (3) Are you currently considering moving abroad for a long time? (answers on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very actively considering))

OLS regression was used for estimation.

Table 17. Dependence of the probability of leaving on the level of confidence in prospects abroad. Full results of linear regression

	I would like to move abroad because I can ensure a better standard of living there than in Ukraine	I would like to move abroad because I can find a better job there than in Ukraine	I would like to move abroad because there are better opportunities for professional development
Strongly disagree	0.0228	-0.270*	-0.0971
	(0.169)	(0.146)	(0.119)

2	-0.140	-0.0387	0.00830
	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.137)
3	-0.106	-0.150	-0.0249
	(0.138)	(0.120)	(0.103)
5	-0.141	-0.131	0.0191
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.089)
6	0.206**	0.133	0.0394
	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.104)
Completely agree	0.398***	0.337***	0.376***
	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Constant	0.355***	0.417***	0.420***
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.060)
Adj. R-Square	0.184	0.151	0.090
N obs.	288	288	288

Standard errors are in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Dependent variable - 'I am actively considering going abroad for a long time' (levels 6 and 7 out of 7). N=288. Comparison with the category 'Can't answer / don't know'. The coefficient shows the increase in the probability of leaving depending on the level of confidence in p.p.

Table 18. Potential triggers for moving abroad.

Factor	Level	Marginal effect	Standard error	t-statistic	p_value	Confidence interval	
Security							
	1	0.39	0.03	13.27	0	0.33	0.44
	2	0.50	0.03	18.91	0	0.44	0.55
Income							

	1	0.18	0.02	8.2	0	0.13	0.22
	2	0.27	0.03	10.2	0	0.22	0.32
Utilities conditions							
	1	0.12	0.02	5.27	0	0.07	0.16
	2	0.17	0.02	7.82	0	0.13	0.21
Social ties							
	1	0.09	0.02	4.36	0	0.05	0.14
	2	0.12	0.02	5.81	0	0.08	0.16
Housing							
	1	0.32	* 0.03	11.57	0	0.27	0.38
	2	0.29	* 0.02	12.23	0	0.24	0.33
International support, politics							
	1	0.02	0.03	0.55	0.58	-0.04	0.07
	2	0.14	0.02	6.08	0	0.10	0.19

The dependent variable is '1. In which situation would you be more likely to leave your settlement?' For the sake of simplicity, the estimates are based on OLS regression and are identical to those based on logistic regression. Additionally, the effect of card and respondent is controlled for.

* There is no statistical difference between the two coefficients.

Table 18. The impact of risk assessment and vision of the future on the desire to stay in Ukraine and go abroad. Linear regression results²³

	Desire to stay in Ukraine	Desire to stay in own settlement	Desire to go abroad
Risk assessment in Ukraine			
Death or injury of me or my family members as a result of hostilities/shooting	0.039*	0.010	0.045*
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Destruction of my home or car as a result of hostilities/shooting.	-0.005	-0.008	-0.029
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Inability to provide financially for myself and my family members.	-0.052**	-0.020	0.084***
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Inability to provide quality education for my child(ren).	-0.022	-0.019	0.091***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Inability to receive necessary medical care for me or my family members.	-0.019	0.031	0.017
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)

²³ The full regression includes demographic controls: age, macro-region, financial status, number of children

Difficult living conditions due to constant power or heating cuts.	-0.006	0.017	0.037
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)

Risk assessment abroad

I will not be able to provide financially for myself and my family members who moved abroad.	0.016	0.024	0.002
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)

I will not be able to provide quality education for my child(ren).	-0.032	-0.022	0.042*
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)

I will not be able to receive the necessary medical care	0.041*	-0.014	-0.008
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)

I will not be able to learn the local language at a proper level	-0.031	-0.016	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)

I will not be able to get used to local customs and rules	0.059***	0.036*	-0.086***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)

What will happen in 3 years

I will live in another place in Ukraine	-0.050	-0.809***	0.390***
	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.092)
I will move to another country	-1.891***	-1.922***	2.910***
	(0.140)	(0.157)	(0.156)
I will work in another professional field that requires qualifications	-0.036	-0.211**	0.155
	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.105)
I will work in another professional field that does not require qualifications	-0.116	-0.170	0.365***
	(0.099)	(0.111)	(0.110)
I will study.	-0.125	-0.175	0.637***
	(0.142)	(0.159)	(0.158)
I will neither work nor study.	-0.349***	-0.146	-0.047
	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.115)
My level of living will not change compared to today.	-0.201***	-0.015	-0.122
	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.080)
My level of living will deteriorate compared to today.	-0.279***	-0.126	-0.083
	(0.090)	(0.101)	(0.100)

The war in Ukraine will continue, the situation at the front will worsen.	-0.191	-0.251	0.323**
	(0.142)	(0.160)	(0.159)
The war in Ukraine will continue, but it will be in a 'frozen state'.	0.011	0.050	0.278**
	(0.115)	(0.129)	(0.128)
The war in Ukraine will completely end.	0.215*	0.206	-0.282**
	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.130)
Constant	5.535***	5.208***	1.102***
	(0.245)	(0.276)	(0.273)
Adj. R-Square	0.184	0.192	0.299
N obs.	2018	2018	2018

Standard errors are given in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dependent variable:

How important is it for you to stay in Ukraine (answers on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (critically important))

How important is it for you to stay in your locality (answers on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (critically important))

Are you currently considering the possibility of moving abroad for a long time? (answers on a scale from 1 (not important at all) to 7 (considering very actively))

OLS regression was used for the estimation.

APPENDIX 2. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

The survey was conducted by Rating Online LLC throughout Ukraine, except for temporarily occupied territories, as well as territories where there is no Ukrainian mobile communication at the time of the survey.

The survey lasted from January 23, 2025 to January 30, 2025.

The target audience of the survey: women aged 18-60 who lived in Ukraine at the time of the survey.

The sample is representative by age and region of residence for the target audience of the survey.

GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The survey was conducted using the CATI-CAWI methodology, which involves two stages. In the first stage, respondents are randomly recruited via CATI (with the Random Digit Dialing (RDD) procedure) and complete a short screening questionnaire, including consent to continue participating in the survey online. As soon as respondents complete this part and agree to complete the online questionnaire, they automatically receive a text message in the Viber messenger (or, in its absence, in SMS) with a link to the questionnaire. By clicking on this link, respondents begin the second stage of the survey (CAWI), during which they independently fill out an online questionnaire on the *Rating Online* platform.

THE FIRST STAGE – CATI RECRUITING

The generation of telephone numbers for the survey was random. A total of 514 224 calls were made to the 436 483 generated numbers. The numbers were generated in accordance with the proportion of mobile operators, using the 12 codes of the three largest mobile operators in Ukraine: KYIVSTAR, VODAFONE Ukraine and LIFECCELL.

The recruitment questionnaire included screening questions (age, gender, region of residence, questions about relocation and moving abroad during the war).

THE SECOND STAGE – CAWI SURVEY

At the second stage, immediately after the completion of the telephone interview with the respondent who agreed to take the survey online, a personal invitation to the online survey on the *Rating Online* platform was automatically sent.

The invitation link was sent via Viber, if the message was not sent to the Viber number (undelivered, technical error) - the invitation was automatically sent via SMS.

The online questionnaire was available in two languages at the respondent's choice. Before starting the questionnaire, respondents were informed about the purpose of the study, the anonymity of the survey, the possible sensitivity of the questions, the possibility of not answering the questions or stopping the survey at any time.

The average duration of the online questionnaire was 0:24:53.

The size of the main sample in Ukraine (target group of women 18-60 years old, living in Ukraine) was 2,018 respondents who completed the survey. The response rate is presented in Table 19.

Table 19. Percentage of respondents reach

Completed the survey	2018
Partially completed the survey	1029
% of respondents: fully completed the survey out of those who opened the questionnaire	66,2%
% of respondents: fully completed the survey out of those who agreed to the survey in the	35,3%

CATI screening

Total % of CATI-CAWI reach **5,6%**

The survey results were weighted by macroregion of residence and age group.

In addition to the main survey stage, an additional booster sampling of **319 respondents** was carried out to reach at least 450 respondents in each of the groups:

- the IDP group (left their settlement for another place after February 24, 2022 due to the war and did not return)
- the group of returnees ("ex-refugees" who left abroad after February 24, 2022 due to the war and returned to Ukraine)

Thus, the total sample, including the targeted groups, consists of **2,337 respondents**.

In total, the sample of 2,337 managed to reach the following target groups necessary for analysis (indicated without weighting): IDPs in total - 470, ex-refugees in total - 460, frontline region of residence - 711.

APPENDIX 3. QUESTIONNAIRE

	<i>Welcome to the national survey platform Rating Online! We ask you to answer all questions honestly. We respect confidentiality, all information will be analyzed only anonymously, and the data will be used exclusively for research purposes. Some questions may be sensitive, but you can stop the survey at any time, or you can return to it later. By clicking the "Next" button, you confirm that you have read this information and agree to participate in the survey.</i>			
№	question	who we ask to	type of question	answer options
1	In which language would you like to take the survey?	all sample	select one option	Ukrainian Russian
2	How old are you?	all sample	open, number	if < 18 and > 60 end of survey
3	Please indicate your gender	all sample	select one option	woman man (end of survey) s to answer (end of survey)
4	Where do you currently live?	all sample	select one option	in Ukraine abroad (end of survey)
5	In which region do you currently live?	all sample	select one option	list of regions + Kyiv
6	In which part of the region do you currently live?	all sample	select one option	list of districts according to the selected region
7	What type of settlement do you currently live in?	except those who live in Kyiv	select one option	1. village 2. small town (up to 50 thousand) 3. city (more than 50 thousand) 4. regional center
8	Did you leave your settlement after February 24, 2022 due to the war?	all sample	select one option	Yes, I left, but I returned home Yes, I left and I didn't return Did not leave
9	Where exactly did you leave? Select both if applicable:	if the answer is 1 or 2 in question 8	select one option	To another settlement in Ukraine Abroad Hard to answer
10	What was the duration of the longest relocation?	if the answer is 1 or 2 in	select one option	1. up to a month 2. 1 - 6 months 3. 7-12 months

		question 8		4. more than a year
11	In which region did you live until February 24, 2022?	if the answer is 1 or 2 in question 8	select one option	list of regions + Kyiv
12	What type of settlement did you live in until February 24, 2022?	if the answer is 1 or 2 in question 8	select one option	1. village 2. small town (up to 50 thousand) 3. city (more than 50 thousand) 4. regional center
13	Is this settlement currently located in occupied territory?	if the answer is 1 or 2 in question 8. If Kherson, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv regions, Crimea, Sevastopol are selected in question 11	select one option	1. Yes 2. Don't know / located in a war zone 3. No
14	Are you considering returning to your place while it is under occupation?	if the answer to the previous question is 1	select one option	1. Definitely no 2. Probably no 3. Probably yes 4. Definitely yes 5. Hard to say
15	Did any of your relatives leave the country during the full-scale invasion and STILL live there?	All sample	multiple options if answers 1-5	1. parents (mine or partner's) 2. my children under 18 3. my children over 18 4. other close relatives

				(brothers, sisters) 5. distant relatives 6. none of the relatives have gone abroad
16	Where do these relatives currently live (select all that apply):	those who chose 1-5 on the previous question	multiple options	1. Poland 2. Germany 3. Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Moldova 4. Great Britain 5. Other European countries 6. Turkey 7. Canada, USA 8. Russia / Belarus 9. Other countries
17	Do you have children under 18 living with you in Ukraine?	all sample	select one option	1. One child 2. Two children 3. Three or more children 4. none
18	How many people, including you and your children, live with you permanently?	all sample	enter number	
19	Tell us about your children under 18 living with you in Ukraine	Those who have children.	Ask as many times as children indicated	Child 1. Boy/girl, enter number of years Child 2....
20	Which of the following statements best describes your future plans regarding having children?	18-49	select one option	1. I don't have children, and I don't plan to have children at all 2. I already have children, and I don't plan to have any more children 3. I plan to have a child within the next 3 years, regardless of the end of the war 4. I plan to have a child in 3 or more years, regardless of the end of the war

				<p>5. I plan to have a child only after the end of the war</p> <p>6. I plan to have a child, but I don't know when yet</p> <p>7. It's difficult to answer, refusal to answer</p>
21	How important is it for you to stay in Ukraine (scale: 1 – not at all important, 4 – can't answer/don't know, 7 – critically important)	all sample	scale 1 - 7	
22	How important is it for you to stay in your settlement (scale: 1 – not at all important, 4 – can't answer/don't know, 7 – critically important)	all sample	scale 1 - 7	
23	Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (scale: 1 – strongly disagree, 4 – can't answer/don't know/not applicable, 7 – fully agree):	all sample, filter on children	<p>Scale 1 - 7 for each statement</p> <p>Rotation of statements</p>	<p>1. I stay in Ukraine because I think it is quite / relatively safe here</p> <p>2. I stay in Ukraine because I have the opportunity to provide a better standard of living here than abroad</p> <p>3. I stay in Ukraine because I have a good job here</p> <p>4. I stay in Ukraine because I have better opportunities for professional development here than abroad</p> <p>5. I stay because I want to get an education / finish my studies in Ukraine.</p> <p>6. I stay because I have a home/house in Ukraine</p> <p>7. I stay to be with my family</p>

				<p>8. I stay to take care of relatives or acquaintances</p> <p>9. I stay because it is important for me to be close to my friends</p> <p>10. I stay because my children are better off here than abroad</p> <p>11. I stay because this is my country</p> <p>12. I stay because I have better access to medical services here than abroad</p> <p>13. I stay because I have better access to other services (banking, administrative, taxes, internet, etc.) here than abroad</p> <p>14. I stay for other reasons (specify)</p> <p>15. I want to leave, but I don't have the opportunity</p> <p>16. I simply don't want to go anywhere</p>
	Now we want to ask a little more about the individual factors that motivate you to stay in Ukraine.		rotation of questions 24-28	
24	How does HOUSING influence your intentions to stay/leave Ukraine? Choose the most important reason. If it is difficult, you can choose several reasons	all sample	Multiple options (rotation of options except the last one)	<p>1. It is better to be under fire, but in my own home, in a comfortable environment.</p> <p>2. I stay because I do not want to lose my property (house, apartment, farm, etc.).</p> <p>3. My current living conditions in Ukraine are difficult, and I would like to move abroad to improve them.</p> <p>4. My current living conditions</p>

				<p>are difficult, I am considering returning to my place of residence by February 24, 2022.</p> <p>5. My living conditions in Ukraine are difficult, but I do not want to move anywhere</p> <p>6. None of the above statements are the main reason for me to stay.</p>
25	<p>How does the opportunity to be with your FAMILY affect your intentions to stay/leave Ukraine? Choose the most important reason. If it is difficult, you can choose several reasons</p>	all sample	Multiple options (rotation of options except the last one)	<p>1. The opportunity to be together is one of the most important reasons for me (us) to stay in Ukraine.</p> <p>2. I am staying primarily to be closer to my relatives who are taking or have taken part in hostilities.</p> <p>3. I stay to take care of my family members who cannot/do not want to leave</p> <p>4. None of the above statements are the main reason for me to stay</p>
26	<p>How does your COMMUNITY (colleagues, friends, acquaintances, etc.) AND COMMUNICATION with them affect your intentions to stay in Ukraine? Choose the most important reason. If it is difficult, you can choose several reasons</p>	all sample	Multiple options (rotation of options except the last one)	<p>1. Very important, my community is my main support and one of the most important reasons to stay</p> <p>2. I can't leave while all "my" people are here. I feel that only by staying in Ukraine can I help/support them.</p> <p>3. I am afraid of losing my friends here if I leave.</p> <p>4. None of the above statements are the main reason for me to stay</p>

27	<p>How does caring for CHILDREN motivate you to stay in Ukraine? Choose the most important reason. If it is difficult, you can choose several reasons</p>	for those with children	Several options (rotation of options, except the last one)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. It is important for me that my child (children) grow up in their native language and cultural environment 2. In Ukraine, it is easier for me to find a good school (kindergarten), clubs, sports clubs for my child (children). 3. I believe that in Ukraine my child (children) will receive a better education 4. I believe that in Ukraine my child (children) receive better access to and quality of medical services 5. It is important for my children to be with their friends. 6. None of the above statements are the main reason for me to stay.
28	<p>Why is it important for you to SUPPORT YOUR COUNTRY at this moment with your presence in Ukraine? Choose the most important reason. If it is difficult, you can choose several reasons</p>	all sample	Multiple options (rotation of options except the last one)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If we leave Ukraine, what kind of example are we setting for our children, what kind of patriots of this country are we, if we leave it in such trouble 2. I consider it my moral DUTY to stay and support my country at this time 3. This is my country, I love it, I feel that my roots are here. This is one of the main reasons for me to stay 4. I stay to work and pay taxes here, and thus contribute to Ukraine's victory in the war. 5. I do not have strong feelings

				<p>for the country itself. But here is the moment of truth and I want to be here.</p> <p>6. None of the above statements are the main reason for me to stay</p>
29	<p>How likely do you think the following situations are that could happen to you (scale: 1 - definitely NOT going to happen, 4 - can't answer/don't know, 7 - definitely going to happen):</p>	all sample	<p>Scale 1 - 7 for each statement</p> <p>Rotation of statements</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Death or injury to me or my family members as a result of hostilities/shelling. 2. Destruction of my home or car as a result of hostilities/shelling. 3. Inability to financially support myself and my family members. 4. Inability to provide a quality education for my child(ren). 5. Inability to receive necessary medical care for me or my family members. 6. Difficult living conditions due to constant power or heating outages.
30	<p>Are you currently considering the possibility of moving abroad for a long time? (scale: 1 - not considering at all, 4 - can't answer/don't know, 7 - considering very actively)</p>	all sample	scale 1-7	
31	<p>Assess how much you agree with the following statements</p>	those who answered 5-	scale 1-7 (rotation of	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I would like to go abroad because I feel in danger (due to

<p>(scale: 1 - completely DISAGREE, 4 - cannot answer/don't know/not applicable, 7 - completely agree):</p>	<p>7 to the previous question</p>	<p>options, except the last one)</p>	<p>shelling) in Ukraine</p> <p>2. I would like to go abroad because I am tired of the constant power cuts, water cuts, etc.</p> <p>3. I would like to go abroad because I can provide a better standard of living there than in Ukraine</p> <p>4. I would like to go abroad because I can find a better job there than in Ukraine</p> <p>5. I would like to go abroad because there are better opportunities for professional development</p> <p>6. I would like to go abroad to get an education there / so that my child(ren) can get an education there.</p> <p>7. I would like to go abroad because my children will be better off there than in Ukraine</p> <p>8. I would like to go abroad because I have a difficult housing situation in Ukraine</p> <p>9. I would like to go abroad to be with my family</p> <p>10. I would like to go abroad to get better access to medical services than in Ukraine</p> <p>11. I would like to go abroad because I will have better social protection there (e.g. state benefits, housing assistance, etc.)</p> <p>12. I would like to go abroad</p>
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				for other reasons (specify)
32	To what extent do the following factors limit your ability to travel abroad? (scale: 1-not at all limiting, 4- can't say/don't know/does not apply, 7- very limiting)	All sample	Scale 1 - 7 for each statement Rotation of statements	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lack of financial resources to move 2. Need to care for relatives or acquaintances 3. Work in the current place of residence 4. I do not want to leave my home/property unattended 5. Lack of housing in the new place 6. It is difficult to move to another place due to health problems 7. It is difficult to find a job in another place 8. The unknown scares me 9. It is difficult to decide to start everything from scratch in a new place 10. Negative attitude of the population of the host country 11. Condemnation from Ukrainians who remain in Ukraine 12. Feelings of shame or guilt before acquaintances/friends who are taking or have taken part in hostilities 13. Problems with documents 14. Language barrier, foreign culture 15. Inability for husband/son to leave 16. Other

33	Who makes the decision to stay in your place of residence or move to another (in Ukraine or abroad)?	All sample	Select one option for each statement Rotation of statements	1. Me personally 2. My husband/partner 3. My children 4. My or my husband/partner's parents 5. Me jointly with my husband/partner 6. Me jointly with my husband/partner and child/children
34	What do you think is most likely to happen to you in three years?	all sample	Select one option for each statement Rotation of statements	1. I will live in the same settlement where I lived before the full-scale invasion/ I will live in Ukraine in another settlement/I will move to another country
35				2. I will work in the same profession that I had before the war/ I will work in another profession that requires qualifications/ I will work in another profession that does not require qualifications/ I will study/I will neither work nor study
36				3. My level of living will improve compared to today/ My level of living will not change compared to today/ My level of living will worsen compared to today
37				4. The war in Ukraine will continue, the situation on the frontline will be approximately the same as now/ The war in Ukraine will continue, the

				situation on the frontline will worsen/ The war in Ukraine will continue, but will be in a “frozen state” (approximately as in 2015-2021)/ The war in Ukraine will completely end
38	When you say "the near future", what maximum period do you usually have in mind?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Next few years 2. Next year 3. Next half a year 4. Next month 5. Next week 6. Next day
39	If you were to go abroad because of the war in Ukraine, how likely do you think the following situations would be to happen to you (scale: 1 – definitely NOT going to happen, 4 – can't answer/don't know, 7 – definitely going to happen):	all sample	Scale 1 - 7 for each statement Rotation of statements	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I will not be able to financially support myself and my family members who have gone abroad 2. I will not be able to provide a quality education for my child(ren) 3. I will not be able to receive the necessary medical care 4. I will not be able to learn the local language at a sufficient level 5. I will not be able to get used to local customs and rules
40	Which of the following events have you experienced since February 24, 2022?	all sample	multiple answer options, rotation of statements, except for the last	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Loss of a loved one (family member, friend) as a result of Russian military aggression 2. Destruction or damage to one's own property as a result of hostilities 3. Shooting/bombing/missile attacks on the settlement where I was at that moment 4. Service of a loved one in the Defense Forces of Ukraine

				(Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard, TRO, etc.) 5. Life in the occupied territory 6. Emotional violence (threat of physical violence, humiliation, intimidation) 7. Physical violence with or without weapons. 8. Prolonged separation from family members 9. None of the above
<i>Next, you will see a description of several hypothetical situations (there will be three pairs of situations in total). Please read them carefully and answer the questions related to the situations described. Remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Answer as you would act.</i>				
1. In which of the two situations given below would you be more likely to leave your settlement? 2. If the situation you have chosen actually happened, what would you do? Would you stay in your locality/Would you move to another locality in Ukraine/Would you move abroad?				
4 1- 43	<i>Attributes</i>	0 no change	(-1) slightly worse	(-2) worsened a lot
	<i>security</i>	The general security situation in the country is as it is now	The situation on the frontline has deteriorated sharply. (Russia is advancing, capturing large cities, shelling of cities is intensifying)	The general security situation is catastrophic. There is a threat of occupation of the country.
	<i>incomes</i>	Your income has not changed	Your income has dropped by 50%	Your family has lost its source of income
	<i>water/light/heat</i>	Power outages continue as they are	No power supply for up to 12 hours a day	No heat and power supply for more than 20 hours a day

		now		
	<i>other people left</i>	Most of your friends stay in your settlement	Most of your friends left your settlement	Most of your friends left Ukraine
	<i>housing</i>	Your current housing has not been damaged	Your current housing is damaged and is not habitable. You are offered free housing in your new location	Your current housing is damaged and is not habitable. You will have to rent your own housing in your new location
	<i>political/corruption scandals</i>	The political situation and the level of international aid have not changed	The political situation has not changed. The level of international aid has decreased sharply.	The country is in a political crisis. Street protests have begun. International aid has almost stopped.
<i>Finally, a few questions about your situation.</i>				
44	Which of the following categories best describes your MAIN employment status now?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Employed, working in the private sector 2. Employed, working in the public sector 3. Entrepreneur, owner of own business 4. Student, working 5. Student, NOT working 6. In military service 7. Pensioner (by age, disability), working 8. Pensioner (by age,

				<p>disability), NOT working</p> <p>9. Not working</p> <p>10. Maternity leave</p> <p>11. Caring for a person with a disability</p> <p>12. Other (specify)</p>
45	Which of the following categories best describes your profession/qualification?	Options 1, 2, 4 or 7 to the previous question	select one option	<p>1. Lawmakers, senior civil servants, top managers</p> <p>2. University scientists, researchers, engineers, doctors, agronomists</p> <p>3. IT specialists: programmers, developers, cybersecurity specialists.</p> <p>4. Administrative workers: office managers, secretaries, accountants.</p> <p>5. Teachers.</p> <p>6. Medical staff: nurses, paramedics, pharmacists, physician assistants.</p> <p>7. Creative professions: designers, artists, writers, journalists.</p> <p>8. Skilled service workers: chefs, photographers, fitness trainers, seamstresses.</p> <p>9. Skilled workers: construction workers, electricians, plumbers, drivers, skilled agricultural workers</p> <p>10. Unskilled workers: agricultural workers and</p>

				workers without formal education, salespeople, waiters, cleaners 11. Other (specify)
46	Which of the following statements best describes your current financial situation?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nnot enough money even for food 2. Enough for daily expenses, but buying clothes is difficult 3. Can afford most things, but need to save or borrow for expensive purchases 4. Enough for almost everything, but buying an apartment or house is unaffordable 5. We hardly deny ourselves anything 6. I do not want to answer
47	In your opinion, how has your family's financial situation changed since February 24, 2024?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Significantly worsened 2. Somewhat worsened 3. No change 4. Somewhat improved 5. Significantly improved 6. Difficult to answer

48	How would you describe your marital status as of today?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Married, living together 2. Married, living separately 3. Single, living with a partner 4. Single, but in a relationship, living separately 5. Single, not in a relationship 6. Divorced 7. Widowed 6. Don't want to answer
49	What was your marital status before February 24, 2022?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Married, living together 2. Married, living separately 3. Single, living with a partner 4. Single, but in a relationship, living separately 5. Single, not in a relationship 6. Divorced 7. Widowed 6. Don't want to answer
50	How would you describe your current housing situation?	all sample	select one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I live in my own housing 2. I rent housing 3. I live in housing provided by my employer 4. I live free of charge in housing provided by relatives/friends/etc. 5. I live in a dormitory 6. I live in temporary housing provided by the community 7. Other (specify)
51	How would you describe your housing situation before February 24, 2022?	Those who choose option 2 to question №8	choose one option	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lived in my own housing 2. Rented housing 3. Lived in housing provided by their employer 4. Lived free of charge in housing provided by relatives/friends/etc.

				5. Lived in a dormitory 6. Other (specify)
52	What do you know about the status of the housing you lived in until February 24, 2022?	Those who choose options 1-4 to question №4	select one option	1. My housing was not damaged 2. My housing is destroyed/uninhabitable 3. My housing was damaged/destroyed and has already been restored 4. Don't know 5. Other (specify)
53	What is your main language of communication in everyday life?	all sample	select one option	1. Ukrainian 2. Russian 3. Other
54	Are there people in your close circle who need your regular assistance in everyday life? (for example, due to disability, poor health or old age)	all sample	select multiple options	1. My parents or my husband / partner 2. Other relatives who need my help 3. Acquaintances who need my help 4. There are no such people 5. Difficult to answer
55	If you had to leave Ukraine, who could you entrust with the care of these individuals?	Those who choose options 1, 2, 3 to question №54	multiple options if the choice is 1-5	1. Other family members 2. Neighbors, acquaintances 3. Social workers 4. Volunteers, international organizations 5. I will hire a caregiver/assistant 6. I try not to think about it 7. I don't want to answer 8. I can't give it to anyone, I'll stay 9. I can't give it to anyone, I'll take it with me
56	Do YOU personally need regular assistance in your daily life? (e.g. due to	all sample	select one option	1. Yes, on a constant basis 2. Yes, from time to time 3. No

	disability, poor health, etc.)			
57	Who provides you with this help?	Those who choose options 1, 2	multiple options	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Children 2. Husband / partner 3. Parents 4. Other family members 5. Neighbors, acquaintances 6. Social services 7. Volunteers, international organizations 8. Hired caregiver / assistant 9. No one provides 10. Do not want to reply 11. Other
	<i>Thank you for your answers! If you have any comments or feedback regarding this survey, you can share them here</i>		open question, optional	

APPENDIX 4. LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Survey questions on a mobile phone screen.....	13
Figure 2. Breakdown of respondents by region of residence.....	15
Figure 3. Breakdown of respondents by type of settlement.....	15
Figure 4. Breakdown of respondents by age.....	15
Figure 5. Breakdown of respondents by having children under 18 living with them.....	15
Figure 6. Marital status by February 2022 and now.....	16
Figure 7. Age breakdown of returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.....	17
Figure 8. Age distribution of refugees and returnees.....	18
Figure 9. Number of children of returnees, refugees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement....	18
Figure 10. Financial situation of the respondents.....	21
Figure 11. Financial situation of returnees, refugees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement....	22
Figure 12. Financial situation by region.....	23
Figure 13. Changes in financial situation since February 2022.....	23
Figure 14. Changes in the financial situation of returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.....	24
Figure 15. Changes in financial situation by region.....	24
Figure 16. Housing situation of returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.....	25
Figure 17. Breakdown by type of settlement before and after displacement (number of respondents = 790), %.....	29
Figure 18. Relatives abroad among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement (multiple options were available).....	30
Figure 19: Which of the following events have you experienced since 24 February 2022? (Multiple options possible).....	31
Figure 20. Events of the war experienced by returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlements (respondents could choose multiple options).....	32
Figure 21. War-related events experienced by refugees (respondents could choose multiple options).....	33
Figure 22. How important is it for you to stay in Ukraine and your settlement?.....	35
Figure 23: Intentions to stay in Ukraine by age group.....	36
Figure 24. Intentions to stay in their settlement by age group.....	36
Figure 25. Desire to stay in Ukraine and settlement among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.....	38
Figure 26: Importance of staying in Ukraine and financial situation.....	39
Figure 27: Reasons for staying in Ukraine. “I am staying in Ukraine...”.....	41
Figure 28: Answers to the question “I stay in Ukraine because I think it is safe enough / relatively safe here” by the regions.....	42
Figure 29: Breakdown of motivations to stay in Ukraine.....	46

Figure 30. Are you currently considering leaving abroad for a long period of time?.....	49
Figure 31. Intentions to leave abroad by age group.....	50
Figure 32. Intentions to leave abroad by region.....	50
Figure 33. Intentions to go abroad among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement....	51
Figure 34. Intention to leave abroad and financial situation.....	52
Figure 35. Influence of demographic factors on the desire to stay or leave. Results of linear regression.....	53
Figure 36. Influence of other factors on the desire to stay or leave. Linear regression results.....	54
Figure 37. Reasons for moving abroad (N = 288). "I would like to go abroad...".....	56
Figure 38. Restrictions on going abroad.....	60
Figure 39. Barriers to going abroad for those who intend to leave (N = 288).....	62
Figure 40. Answers to the question "I want to leave, but I don't have the opportunity" by age groups.....	63
Figure 41. Answers to the question "I want to leave, but I don't have the opportunity" by settlement.....	63
Figure 42. Share of respondents with financial and logistical constraints to leave by age group.....	64
Figure 43. Share of respondents with financial and logistical constraints to leave by settlement.....	64
Figure 44. Who makes decision to stay in your settlement or move to another (in Ukraine or abroad)?.....	65
Figure 45. Who makes the decision to stay or go and intentions to go abroad?.....	66
Figure 46. Share of women who believe that the following situations can happen to them in Ukraine.....	72
Figure 47. Assessment of risk events by region (answers of women living in Ukraine only).....	73
Figure 48. Assessment of risk events by financial status (answers of women living in Ukraine only).....	74
Figure 49. Share of women who believe that the following situations can happen to them abroad.....	75
Figure 50. When you say "near future", what is the maximum period you usually have in mind?.....	76
Figure 51. Expectations about place of residence in three years.....	76
Figure 52. Expectations about work, living standards and the situation about the war in three years.....	77

APPENDIX 5. LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. The attributes and levels of hypothetical situations for discreet choice experiment.....	11
Table 2: Plans to have children (respondents aged 18-49, number of respondents = 1,538).....	19
Table 3. Employment status of the respondents.....	20
Table 4. Occupations/qualifications of employed respondents (number of respondents = 1,123).....	20
Table 6. Who provides assistance to respondents in need (multiple options available) (number of respondents = 369).....	26
Table 7. Are there any people near you who need your constant help in everyday life? (respondents could choose several answers).....	26
Table 8. In which region did you live before 24 February 2022?.....	27
Table 9. Countries to which relatives of respondents left during the war and where they currently live (several options were available).....	30
Table 10. Importance of staying in Ukraine and in the settlement.....	35

Table 11. Motivation to stay in Ukraine by age group.....	43
Table 12. Motivation to stay in Ukraine among returnees, IDPs and those who did not leave their settlement.....	44
Table 13. Reasons for staying in Ukraine for those who want and do not want to go abroad.....	54
Table 14. Factors for refugees to return to Ukraine.....	58
Table 15. Marginal effects on decisions about destinations.....	69
Table 16. The impact of socio-demographic factors on the desire to stay in Ukraine, in own settlement and to move abroad. Linear regression results.....	81
Table 17. Dependence of the probability of leaving on the level of confidence in prospects abroad. Complete results of linear regression.....	82
Table 17. Potential triggers for moving abroad.....	85
Table 18. The impact of risk assessment and vision of the future on the desire to stay in Ukraine and go abroad. Linear regression results.....	86
Table 19. Percentage of respondents reach.....	90